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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to explore the military and political implications of
the United States' foreign policy towards Guatemala in the years 1961 to 1969.
Guatemala was a key battleground of the Cold War in Latin America in the crucial
decade of the 1960s. While greater scholarly attention has focused on the 1954 U.S.
backed CIA planned cou~ in Guatemala, the events of the 1960s proved an equally
significant watershed in U.S.-Latin American relations.
Tue outbreak of a nationalist insurgency in Guatemala early in the decade
provided the Kennedy Administration with a vital testing ground for its new
counter-insurgency and civic action politico-military doctrine.

Tue fear of another

Cuba, combined with the growing political and social instability within Guatemala,
increasingly drove U.S. policy makers first in the Kennedy and later in the Johnson
Administration to adopt a largely military solution in Guatemala just as in South
Vietnam with similar tragic results.
Relying primarily on Presidential archival materials, government documents, and
Spanish publications as the basis ofits analysis, this study demonstrates how 1) the U.S.
transmutation of military doctrine and cultures warped civil-military relations within
Guatemala, 2) assured the emergence of the Guatemalan military as the dominant force
within society, and 3) inadvertently increased the very instability and conflict the U.S.
hoped to stem within the region.

This project demonstrates that by the late 1960s, due in significant part to U.S.
11

political and military inteivention, the manageable crisis of a small nascent guerrilla
movement erupted into an all-out Guatemalan civil war whose tragic consequences
reverberate to the present.
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CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION

On the night of November 12, 1960, two Guatemalan army officers -- Captain

Chur del Cid and Colonel Rafael Sessan Pereira -- imprisoned in the Matamoros
barracks for acts of rebellion against their government, escaped from their basement
cells through the collusion of dissident officers within the Guatemalan Army. While
attempting to make their way to a side gate of the barracks, they were spotted by an
army colonel and captain' who rushed to sound the alarm. Captain Chur del Cid and
Colonel Pereira immediately shot both brother officers down at point blank range. With
the aid of nearly a hundred fellow conspirators, they quickly seized automatic weapons
from the barracks armory, commandeered several jeeps and an armored car, and
crashed through the Fort Matamoros' main gate headed for the Atlantic Coast. 1
This entire incident may have gone down as just another example of what the
United States Department of State once referred to as "overheated Central American
bravado"2 except that the daring Colonel Pereira was a part of a much larger scheme
involving over a third of the officers in the Guatemalan Army. The colonel and his
co-conspirators were bent on rebellion and not just flight. Arriving in darkness at the
important Zacapa military base in northeastern Guatemala, Pereira and his compatriots
pretended to be reinforcements and captured the garrison without firing a shot. Most of
the soldiers at the base joined the revolt, others fled. Among the escapees was Colonel
Ramon Gonzales, the commander of the Zacapa base. Racing along the dirt roads in his
favorite English sports car, he reached the sleepy capital, Guatemala City, around dawn
and gave the alarm. Military and government officials were stunned and incredulous.

1

No one had suspected either a coup or revolt from among the military .

The tiny

Communist Party and Fidel Castro were the current bogeymen of Guatemalan politics .3
While shock and confusion reigned in the capital, Pereira's rebel convoy which
had swelled to near battalion size drove on toward the coast , increasing in numbers and
enthusiasm at each village along the way.

Several of the rebels camped outside the

Atlantic port of Puerto Barrios, dressed in campesino garb, posing as rice dealers. The
next morning they captured both the base and the port . They executed the colonel in
command and began to distribute mimeographed tracts to nearby peasants and
fishermen.

Some of the pamphlets called for an overthrow of President Y digoras

Fuentes because of his corruption and slavish devotion to the United States ; others
espoused Marxist and Castroite revolution. Hundreds of peasants presented themselves
to the rebels and asked for arms. The Guatemalan navy, consisting of only three vessels
-- two of them actually personal yachts of the president -- escaped the capture of its
main base and got away from shore in time to notify the capital through radio
transmission , confirming the se1iousness of the revolt. 4
A telegram arrived at the State Department from the U.S. embassy in Guatemala
City a little after noon on November 13th, 1960. "Some kind of uprising Guatemala
City aborted early this morning" , began U.S . Ambassador to
Muccio. 5

Guatemala , John J.

He then relayed considerably inaccurate and sketchy details of what had

occurred so far. His report proved overoptimistic.
By the afternoon of the next day Secretary of State , Christian Herter, apprised
President Dwight D. Eisenhower who was vacationing in Augusta , Georgia , of the
situation . It was becoming clear to numerous U.S. State Department and diplomatic
2

officials that events in Guatemala were splillllllg "out of control" and required
immediate U.S. action. Guatemalan President Miguel Y digoras Fuentes had been
engaged in a drinking bout at his country estate with a number of his colonel mends on
the day of the revolt. In his autobiography My War with Communism, he claimed it
was "a banquet."

He kept calling Ambassador Muccio with alarming reports that

Castro was involved in this rebellion, which had meanwhile spread to over a third of the
Guatemalan military. Reports of skirmishes between Nicaraguan troops and Cuban
"invaders" along the Costa Rican border further flamed U.S. fears.6

Complicating

matters was the presence of some two thousand Cuban exiles being trained by the CIA
for an invasion of Cuba at the La Helvetia plantation of conservative businessman
Roberto Alejos in the province of Retalhulen in the remote northwestern region of
Guatemala.
By the evelllllg of November 14th, before President Eisenhower even gave
orders for U.S. military intervention, the Guatemalan Air Force, as well as Cuban exiles
and American CIA pilots flying from secret air bases near the capital, began bombing
and strafing the rebels in Puerto Barrios and Zacapa, as a sort of trial run for their later
operations in the Bay of Pigs. U.S. transport planes, on Eisenhower's orders, airlifted
both Cuban mercenaries and loyal Guatemalan troops to siege lines outside the rebel
strongholds. U.S. bombers flying from air bases in the Panama Canal Zone joined the
attack. By November 16th, five United States naval vessels, including an aircraft canier
with eighty-five jet fighter-bombers and a 2,000 man strong Marine amphibious group,
arrived off Puerto Barrios, supposedly to "interdict a planned Cuban invasion of
Guatemala in support of Castroite rebels."7 The next day the revolt was finally crushed
3

without direct U.S. Marine inteivention.

Most rebel officers surrendered. Dozens

escaped, however , into the countryside where they soon formed the embryo of a
guerrilla movement which fights in the Guatemalan jungles to this day.8
Although nowhere near as famous as the 1954 U.S. backed CIA planned coup
in Guatemala, the revolt of November 13, 1960, and its immediate aftermath proved a
watershed event for both U.S.-Guatemalan relations and the entire history of Central
America. The revolt sparked the first serious insurgency in the Western Hemisphere
since Augusto Sandino's war with the United States Marines in Nicaragua in the 1930s.
It also elicited a determined reaction from three successive administrations in
Washington. Beginning in the 1960s the United States, primarily in response to the
perceived political and economic threat of the Cuban Revolution and this nascent
guerrilla movement in Guatemala, began to exert increasing political influence on
Guatemalan society, particularly in the areas of military aid, internal security, civic
action and counterinsurgency training. Guatemala became a laboratory for the Kennedy
Doctrine of nation building and defeating wars of national liberation in Latin America
just as Vietnam became the model in Asia. Combined with other internal factors in
Guatemalan society, United States military aid and doctrine increasingly polarized
politics, warped economic development, repressed democratization and despite the
lofty, even sincere, ideals of the Alliance for Progress, helped elevate the Guatemalan
military from its traditional role of arbiter among numerous political factions to sole
ruler of Guatemalan society.

Before the decade ended some 10,000 Guatemalan

civilians would lose their lives as a result of these developments.

4

This study will examine how political and social crisis first arose in Guatemala in
the late 1950s as a consequence of the 1954 U.S. sponsored coup and the Eisenhower
Administration's insistence in maintaining a strong anti-communist bastion in
Guatemala. Washington's support for political repression and the crushing of internal
dissent provided a key impetus for the later largely nationalist insurgency movement.
The 1959 Cuban Revolution heightened the Eisenhower Administration's concerns for
further revolutions in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Eisenhower's response

emphasized internal security and increased military and economic aid to keep
Guatemala and other supposedly threatened nations firmly within the capitalist Western
fold.
This paper will demonstrate how the Kennedy Administration devised a much
more sweeping two pronged strategy for opposing any communist intrusion into its
vital Latin American sphere of influence. The Kennedy approach encompassed both
Alliance for Progress economic aid and a new counter-insurgency and civic action
security program. Guatemala became a prime testing ground for this comprehensive
military, ideological, and geopolitical struggle against communism in the Western
Hemisphere. The United States brought enormous influence to bear particularly in its
championing of the Guatemalan military as the chief agent of stability and change.
Washington frequently intervened in the volatile internal politics and social upheaval of
Guatemala with often unintended yet almost always tragic results.
When hopes for socio-political reforms and liberal economic development
faltered by the mid-1960s, the Johnson Administration with its Mann Doct1ine
increasingly turned to a strictly military solution in Guatemala strikingly similar to its
5

policy in both Vietnam and the Dominican Republic.

The short term success of

defeating most of the Guatemalan insurgents exacerbated the political climate of terror
and fear, and crushed the last hopes for ameliorating the horrendous living conditions,
racism and social injustice of Guatemalan society. In attempting to prevent a serious
insurgency and social crisis in Guatemala , the United States helped set into place many
of the key elements which led directly to both.

6
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CHAPTER II
IMPACT OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION ON THE UNITED STATES MILITARY
AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO GUATEMALA

On the morning of January 1, 1959, Guatemalan President Miguel Ydigoras

Fuentes was enjoying the traditional New Year's breakfast of rum, orange juice and
tamales when his Foreign Minister Unda Murillo whispered in his ear: "Batista has
resigned. He has fled with
all his ranking military and political supporters. It appears
.,,
Castro will run the new government ." 1
Although neither Y digoras or his foreign minister seemed particularly alarmed at
that moment (nor were most officials in the U.S. embassy in Guatemala City), Castro's
revolution would have a profound effect on the politics and internal security of
Guatemala for the next two decades. As Castro moved towards socialism and agrarian
reform during his first year in power, he increasingly aroused the ire of the Eisenhower
Administration, Guatemala's principal benefactor in both economic and military aid.
The conflict between Castro and the Kennedy Administration almost led to nuclear
war.
The revolution in Cuba represented a serious blow to U.S. economic and
strategic interests in Latin America. It also threatened to upset the favorable balance of
power the United States had hitherto enjoyed in the Cold War.

The containment

policies of Truman, Kennan, Acheson and Dulles had been designed primarily for
Europe , then expanded to Asia and the Middle East. Communism would be deterred at

a safe distance in fairly exotic locales. Yet with a socialist revolt in the Caribbean, the
Cold War, for the first time, seriously intruded upon the Western Hemisphere,
8

-

Washington's own backyard and previous "safe zone." Castro's revolution violated two
cardinal rules of Washington's Latin American policy. First, by expropriating U.S.
property which Castro began in the summer of 1959, it challenged the doctrine of no
expropriation without full and immediate compensation that had been the cardinal rule
since the start of U.S. economic expansion in Latin America in the 1890s.2

Second, in

the spring of 1960 Castro crossed the line of acceptable behavior by embracing
communism and aligning ,Cuba with the Soviet Union in direct defiance of the U.S.
position , ratified by the OAS, that communism was "incompatible with the institutions
and way of life of the Western Hemisphere.113 As humiliating and shocking as the
Cuban Revolution was to the United States, a far greater threat emerged in the potential
spread of Cuban style revolution throughout Latin America. While the United States
could countenance the economic and strategic loss of a single island, it understandably
feared the exportation of the Cuban model to other countries. Locked in a global
struggle with the Soviet Union, successive administrations in Washington viewed the
"loss" of any additional Latin American territory as a victory for their mortal enemy.
The rise of fidelismo throughout Latin America made it clear that the United States
faced an urgent challenge in developing new strategies for dealing with a completely
unprecedented situation·-- a hemisphere that appeared to be on the verge of revolution.4
One of the first places that revolution would break out was Guatemala.
But before the Kennedy Administration developed a larger grand strategy
against Castro style Communism in Latin America, the Eisenhower Administration
reverted to a more characteristic response to destabilize and overthrow Castro's regime
through covert action.

This decision would eventually lead to an insurgency in
9

Guatemala. As early as November 1959, Eisenhower approved sabotage operations
against Cuban sugar refineries, port facilities, and electrical power stations. On March
16, 1960, CIA chief Allen Dulles went a step further in submitting a memorandum to
the President entitled "A Program of Covert Action Against the Castro Regime." Its
stated objective was "to bring about the replacement of the Castro regime with one
more devoted to the true interests of the Cuban people and more acceptable to the
U.S., in such a manner as ,to avoid any appearance of U.S . intervention."5 Allen Dulles
and Eisenhower were both old hands at this type of clandestine operation, having
carried off similar ones in 1953 in Iran against Premier Mossedegh and in 1954 in
Guatemala against President Jacobo Arbenz. Revisionist Richard H. Immerman's 1982
The CIA in Guatemala : The Foreign Policy of Intervention is probably the most
thorough investigation of theUnited States' role in the 1954 coup to date. Immerman
traces a direct link between the 1954 coup and the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion,
conducted in totally different circumstances, yet with the same easy assumption that the
CIA could rig a counter-revolution in its favor without directly revealing U.S.
involvement.

Immerman made extensive use of newly declassified government

materials under the Freedom of Information Act, oral histories, National Security
Council and State Department memoranda from the Eisenhower Library as well as
personal interviews. The one criticism of his work is that it deals almost exclusively
with the U.S . side of the coup and its aftermath, and ignored the impact of Guatemalan
domestic politics on the coup .
Ironically, the CIA chose Guatemala as the training site for its secret invasion of
Cuba, code named Operation Zapata , named oddly for the anti-American, pro-land
10

-

reform hero of the Mexican revolution. Guatemala was in fact the obvious choice as
the United States' most pliable ally in the region.

In the years 1954-1959 in what

amounted to a government salvage job after the economic and social dislocation of the
1954 coup , Washington disbursed some $110 million in economic aid to tiny
Guatemala.

lbis figure comprised about a third of all U.S . economic aid to Latin

America in the period .

Having conspired, along with Guatemalan rightists, to

overthrow the democratically elected reformist government of President Jacobo
>

Arbenz , the Eisenhower Administration felt duty bound to create a prosperous capitalist
showcase state in Guatemala .

It encouraged a tripling of U.S . investment in the

country , vastly expanded Guatemala's military and totally reorganized the state's internal
security apparatus. 6 Eisenhower's hard line stance in Guatemala reflected a ratcheting
up of Cold War tensions around the globe in places as diverse as Iran, Formosa, and
South Vietnam by his aggressive Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Dulles felt that
Marxist take-overs could be reversed and cited Guatemala as the first successful
example.
In the wake of the 1954 coup , the FBI , CIA and U.S . diplomatic personnel

descended on Guatemala to begin instituting a drastic overhaul of the police and
security network.

In conjunction with Castillo Armas' Liberacion government , they

helped establish the Guatemalan National Security Council (modeled after the United
States') , the new Department of Security (modeled after the FBI) and the Defense
Against Communism Department (modeled after the CIA).

CIA personnel and

Guatemalan security police drew up a "blacklist" of 70,000 "subversive suspects" from
the Arbenz period which would become a primary reference book for government
11

associated right wing paramilitary groups throughout the 1960s.7 CIA officer David
Philips in The Nightwatch revealed how he and other counter-intelligence officers
sorted through Guatemalan records in the mid-1950s:
I returned to Guatemala for a one month temporary duty
assignment...as part of a team to assist the new government
in sifting and evaluating the documents left behind when
Arbenz and his friends abruptly went into the foreign
embassies. The papers we found were an intelligence gold
mine, filled with nuggets
of
information...The
CI-nicks-counter-intelligence officers -- who worked with
me were ecstatic. These were pearls which could be fondled
for years.8
In 1956, the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) - AID's
predecessor instituted the first Office of Public Safety police training program in the
Western Hemisphere in Guatemala. FBI and U.S. military advisers strengthened and
reorganized the 3,000 man National Police, the secret Judicial Police and the Treasury
Guard, Guatemala's Secret Service.9

A 1957 Office of Public Safety Memorandum

clearly laid out the priorities of this reorganization:
It may be assumed...that the primary police function of
protecting life and liberty and preserving the peace is in
reality a secondary function of the police administration and
executive management. Operations top level planning,
intelligence gathering activities are singularly directed
towards alertness and preparedness against 'the threat of
the communists' instead of being directed against the army
of criminals.10
Ronald M. Schneider's 1958 orthodox work, Communism in Guatemala,
provides a good representation of U.S. fears of communist subversion in the region
during the 1950s. But like its 1955 predecessor, Daniel James' Red Design for the
Americas: Guatemala Prelude, its scholarship has been called into question for its
exaggerated appraisal of the communist threat and its almost exclusive reliance on
12

extreme right wing sources and interviews with Castillo Annas' Liberacionista Army
veterans. Post-revisionist historian Stephen G. Rabe has even suggested that the CIA
helped finance Schneider's study. 11

Even in this relatively early period, Washington began to view Guatemala as an
ideal training ground for the U.S.'s larger security goals in the hemisphere.

A 1958

Public Safety memorandum spoke of the director's "pleasure regarding the project for
· ')

third-country training in Guatemala for Ecuadorians in border control methods and
scientific surveillance techniques."

The same document went on to cite "joint

Guatemalan, Salvadoran and Honduran police training exercises near Guatemala
City .... "12
Still the government of President Castillo Armas, the U.S. designated leader of
the 1954 coup (who had been a furniture salesman in Honduras when the CIA picked
him) proved so inept, corrupt and repressive that no amount of American largesse
succeeded in halting Guatemala's economic and political slide.

When a deranged

rightist officer assassinated C;istillo Annas in July 1957, several officials in the United
States and Guatemalan governments including U.S. ambassador David Sparks,
expressed relief

13

In the election which quickly followed, massive voter fraud by the

ruling party, the National Democratic Movement (MDN) cast doubt on its candidate
Miguel Ortiz Pasarelli's victory.

When the apparent true winner,

Miguel Y digoras

Fuentes, retired general and former Public Works Minister under the ruthless dictator
Ubico, protested , Washington supported his call for new elections. An ailing Secretary

13

of State John Foster Dulles sought an end to political anarchy in Guatemala, which had
increasingly become an embarrassment to United States' prestige.

14

Y digoras won a plurality of 42% in the 1958 elections , running on a platform of
nationalism and political reconciliation .

His victory was ultimately decided in the

National Assembly with considerable arm twisting by the new U.S. ambassador John J.
Muccio , who conveyed the Eisenhower Administration's "strong desire for a stable and
unified government.

1115

Y digoras was therefore somewhat beholden to the United States despite the fact
that four years previously th~ CIA had rejected him as a potential leader of the coup on
the grounds that he was "too headstrong and unpredictable. "16 Guatemala owed the
United States $18.2 million in development loans borrowed between 1955 and 1959
and counted on a similar amount in direct U.S . economic grants for survival each year.
In April 1960 when the CIA requested the creation of a secret training base m
Guatemala for Cuban exiles bent on invading Cuba, Y digoras willingly complied . A
$50,000 personal bribe , combined with $500 ,000 increase in military aid no doubt
sweetened the deal. 17 Y digoras may have even genuinely relished his involvement in this
clandestine attack against Castro . In his autobiography Y digoras pictured himself as a
cold warrior in the most colorful terms :
I fought Castro-Communism from the outset and from the first
days of 1959. I was a victim of Fidel Castro's aggression . I
frustrated his invasion of Panama in March of 1959; I broke off
relations with his government in April of 1960; I withstood two
military uprisings inspired by his money and his agents ; I
cooperated with anti-Castro groups to train 2,000 Cubans and
launched them against the Soviet bastion in the Caribbean; I put
down an incipient civil war in March , April and May of 1962 ; I
swung a submachine gun around my shoulder in November of
1962 and put down a rebellion of the Guatemalan Air Force . 18
14

Even members of Y digoras' own government later admitted much of this was
bombast.

The plantation La Helvetia owned by the brother of the Guatemalan

ambassador to Washington, Carlos Alejos, provided an ideal training site for the Cuban
exiles. It was remote yet within B-26 bombing range of Cuba. For insurance, the CIA
constructed two new airstrips to support the Cuban invasion on the outskirts of
Guatemala City and set up a frogmen training center in Barcenda. Secrets as large as
armies and airforces are notoriously difficult to keep -- and word of the operation
quickly leaked throughout Guatemala, prompting student protests.

On October 30,

1960, the centrist Guatemala City daily La Hora published an article revealing the
existence of the camp and the Cuban exiles training there. 19
Guatemalan officers, especially the younger reformist ones, expressed outrage.
According to Turios Lima, a young participant in the revolt and later guerrilla
commander, the presence of Cuban exiles training in Guatemala: "was a shameful
violation of our national sovereignty.

And why was it permitted?

Because our

government is a puppet. 1120 But he emphasized that his reasons for joining the revolt
were essentially "the traditional ones of younger officers fed up with corruption,
desiring structural changes in the army, nothing really different.1121
Disgust throughout Guatemala with Y digoras' corruption was universal.

In

1958 as his first official act in office Ydigoras increased his own salary to $150,000 a
year -- the highest for a head of state in the Western Hemisphere. He also granted
himself a generous million dollar pension fund. He appointed his daughter ambassador
to France and his cousin education minister.22

15

Auctioning off the national fincas

(government owned plantations) to whomever offered him the largest bribes. the new
president sold offices, as one opponent put it "like a street vendor selling tortillas. "23
Y digoras particularly enraged younger officers by promoting older cronies while
obstructing the promotions of lieutenants and captains. He went "colonel crazy" in the
late 1950s, jumping favorites several grades, bestowing the rank on civilian bureaucrats
and drinking buddies until the Guatemalan Army attained the ludicrous distinction of
having 35% of its officers hold the rank of colonel (4.7% of U.S. army officers in the
same time period were colonels).
TABLE 124
COMPARATIVE OFFICER GRADE STRUCTURE 1960
(in percentages)
Rank
General
Colonel
Lt. Colonel
Major
Captain
1st Lt.
2nd Lt.

United States
.4
4.7
11.3
17.4
32.9
18.4
14.9

Brazil
1.0
3.7
10.0
14.8
33 .0
26.8
10.3

Guatemala
1.0
35.1
6 .0
6 .0
14.0
15.0
23.0

Panama
1.0
2.0
4.0
7.0
32 .0
54.0

In 1960 El Imparcial, Guatemala's most influential newspaper, decried the "lack
of discipline [which] increased from top to bottom, consuming social energy and
discouraging everyone. "25 Not all officers, however, were angry at Y digoras for his
graft and demoralization

of the military.

Several senior colonels expressed resentment

that they had not been cut in for their fair share of the $50,000 bribe or the $500,000 in
additional military aid.26
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The Eisenhower Administration's reaction to the rebellion of November 13,
1960, proved swift and decisive. Informed by Secretary of State Christian Herter that
the situation was "not good", President Eisenhower decided that "if we received a
request from Guatemala for assistance, we would move in without delay."27

Stymied

by the breakdown of the Geneva talks with the Soviets over the U-2 Incident and stung
by domestic political criticism, blaming his administration for the "loss" of Cuba,
Eisenhower was in no mood to equivocate. As in the 1954 coup, American pilots flew
combat missions against the rebel bases in American donated planes with Guatemalan
airforce markings. In this and other phases of U.S. involvement, Guatemala emerged as
a training ground for perfecting CIA covert techniques later used in Laos and Vietnam
Lacking an airforce, pummeled by U.S. B-26 bombers from both Retalhulen and
Panama, the rebels' resistance quickly faded.

The U.S . naval presence off Puerto

Barrios overawed many of the insurgents and clearly dispirited rebel morale. Still the
revolt had been a close run thing.

Disputed reports from among the participants

claimed that Cuban exile troops and not loyal Guatemalan soldiers carried out most of
the ground fighting against the insurgents . Y digoras apparently mistrusted his own
troops .28 Some 120 Guatemalan army officers and an estimated 3,000 soldiers, over a
third of the overall force, participated in the uprising which lasted four days, took over
three major military bases and gained control of the country's largest port city. While
the revolt started as a nationalist protest against institutional decay and the presence of
the Cubans, its bloody outcome further radicalized the survivors. They would return to
the country fifteen months later as determined communist guerrillas. Thus in one fell
swoop, the United States and Y digoras eliminated nearly all the young reformist
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idealism within the Guatemalan military.

This would be sorely missed when the

Kennedy Administration attempted to implement social reforms within Guatemala a
year later.29
Despite Washington's energetic support on behalf of his regime during the crisis,
the United States increasingly pulled away from Y digoras after the coup. The slow
unraveling of Ydigoras' presidency began in November 1960. A 1959 collapse in the
price of coffee, Guatemala's number one export, accelerated domestic disillusionment
with Y digoras' economic program He would flounder desperately in his remaining two
and a half years in office, trying to divert attention from his personal malfeasance,
political unpopularity and economic failure by alternatively calling for invasions of
British Honduras (Belize) and Castro's Cuba as well as overdramatizing his extremely
modest land reform program

30

After the Cuban Revolution, the Eisenhower Administration began to shift its
Guatemalan security policy away from deterring a Moscow-inspired political takeover
by a leftist-communist popular front to the suppression of a possible Castro style
guerrilla insurgency. Hemispheric defense doctrine, with its emphasis on anti-Soviet
submarine surveillance and air patrols , gave way to internal security.31 While the
Kennedy Administration claimed credit for developing this new strategy in a truly
comprehensive fashion, much of its roots really lay in Eisenhower's re-energized Latin
American policies in the late 1950s. The 1958 near murder of Vice President Richard
Nixon by angry mobs in Caracas, followed by the Cuban Revolution, aroused the
administration from its general torpor regarding Latin America with its emphasis on
large capital investments, limited military grants, and "trade not aid." The Suez and
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Hungarian crises, the launching of Sputnik, and the 1958 U.S. invasion of Lebanon had
tended to keep Washington's attention riveted on the Soviets and the Middle East, not
Latin America .

By the late fifties, however,

the rise of anti-Americanism in the

Hemisphere, spurred by U.S. support for dictators, and the fear of "other Cubas"
forced Eisenhower to re-evaluate his Latin American policy.
This shift on the security side occurred much earlier in Guatemala when the
instability of Castillo Ann,as' post 1954 coup government required a heavy emphasis on
internal surveillance and police repression of

"all hostile political elements."

remained doubtful just how powerful these "elements" that

It

included a handful of

communists, peasant labor leaders, university professors and students, actually were.
Certainly, the temptation of Guatemalan political leaders to use this largely American
fashioned security apparatus for their own dictatorial purposes proved overwhelming.
The security build-up in Guatemala served as a model for similar expansions in other
Latin American nations implemented at the end of the decade.

A foreign service

dispatch of September 1959, from the American Embassy in Guatemala to the State
Department traced the history of U.S. military involvement throughout the decade and
highlighted the fluctuations of disbursements:

Guatemala has been the recipient of exclusive aid under the
Mutual Security Program. In addition to moderate military
assistance and the existence of an Army Mission and an Air
Mission, some $58,000,000 has been made available during the
past five years as technical and Special Assistance. This was a
consequence of the need to bolster the economy and strengthen
the democratic regime which followed the overthrow in 1954 of
the Communist-dominated Arbenz Government.
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The allocation of funds have been as follows:
TABLE Il 32
APPROXIMATE COSTS
(In Thousands)
Army Mission Including
Milita(Y Assistance

Air
Mission

(Construction of InterAmerican Highway)

ICA
TC

SA

$1,814
1,833
2, 189
2,226
2,708
2,400

$ 8,039
12,681
15,423
10,250
423
70

BPR

'

1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960

$ 67
68
68
688
237
170
239
313

$ 60
64
58
71
77
78
93
135

$ 70
2,902
8,845
9,440
2,375
3,500

Military assistance to the Army Mission ( column #I) , which included training
and equipment, was minimal during the years of the Arbenz presidency , 1953 and 1954.
In fiscal year 1956, aid increased by about 1,000%. This occurred in conjunction with
the massive overhaul of Guatemalan military and security forces (police , secret police ,
and the new security departments) , by U.S . Army, CIA and FBI advisors. A gradual
fall-off of investment then occurred which began to rise noticeably again during the
Castro years 1959 and 1960. During the years of this admittedly uneven build-up , the
Guatemalan Army increased in size by 60%, from 5,000 to 8,000 men .

The

Guatemalan National Police increased by 50% from 2,000 to 3,000 men . The Public
Safety Program records show similar patterns of U.S . investment.
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Table ill 33
ANNUAL BUDGETS OF TIIE PUBLIC
SAFE1Y PROGRAM, GUATEMALA 1957-1961
(US thousands)
FIRST YEAR
57
58
59
60
61

TOTAL
280
158
72
267
271 '

PART
0
37
13
1

TECH
38
58
53
37
35

11

COMMOD OTHER
242
0
58
5
0
6
219
10
213
12

The United States made a large initial investment to set up the program and
reinvigorate Guatemalan police and internal security. A drop-off followed, but again
the advent of Castro brought about a nearly 400% increase in funding between FY1959
and FY1960 which continued into FY1961. It is important to note that no tables of
CIA or FBI spending in Guatemala have been declassified to date, though one can
assume their spending patterns approximated those of Military Assistance and the
Office of Public Safety. It is known that the CIA under both Eisenhower and Kennedy
spent $11 million setting up various Cuban exile bases and training programs in
Guatemala between April 1960 and April 1961.34

Political scientists and human rights

activists, Susanne Jonas and Michael McClintock, in their works The Battle for
Guatemala (1991) and The American Connection (1985) make a strong argument that
the roots of all political repression in Guatemala lay in these crucial Eisenhower years of
the mid to late 1950s, but this study will show that the Kennedy influence in the early
1960s was even more pronounced and predominant.
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One of the ironic outcomes of the Eisenhower Administration's increased
military assistance, intelligence and internal security spending in Guatemala was that the
network it helped install seemed to know everything that was going on inside of the
country except the fact that one-third of the military was about to rise up and
overthrow the government .

Much of this was due to both Washington and the

Guatemalan government's obsession with the small Guatemalan Communist party as the
only credible threat to the government.
In hindsight the appraisal made in this internal Office of Public Safety memo,

dated June 20, 1960, speaks volumes of the U.S. misappraisal:
Tue extent to which military assistance can, by strengthening Guatemala,
aid U.S. national security and our foreign policy interests is perceptible
but of a rather diverse nature. As of now it is doubtful if Guatemala
could be of much help outside the confines of its own frontiers. There is
however gradually being engendered a better understanding of free world
ideology, a better esprit de corps, and hopefully, we think, slightly less
political ambition on the part of those trained in the military. It is true
there remains a large group of older senior officers who would like to be
President, but junior officers are now learning something about simple
military devotion to duty. Training in U.S. service schools has positive
benefits not only in the military sense but also has observably had very
considerable desirable moral influence on those who have passed through
them 35
Four months later the Guatemalan military erupted in revolt led almost
exclusively by junior officers, most trained in U.S. service schools, all under the age of
thirty. Tue memorandum was correct in stating that a majority of these officers had a
strong moral devotion to duty, yet that devotion led them to oppose, not endorse, the
security policies of the United States.
"Castro changed everything," asserted Captain Thomas "Rip" Robertson , former
rodeo rider and CIA pilot who took part in both the 1954 Guatemalan coup and the
22

1960 crushing of the rebels. "We were in a whole new ballgame and our pitching was
pretty wild the first couple of years." 36
It would fall to the Kennedy Administration to try and pick up the pieces of a
fairly botched U.S. economic and security policy in Guatemala. The new administration
would crystallize the doctrine which dominated U.S. policy in Guatemala for the
remainder of the decade.
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CHAPTER ill

THE KENNEDY DOCTRINE IN GUATEMALA
1961-1963
"For the first time in our history an enemy stands poised at the throat of the
United States," candidate John F. Kennedy told a veterans', convention at Miami Beach
on August 26, 1960. "Castro's ambitions extend far beyond his own shores. He has
transformed the island of Cuba into a hostile and militant Communist satellite -- a base
from which to carry Communist infiltration and subversion throughout the Americas ..."1
In January, 1961, the same month the new president took the oath of office, Premier
Nikita Khrushchev delivered a speech to the meeting of International Communist
Parties in Moscow , in which he pledged the Soviet Union's support for "wars of
national liberation" around the globe. A representative of the Guatemalan Communist
Party (the PGT) attended this meeting.

But the Kennedy Administration had no

intention of countenancing Guatemala's "liberation."
The Kennedy Administration arrived in Washington in January 1961, with a
throng of what were later referred to as "action intellectuals" ready to propose and
implement a host of new foreign policy initiatives designed to roll back and defeat
Communist revolution throughout the Third World. Early hagiographic accounts, such
as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.'s 1965 A Thousand Days, pictured Kennedy and his advisors
as sober, reflective, dedicated knights-errants. But as revisionist historians, such as
Thomas G. Paterson , in his 1989 Kennedy's Quest for Victory point out, the new
president and his close inner circle placed a premium on toughness, energy, drive and
vigor, on an aggressive "hands-on can do" approach to foreign policy. They regarded

27

Eisenhower's recent Cold War diplomacy, particularly in Latin America, as soft,
uninspired and lethargic.

"We have allowed a soft sentimentation to form the

atmosphere we breathe," Kennedy claimed "toughminded plans have to be designed."2
Kennedy regarded Latin America as an area of supreme geo-political importance
only superseded by the direct conflict with the Soviets in Europe. With much fanfare,
he proposed an "Alliance For Progress" in March of 1961, an ambitious $20 billion aid
program for Latin America over ten years. While the Eisenhower Administration had
already put forward a somewhat similar increase in Latin American aid at the Bogota
Convention in 1960, the Alliance for Progress promised to do far more.

It

encompassed "a vast cooperative effort unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of
purpose, to satisfy the basic needs of the American peoples for homes, work and land,
health and schools ... "3
This new partnership of North and South would embrace both econormc
development and social restructuring. It included national planning and technical aid,
agrarian and tax reform, public housing, education, health care -- a veritable cornucopia
of social reforms and improvements. All this would supposedly operate within the
framework of democratic institutions, proving "the compatibility of representative
government with material progress." Harking back to Jefferson and Bolivar, Kennedy
cloaked these ideas with the mantle of revolution: "Let us once again transform the
American continent into a vast crucible of revolutionary ideas and efforts... "4
Central to the Alliance for Progress, though never mentioned by name, was a

more recent revolution -- the Cuban one of Fidel Castro. "It was," Ronald Steel
observed in Pax Americana "neither charity nor a guilty conscience but Fidel Castro
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who provided the inspiration for the Alliance for Progress ... [it] might never have seen
the light of day, let alone grow into a childhood, had Fidel not injected the fear of
Communism into official Washington."

5

Less than a month after the announcement of this grand new initiative, the
ghastly failure of the U.S. backed Bay of Pigs Invasion doused cold water on Kennedy's
initial enthusiasm for redrawing the political and social parameters of Latin America.
Yet the seriousness of its Cuban failure only emphasized the administration's desire to
achieve some kind of success south of the border. It proved telling that the man who
had come up with the phrase "Alliance for Progress" and would help put the program
together , Kennedy aide and Harvard graduate Richard Goodwin, (twenty-nine years old
at the time) had never been to South America. 6 Kennedy's ideology and energy almost
immediately ran up against the harsh political and social reality of Latin America.
Guatemala, one of the highest per capita recipients of Alliance for Progress aid
in the 1960s illustrated just how stark Latin American reality could be.

In 1961

Guatemala had a basically two crop export economy consisting of coffee and bananas,
90% of which were sold to the United States for very low, largely U.S. determined,
prices . On the other hand, Guatemala purchased 80% of its imports -- staple grains,
manufactured goods , machinery and equipment -- from the United States at relatively
high U.S. prices.

The result was an unfavorable balance of payments and an almost

classic neo-colonial dependency on the United States .7
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Guatemalan society, like most of Latin Americas, was sharply stratified along
rigid, almost feudal, class lines. The criollos, affluent land owners of Spanish and other
European ancestry, comprising about 2% of the population, owned 70% of the land.
Most of the senior, high-ranking military officers either came from or identified with
this class.

Together with wealthy businessmen and foreign investors the criollos

dominated Guatemala's economy and politics. Politically they aligned themselves with
the right-wing National Liberation Movemeut (MLN), Castillo Armas' reactionary,
fiercely anti-Communist political party. 8
A larger middle class group of mixed Spanish and Indian ancestry, the ladinos
made up around 40% of the population and owned about 20% of Guatemala's land.
Largely urban, shopkeepers, craftsmen, managers, low level government functionaries,
as well as some small farmers, the ladinos were an important force in the more modem
sectors of the Guatemalan economy and supplied the Guatemalan military with most of
its junior officer corps. The majority, but not all, allied themselves with the liberal
centrist Revolutionary Party (PR) .

The Kennedy Administration counted on these

ladinos to lead the way towards the modernization and democratization of Guatemala.9
The largest population group in Guatemala in 1961, making up about 55% of
the roughly four million population, were impoverished Maya Indians. They owned less
than 10% of the land and were virtual serfs forced by law to work 150 days a year for
starvation wages on the vast coffee, banana and cotton plantations of the criollos.
Largely disenfranchised, 80% illiterate, with a life expectancy of forty-two, an infant
mortality rate of 40% and an average per capita income of $63 a year ( compared to
$181 for the average Guatemalan), the Indians of Guatemala remained completely
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isolated from the political life of the country. Worse, they were subject to a centuries
old form of racism and discrimination. With their very different Amerindian looks,
clothing, language, customs and religion, the Maya represented the ever present
"demonic other" of Guatemalan society. Through over four hundred years of Spanish
domination, they endured expulsion, massacres and economic dehumanization.10 As
one Spanish plantation owner said in a telling comment on both racism and upper-class
opposition to modernity: ,''Why spend ten thousand dollars for a tractor when you can
get Indians to work for seventy-five cents a day?"11
This almost incredibly inequitable political-economic structure of Guatemala
posed a huge obstacle to the Alliance for Progress , which the Kennedy Administration
never really overcame. Yet while the Eisenhower White House never even attempted
to change and, in fact, reinforced this status quo, the crusaders of the New Frontier,
actually made a stab at it. The already relatively high economic aid to Guatemala
increased by over 40% in the early 1960s to about $25 million per year. This expansion
of aid was based in part on the Alliance for Progress' favoritism towards "constitutional
governments" in Latin America. The Kennedy Administration cut aid to numerous
notorious dictators in the region such as the Dominican Republic's Trujillo and Haiti's
Duvalier. Kennedy hoped to encourage democratization by rewarding more moderate
and democratic regimes like Betancourt's in Venezuela and Frondizi's in Argentina. In
January 1961 the Kennedy Administration refused to recognize a military junta which
had recently seized power in El Salvador.

Such lofty principles, like much of the

rhetoric of the Alliance for Progress, did not last long. Still, in early 1961 hopes for the
Alliance ran high.
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In a wave of initial optimism and idealism scores of Peace Corp Volunteers and
Maryknoll missionaries arrived in Guatemala, setting up peasant cooperatives and local
improvement projects.

United States Agency for International Development (AID)

loans, both large and small, multiplied as well as credits from the Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB), the Inter-American Bank of Rural Development (IBRD) and
the Export-Import Bank. , Guatemala received staple grains and dairy products from
Food for Peace and private contributions from CARE and Project Hope .12
The bulk of the larger economic loans and grants to Guatemala, however, like
practically all Alliance for Progress aid, were "tied loans." This meant that the dollar
loans or grants had to be spent on purchasing American goods and services. In effect
the Export-Import Bank and AID used taxpayers' money to subsidize the growth of
large American companies that did business with Guatemala.

Guatemala's U.S.

purchases were often made at prices 30%-50% above world market prices so that, in
real terms, the value of the aid was little more than half the nominal amount. Moreover ,
goods which Guatemala bought within the framework of this "not-quite-aid" were
typically second rate. American freighters transported goods to Guatemala which
could no longer be sold on the U.S. market -- obsolete machinery, antiquated vehicles
and machine tools . (The same procedure existed with U.S . military sales to Guatemala.
The U.S. military unloaded much of its obsolescent equipment on Guatemala at high
U.S. prices.)

Worse still, the Hickenlooper Amendment

to the 1962 Foreign

Assistance Act, drawn up in reaction to Castro's seizure of U.S . property in Cuba,
called for the automatic suspension of U.S. aid to any country "which expropriated or
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nationalized the property of U.S. citizens."13
Guatemala held the same stipulation.

Foreign and international loans to

Thus, Alliance for Progress aid,

meant

supposedly to develop and reform Guatemalan society, by its very nature forbade the
equitable reform and redistribution of Guatemala's land and resources. In 1960, U.S.
and foreign companies owned nearly 40% of Guatemala's arable land They also held
claim to the vast majority of its natural resources -- oil, nickel, tungsten, iron, timber
and natural gas.

In the, early 1960s, $92 million of the $117 million of foreign

investment in Guatemala came from the United States. By 1964, Guatemala imported
$38 million more than it exported and $36 million of this unfavorable balance of
payments was with the United States.14
The majority of large Alliance for Progress development projects helped neither
Indians nor middling Guatemalan businessmen and farmers. The huge $12 million Rio
Hondo Road Project, begun with much publicity by the Kennedy Administration in
1961, provided a prime example of Alliance for Progress aid in Guatemala. Tue project
connected the main Atlantic port of Puerto Barrios with Honduras. The Guatemalan
government had to pay the $12 million in principal plus roughly $5 million in interest
back to the United States in dollars, which placed a heavy burden on Guatemala's
balance of payments. The Guatemalan government purchased all the machinery for
construction from the United States under the terms of the loan.

The engineer,

contractors, supervisors and smveyors were all from United States companies. Three
U.S. firms -- Nebloteer, Poteshnick and Harrison, paved and constructed the road. Toe
highway itself largely facilitated the shipment of export crops -- coffee, bananas and
cotton, not from individual farmers but from large plantations. 15 U.S. AID loans built
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similar roads north to the mineral and oil extraction enterprises of American and foreign
investors . The Rio Hondo project drove numerous Indian families, that had the bad
fortune to be located in its path, off their land with little compensation. All these newly
constructed roads provided access for the Guatemala military in their new U.S. built
trucks , jeeps and armored cars to reach remote hinterlands where guerrillas operated.
Most of the road projects of the Kennedy era in Guatemala traveled through guerrilla
country. Little wonder many
embittered Guatemalan Indians referred to the Alliance
·,
for Progress as Alianza para el Progresso - The Alliance Stops Progress. 16

Much of

the historiography of the Alliance captures the disillusionment with the program in its
very titles : Victor Alba's 1965 Alliance Without Allies, Jerome Levinson and Juan de
Onis' 1970 The Alliance That Lost Its Way, Robert Smetherman's 1972 The Alliance
for Progress: Promises Unfulfilled.
The Kennedy Administration's economic program in Guatemala operated on the
assumption that there was a connection between poverty and political instability which
would inevitably lead to Communism. But as political scientist Lucien Pye and others
pointed out, this was not necessarily the case.17 Economic development was probably a
greater cause of social instability than simple economic deprivation in Guatemala. The
Alliance for Progress unleashed a torrent of investments, loans, grants, rural projects,
industrial enterprises, peasant cooperatives, road building, local improvement
campaigns, free clinics, bribery, extortion, land grabbing, price fixing, forced expulsions
As the Yankee dollars poured in, the

and general socio-economic chaos.

de-stabilization of society and the exploitation of the poor increased.

Peasant

cooperatives and credit unions, set up by Peace Corps volunteers, enraged local
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plantation owners because they made the campesinos less dependent on the criollos.
When American AFL-CIO volunteers handed out Spanish translations of the
Declaration of Independence to labor umons, Guatemala businessmen protested
vociferously against the distribution of Communist propaganda. Food for Peace milk
and cheese undercut Guatemalan dairy farmers. When the Peace Corps built schools in
the countryside, less Indian children reported for work on cotton plantations. 18

The

Guatemalan oligarchy an,d the Kennedy Administration were clearly speaking two
different languages in early 1961. Jean-Francois Revel captured something of this
quandry when he stated: "The idea that an authoritarian political system must collapse
because it cannot provide a decent life for its citizenry can only occur to a
democrat ...The notion that whoever holds power must clear out because his subjects
are discontented or dying of hunger or distress is a bit of whimsy that history has
tolerated few times in real life."19
The Alliance for Progress brought about a huge rise in expectations to the poor
of Guatemala which upset the traditional social fabric much more than Castro's largely
annoying radio broadcasts. Wealthy Guatemalans certainly regarded Kennedy, with his
wild ideas of land reform and progressive tax codes, as a much greater threat to then:
position than Castro. As one landowner put it, "When the Cubans come I can shoot
them but I can't shoot these damned Americans.1120 One of the great unintended results
of the Alliance for Progress in Guatemala was that it helped fuel the very insurgency it
was designed to defeat. Capitalist democracy in a society as feudal as Guatemala
represented , a truly revolutionary idea. Yet having raised expectations of individual
prosperity, the program failed miserably to deliver on them. The great majority of
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funding still went to the larger development projects which inevitably benefited U.S.
investors and Guatemalan elites.

Peasant social reforms and local improvement

projects, on the other hand, barely scratched the surface of deep, systemic, century old
inequities.21
Was another alternative available to the Kennedy Administration to truly
modernize and democratize Guatemala? Numerous tracts of land could have been
redistributed among the Indians. A larger amount of government loans and private
,,

investment could have been targeted to small businesses and domestic manufacturing.
But such a course of real reform would have infuriated the Guatemalan oligarchy and
substantial elements of the military, the United States' only real allies in Guatemala. It
also would have hurt U.S. corporations' and investors' profits. Such a scheme would
also weaken the political dependence of Guatemala on the United States at a time when
the Kennedy Administration attempted to forge strong U.S. dominated military and
economic alliances throughout Central American as a wedge against Castro.

The

Kennedy Administration faced a fundamental dilemma early on in Guatemala. It could
either have chronic instability, wedded to political and economic dependence or an
independent, semi-socialist state in Guatemala.

As much as the Kennedy

Administration claimed to dislike the former, it clearly preferred it to the latter.
The Kennedy Administration's reform program in Guatemala can best be
evaluated in its approach to the vital land issue.

Just as 19th century black

sharecroppers in the United States could never hope to gain any real political power
until they first owned their own land, so two-thirds of the Guatemala population
remained forever isolated, embittered and marginalized, simply because they did not
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own enough land to feed themselves. Large scale coffee, banana and cotton production
for export soared during the Alliance for Progress years, almost in direct proportion to
malnutrition, unemployment, infant mortality, disease and demoralization among the
Indian and poor ladino population. 22 Mayas would literally die of starvation while
hauling hundred and fifty pound banana stems on their backs fourteen hours a day. In
1961, one YMCA volunteer walked away in shock when he discovered 5,000 Indians
living in rat infested tin and stucco housing on a coffee plantation with a total of six
'

open water faucets and no medical facilities. 23

From 1961 to 1964 the Gross National

Product of Guatemala rose an average of 5.5% a year -- a higher growth rate than the
United States in the same period, yet income among the lower 60% of the Guatemalan
population actually dropped 14%. 24

"Guatemala," as Marxist journalist Eduardo

Galeano remarked, "was developing itself into its grave. "25 Or as Riguberta Menchu, a
peasant Maya woman put it, "These people don't care. For these people an Indian is
less than a dog. "26
In 1961 under pressure from the Kennedy Administration Guatemala's president
Miguel Y digoras Fuentes finally initiated his long awaited land redistribution program
He decided his government should dispose of some 132 national fincas (government
owned plantations) expropriated from Germans during World War II and from fo1mer
Ubico and Arbenz supporters.

Y digoras held several elaborate, ribbon cutting

ceremonies, attended by U.S . embassy officials, in which he distributed 12 of the 132
fincas to landless Indians to be divided into numerous family plots.

He sold the

remaining 120 fincas to wealthy landowners and a number of his own relatives,
pocketing much of the profits. 27 Ambassador John 0. Bell called the effort "a good first
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step. 1128 For his agricultural minister during the Kennedy years, Y digoras appointed
Pedro Mombiela, one of Guatemala's richest cattle barons.

Like most Guatemalan

cattle ranchers, Minister Mombiela had created his vast grazing empire by expelling
Indians at gun point from their traditional holdings. Guatemalan U.S . AID director,
Herbert Hardin, said that Mombiela has "a number of interesting ideas in the areas of
land reform. "29 One of his brainstorms was colonization . Mombiela distributed tracts
of impassable, mountainous
jungle lands in the northernmost province of Peten on
,
which, as one peasant remembered, "God couldn't grow a carrot ," to incredulous
Indians chosen by lottery. Some of these areas were so remote "a jaguar couldn't reach
them "30 Government helicopters dropped off the lucky owners along with some lumber
and a few hand tools. The hardy individuals among them managed to hack their way
back to civilization with machetes. Those less resourceful were left to the vultures. 31
The Inter-American Bank of Rural Development director in Guatemala wrote: "There
have been some problems with the government's new overambitious resettlement
schemes. "32
In his five years in office Y digoras redistributed land to 2,451 Indian families.
In 1953-4 President Arbenz, who was overthrown by the CIA, redistributed land to
some 100,000 Indians. One idealistic U.S . businessman , Patrick A Mulvey, became so
frustrated with the Kennedy Administration's failure to push land reform in Guatemala ,
that he hatched the idea of the U.S. government, through third parties , simply buying up
$40 million dollars worth of land and then redistributing it to peasants on its own. As
he wrote , the mere mention of land reform in Guatemala "sets off the red flag of
Communism among wealthy businessmen."33 The White House shelved Mulvey's idea
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as "an interference in the internal affairs of Guatemala."34

Thomas and Marjorie

Melville's 1971 Guatemala: The Politics of Land Reform is one of the earliest revisionist
works on economic and social inequality in Guatemala. Written during the height of
the Vietnam War by two former Maryknoll missionaries, who shocked the State
Department by joining the guerrillas, their study comprehensively examines the failure
of agrarian reform with particular emphasis on Guatemalan sources. The Melvilles
correctly appraise land reform as the acid test of democratization in Guatemala, which
both the U.S. and all Guatemalan governments since Arbenz failed.

They also

convincingly demonstrate that the 70 year alliance between the Guatemalan oligarchy,
U.S. investors,and the U. S military effectively quashed all reform efforts whether they
emanated from Guatemala or Washington.

With the road to social progress increasingly blocked by local elites and the
United States' own reluctance to force through meaningful change, the main emphasis
of the Kennedy Doctrine in Guatemala shifted quite early from reform to repression.
Almost from day one, the Kennedy Administration established the primacy of internal
security, of holding the line against Communist and leftist agitation while or until
supposedly enlightened elements with Guatemalan society would implement social
reforms. National Security Action Memorandum 34, dated February 20, 1961, laid out
the four point security program which would dominate Kennedy policy in Guatemala.
It sharply reflected a military emphasis.
1. The Defense Department has taken steps to unify the various Service

Missions in each LatinAmerican country into a single MAAG
(military Assistance Advisory Group) under the command of Commander
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in Chief Caribbean Command (CINCARIB).
2. AID is engaged in reviewing the Public Safety Program for Latin America to
insure that it is highly responsive to the critical needs of each Latin American
country for police assistance and surveillance of hostile elements.
3. Pursuant to NSAM 19, AID and the Defense Department are acting jointly
in the development of civic action projects, additional to those now
underway, that might usefully be undertaken in Latin America.
4. Pursuant to NSAM 18, an expanded program of close collaboration
between the U.S. and Latin American military in areas of training,
equipment and tactical indoctrination is currently underway. 35
These became the pillars of U.S. policy in Latin America as a whole. In the
early 1960s the Kennedy White House moved away from President Eisenhower's
program of unconventional covert war against undesirable governments (Mossadegh's
Iran, Arbenz's Guatemala) towards a policy of both overt_and covert war against the
internal enemies of friendly governments such as South Vietnam and Guatemala . U.S.
trained anti-guerrilla fighters would defeat local insurgents that plagued U.S. allies.
Kennedy's new counter-insurgency program initially turned the foreign policy
establishment on its ear with a flurry of seminars, counter-insurgency courses,
bureaucratic upheavals "and an almost frantic formulation of unfamiliar policy" 36 Some
of this actually had a comic aspect as plump, middle aged foreign service veterans
donned jungle gear while observing Green Beret exercises. The traditional American
military service chiefs resisted what they regarded as the "crackpot aspects" of this new
"we have to be guerrillas to defeat the guerrillas"

doctrine, but gradually, albeit

reluctantly, they got on board especially after each service was guaranteed its own sexy,
new COIN outfit. 37
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.•

History provides numerous examples of nove~ ground breaking milita1y
doctrines, which events prove to be dead wrong: Douhet's theory of strategic bombing,
the British early twentieth century battleship mania, and French Defense Minister Andre
Maginot's state of the art, high-tech defensive line, to name a few. While the jury may
still be out on the Kennedy Doctrine of Counter-insurgency, it seems destined to join
this list of strategic "white elephants .11 Michael McClintock's 1992 Instruments of
Statecraft

provides

one

'

of the

latest

and most

sweeping

studies

of U.S.

counter-insurgency warfare in the post World War Two era. McClintock reveals that,
while the Kennedys were aware of the broader socio-political parameters of Third
World guerrilla warfare, they still judged the threat to be amenable to a technical fix.
McClintock gives rather short shrift of the Kennedys' understanding of the political
nature of insurgency, that it was a response to colonialism and socio-economic injustice,
but his work is indispensable in chronicling the military development of this doctrine,
dating back as far as the Filipino Revolt of 1899-1902. Like his earlier 1985 American
Connection, McClintock's Instruments of Statecraft draws heavily upon declassified and
leaked Department of Defense , FBI , and CIA sources . Both books are sharply critical
of U.S . policy and full of valuable data and insights on how ideology can shape military
doctrine and vice-versa .
As far back as the early 1950s, John F. Kennedy expressed the belief that Soviet
sponsored brushfire warfare represented the gravest threat to the world balance of
power. He felt the United States had to counteract it with a new kind of anti-guerrilla
warfare, especially
large.

in Latin America, where the threat of social revolution loomed

Drawing on the lessons of the few successful counter-insurgency campaigns,
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those of Sir Robert Thompson in Malaya and Edward Lansdale against the Huks in the
Philippines, Kennedy began formulating his new "Special Warfare" strategy. Ironically,
former French paratroop generals like Francois Massu, supplied much of the
counter-insurgency inspiration to the Kennedy Administration from articles in the
Revue Militaire D'Information. 38 What most observers failed to note was that these
same French officers had lost their own counter-insurgency campaigns first in
Indo-China and later in Algeria, using these exact, highly acclaimed yet wrong headed
theories.
The first principle of the Kennedy Administration's counter-insurgency strategy
in Guatemala was to avoid the use of large conventional American ground forces.
Except for Green Beret advisers, Army technicians and trainers, Guatemalans were to
fight Guatemalans.

Thus Vietnamization came to Guatemala eight years before

President Nixon implemented it in Vietnam

As a March 20, 1961 Department of

Defense Memorandum stated: "A well trained indigenous force can better counter the
Communist threat and propaganda than the larger powers. At least our hand will not be
apparent. Our biggest assistance can come through the Military Assistance Advisory
Groups (MAAG) if they are provided with the doctrine for anti-guerrilla
counter-subversion and are given clear political goals. "39
On May 25, 1961 Kennedy addressed the entire nation before a Joint Session of

Congress, devoting considerable time to the Communist insurgency crisis. In words
riven with irony, he expressed as much the U.S. program in Vietnam and Guatemala as
the supposed Soviet threat it was designed to defeat:
...their aggression is more often concealed than open. They have fired no
missiles, and their troops are seldom seen. They send arms, agitators, aid,
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technicians, and propaganda to every troubled area. But where fighting is
required, it is usually done by others, by guerrillas striking at night, by assassins
striking alone...by subversives, saboteurs and insurrectionists, who in some
cases control whole areas inside of independent nations.40
With few credible insurgencies in the hemisphere in early 1961 Kennedy initially
took a keen interest in Latin American police training. In National Security Action
Memorandum No. 88, dated September 5, 1961, he called for additional "steps ...to train
the Armed Forces and Police Forces of

Latin America in controlling mobs, and

rioters ...Also what other steps are we taking to increase the intimacy between our
Armed forces and the military of Latin America? It has been suggested that we set up a
camp in the United States similar to the FBI Academy which brings in police from all
over the Americas."41
The United States had been training Latin American police officers in a
haphazard, country by country fashion since the 1940s.

In 1962 at Kennedy's

insistence, the United States created the Inter- American Police Academy in the Panama
Canal Zone.42 In late 1963 the school changed its name to the International Police
Academy (IPA) and moved to Washington, D.C. Spanish speaking, retired American
police and FBI officers taught the standard eight week general course which covered
finger printing techniques, surveillance, riot control, interrogation, incarceration and
criminal record keeping methods. During the 1960s, 452 Guatemalan police officers
graduated from the academy. The Guatemalan police acquired an unsavory reputation
for corruption dating back to the 1950s. Office of Public Safety memos reported rapes,
opium smuggling and the frequent torture of suspects. One report stated that suspects
::.

were often held between "ninety days and four years before being charged with
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crimes.''43

U.S. sponsored police training emphasized both professionalization and

moderation to solve these problems. In 1962 Assistant Secretary of State, Edwin
Martin, noted that :

In assessing the internal security situation in Latin America we found
that civil police forces in many countries needed assistance in police
administration, training and operational techniques and particularly
required greater mobility and more adequate systems of communication
largely related to riot control and other threats to public order.
Consequently the public safety program, which is an integral part of the
AID program, is designed to meet these requests. 44
Through the Office of Public Safety Program, the Kennedy Administration
supplied the Guatemalan police with helicopters, computers , radios, armored cars and
machine guns. It furnished the police with millions of rounds of small arms ammunition,
thousands of revolvers, shotguns, tear gas grenades, riot batons, shields and helmets,
hundreds of walkie-talkies, police cars and wagons, gas masks and bullet proofvests.

45

Students from San Carlos University, as well as labor unions and leftist political parties,
frequently demonstrated against the government during the Kennedy years and the
Administration wanted always to be fully prepared . As former AID Administrator
David Bell testified before Congress in 1963:
The police are the most sensitive point of contact between the
government and the people, close to the focal points of unrest and better
trained and equipped than even military in
most cases to deal with both major and minor forms of violence,
conspiracy, and subversion.46

In the opening paragraph of the International Police Academy's catalogue, the
Office of Public Safety stated that of all its programs "training has the most enduring
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effect. 1147

While Academy spokesmen characterized the school's course material as

dealing exclusively with "those modern techniques of law enforcement necessary to
maintain an effective, responsive and humane police force, 1148 counter-insurgency and
political warfare constituted a considerable part of all instruction, according to the
academy's own published curriculum . Lectures , such as "The Threat to Latin America,"
"Communism in the Caribbean" and "The Enemy Within," indicated the ideological
flavor of this supposedly 1,lllbiased, strictly professional, training. 49
Public Safety Advisers in Guatemala furnished in-country police training as well.
Each adviser put together a team of top IPA graduates , high ranking senior Guatemalan
police, as well as U.S. military police personnel from the American Embassy's MAAG
Army mission to conduct police training seminars throughout Guatemala. The Office of
Public Safety's in-country advisory staff: like all American security programs in
Guatemala, was relatively large. From two political advisers in 1961, the OPS mission
grew to four by 1965 and seven by 1969, making it the largest contingent in Latin
America. (See table below.)
TABLE IV 50
US ASSISTANCE TO LATIN AMERICAN POLICE FORCES UNDER THE
PUBLIC SAFETY
PROGRAM - FISCAL YEARS 1961- 1969
(Current U.S . dollars , in thousands)
Total Expenditures Students Trained in the US US Public Safety Advisors
120
78
2
Argentina
2,325
2
64
Bolivia
8,612
570
Brazil
1
2,386
163
Chile
5
448
6,944
Columbia
4
160
1,921
Costa Rica
204
3
Dominican Republic 4, 193
160
3
3,915
Ecuador
45

(TABLE IV continued)
Total Expenditures Students Trained in the US US Public Safety Advisors
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Jamaica
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Uruguay
Venezuela
Other/Regions
TOTAL

2,092
4,855
1,741
780
745
315
2,148

168
462
105
92
34
81
202
23

1

7.
3
1
2
3

llO

4,142
2,209
3,625
2,239

173
541
36

4
4

55,307

3,874
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While the OPS mission was still relatively small compared to the U.S. military
mission, it remained vital due to its strategic placement at the heart of the Guatemalan
police apparatus . OPS advisors and their associate personnel trained , directed and
indoctrinated thousands of Guatemalan rank and file police officers. According to AID
figures the in-country training program involved some 30,000 Guatemalan police during
the decade of the 1960s, making it the largest in Latin America. 51 In-country training
covered urban and rural patrolling operations, vehicle and equipment maintenance , the
tracking

of

suspected

subversives,

communication ,

"implementation of modem scientific aids," (torture).

intelligence,

and

the
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The Guatemalan National Police Force expanded dramatically during this period
of intensive U.S. training and modernization . From 3,000 men in 1961 it grew to 4,500
in 1965 and to 6,500 by 1968. Due to their sensitive nature, many of these figures may
only be fragmentary . The Guatemala government employed numerous "reservists" and
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"assistants" during periods of terrorist crises in the 1960s. Part of the OPS training
and indoctrination of the Guatemalan National Police included the Kennedy
counter-insurgency doctrine of employing "associated friendly paramilitary forces to
help support embattled free world governments. "53

Both the Guatemala military and

police maintained close links to rural and urban paramilitary squads throughout the
1960s. These right wing groups frequently consisted of retired or reserve police and
Army officers joined typic~lly by plantation overseers and factory foremen employed by
the Guatemala oligarchy. Because of the sensitive nature of these groups and the
danger of their activities smearing the reputation of the U.S. Office of Public Safety, the
program itself rarely provided them with arms.

Instead, the Guatemala police

purchased weaponry for them through private arms sales with U.S. manufacturing
firms. (See table below.)

TABLE V 54
US ARMS SALES TO GUATEMALAN POLICE FORCES 1961-1969
Quantity
75,000 rds
100,000 rds
120
120
75
640
25,000 rds
167,000 rds

65
100
650,000 rds

License Date ReciQient
lmQQrter
6/61 Police Use
Jones Aircraft & Arms
-New York, NY
"
FC amrno(Army 3800 45cal.)
9/61 Police Use
SW .38 cal. revolvers
Smith & Wesson
12/61
Judicial Police
-Springfield, MA
"
SW .22 cal. revolvers
6/62 Judicial Police
CI .38 cal. revolvers
Colt Industries
6/93 National Police
-New York, NY
12/63 National Police
CI .38 cal. revolvers
6/64 National Police
Jones Aircraft & Arms
FC .38 cal. ammo
-New York, NY
9/64 Treasury Police
WI ammo (.388,.222,.270
Winchester Industries
-Hartford, CT
.32,.22 ,.25,.38 cal.)
3/ 65 National Police
6/65 Judicial Police
WI rifles
Smith & Wesson
9/65 Treasury Police
SW .38 cal. revolvers
-Springfield, MA
"
12/65 National Police
WI ammo (.22,.25,.32,
.78,.380 cal.)
Products
FC .45 cal ammo
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(TABLE V continued)
Quantity
2,500
2,500
200
150
150
345,400 rds
120
300
250

Products

Importer

AA MPG-100 CNgas
AAI Corp-Baltimore , MD
grenades
II
AA MPG-100 C gas grenades
SW .38 cal. revolvers
Smith & Wesson
- Springfield , MA
CI .38 cal . revolvers
Colt Industries
-New York, NY
CI .22 cal. pistols/revolvers
WI ammo (.22,.243,.250 .
Winchester Industries
·.270,38, cal.)
-Hartford , CT
SW .38 cal. revolvers
Smith & Wesson
-Springfield, MA
CI .38 revolvers
Colt Industries
-New York, NY
II
CI .22 pistols/revolvers

License Date Recipient
2/66

National Police

2/66
10/67

National Police
Judicial Police

12/67

National Police

3/68
3/68

Treasury Police
National Police

12/68

Treasury Police

3/69

National Police

4/69

Judicial Police

During crisis periods in the early 1960s, the United States frequently rushed
additional special purpose police equipment on U.S. Army transport planes directly to
Guatemala City. Some of this equipment was similar to that of the Soviet Bloc. A
March 15, 1962, memorandum to the President stated:
Contrary to the impression in a cable from Guatemala City this morning,
most of the internal security equipment which has been approved has
been delivered. Two items, sickening gas and two water tank trucks
were not initially approved because it was not thought desirable to
associate the United States with these patently repressive instruments.
As a substitute new tank trucks , which incidentally must be procured in
Germany and are of the type used by the Soviets and East Germans
along the Berlin Wall (author's italics) have been sent and are now in
Guatemala City...55
It is ironic that John F. Kennedy, famous for his 1963 speech at the Berlin Wall

condemning Communist tyranny against the people of Eastern Europe , used the exact
same instruments of repression against college students and labor unions in Guatemala.
This classified document is also indicative of Kennedy's keen interest in the internal
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security of Latin American nations. One would not ordinarily suppose that a U.S.
president would be concerned with such detailed minutia as the type of crowd control
equipment employed against rioters in Guatemala City.

Civic action provided another keystone to the Kennedy Doctrine in Guatemala
and particularly emphasized the notion of "winning the hearts and minds" of the
Guatemalan people as we)l as vigorously promoting the concept of "nation building."
The Pentagon defined civic action as:
the use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the
local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works,
agriculture, transportation, communication, health, sanitation and others
contributing to economic and social development which would also serve to
improve the standing of the military forces with the population .56
Several questions arise from the definition itself By its very nature civic action
contained an imperialist connotation. It consisted largely of bringing civilization to the
natives. The whole concept was externally imposed like most Alliance for Progress
programs.

It also embodied a militarist solution.

Under civic action the military

became the chief agent of economic development in the countryside, not civilian
government agencies or the peasants themselves. The third question to ask is why does
the indigenous military's standing with the population need to be improved?
answer was

The

that in most of the Third Word countries where the United States

employed civic action, the military had a terrible reputation as the violent gendarme of
the unjust status quo. Tiris was certainly the case in Guatemala where the appearance
of soldiers in Indian villages touched off panic -- and for good reason. Civic action
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therefore involved the concept of having soldiers with few economic skills attempt to
bring material prosperity to people who hated them
Since civic action neatly tied together

both the military and economic

components of the Alliance for Progress, the Kennedy Administration enthusiastically
pushed it as a kind of panacea for the socio-political problems of Latin America. In his
March 13, 1961, Alliance for Progress speech President Kennedy stated: "And the new
generation of military leaders has shown an increasing awareness that armies can not
'

only defend their countries -- they can as we have learned through our own Corps of
Engineers, help to build them "57

Unlike counter-insurgency,

civic action had the

advantage of being far more palatable to elements of the Congress that remained
skeptical of Kennedy's militaristic approach to Latin America. Senator George Aiken of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee expressed these sentiments when he spoke to
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara.
I have been concerned as I know you have over the past years , Mr . Secretary,
lest we provide the means for arming one Latin American country against
another -- or against their own people. I know we have both expressed a hope
that there will be more conversion to engineering battalions and other phases of
the military besides that of being strictly policemen. And I am glad to hear you
report what progress is being made. 58
Normally the Civil Action portion of a Military Assistance Program (MAP)
grant was in the area of 10-15%. (In Guatemala in the early 1960s it averaged 12%.) 59
But this 10-15% greatly eased the Congressional passage of MAP grants to dictatorial
regimes. Administration officials "talked up" the benefits of the Civic Action portion of
military assistance while they publicly down played the more unsavory aspect of
counter-insurgency and Office of Public Safety funding which really made up the lion's

50

share of grants. The opposite was true in classified documents where State Department
and CIA personnel rarely emphasized Civic Action as a workable solution to the crisis
in Guatemala.
The United States sent its very first Civic Action Mobile Training Team
(CAMTT) to Guatemala in November 1960. Guatemala served as a sort of guinea pig
for virtually all of Washington's Latin American security initiatives in this period. At
first the program was designed to have a very "low cost", almost "no cost" budgetary
profile. The U.S. would simply provide training and the Guatemalan military would
pick up the tab for improving its nation's infrastructure.

In 1961 the Kennedy

Administration expanded funding dramatically from the $75,000 the Eisenhower
Administration provided to $310,000.60

President Ydigoras expressed immense

enthusiasm for this new version of military assistance. Unpopular at the time, he saw
civic action as a vehicle to improve his image. The Guatemalan civic action program
was unique from all others in Latin America in that the United States Civic Action
coordinator acted solely as an advisor. As part of the deal to allow it to be tested in
their country, the Guatemalan military controlled and conducted the entire program
Both U.S. Army Mission and AID officials complained of this, fearing the notoriously
corrupt Y digoras might siphon off funding. Indeed for the amount of money and
equipment disbursed, the Guatemalan Army did not complete that many projects.
Civic action in Guatemala focused on a limited number of irrigation projects,
dispensary services, road building, school construction, water purification and sanitation
and communication improvements. As with several large AID projects many of these
had a dual civilian-military purpose. In accordance with U.S. military doctrine, the
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Guatemalan military carried out the majority of its civic action programs in the most
disaffected regions of the countryside, Zacapa and Izabal where the rebel movement
flourished. 61
The problems that resulted from the Guatemalan civic action program illustrated
some of the basic weaknesses and contradictions of the Alliance for Progress and the
Kennedy Doctrine in general. Supposed altruism engendered resentment from all sides.
Peasants and Indians expr~essed suspicion over these projects, particularly road building
and the laying of telephone lines in guerrilla areas. In the past, government school and
road construction always employed local Indian labor, providing desperately needed
income to the rural poor . Now the Guatemalan Army carried out the majority of these
construction projects , eliminating civilian jobs.

This also angered local ladino

construction firm owners. Large landowners complained that irrigation projects made
the Indian more self-reliant and less apt to report to work on their plantations.
Landowners regarded civic action built school houses with particular anathema. "Once
an Indian can read you can never get him to work. ..he becomes lazy... no good," one
stated in Barizan after the military erected a new school house. 62
Indian and peasant workers felt they could build schools and clinics more
cheaply and efficiently than the Army. They pointed to shoddy construction, inflated
costs, and graft at virtually every civic action site. Soldiers invariably sold left-over
construction materials to local businessmen. Many officers in the Guatemalan Army
infused with machismo and a centuries old warrior code deeply resented having to play
the part of "glorified construction workers." They felt it denigrated their stature as
soldiers to swing picks and shovels.
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With guerrillas operating openly in the

countryside, civic action programs seemed superfluous to them, their job was to kill the
enemies of the state.

Talented ambitious officers avoided civic action duty.

Incompetent, corrupt ones generally ran the program
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Because of its relatively low budget, $300,000 - $500,000 per year in the 1960s
(though some of this was supplemented with Guatemalan funds), the U.S.-Guatemalan
Civic Action Program had a showcase atmosphere to it. Isolated projects furnished
excellent ribbon cutting photo opportunities for U.S. and Guatemalan political and
military leaders. "A lot of it was a publicity gimmick," Peace Corp worker Gerald
McGetrick noted. 64 Indeed in 1963 some 20% of the U.S. Civic Action budget in
Guatemala went to such ceremonies, receptions and brochure publications, detailing the
accomplishments of Civic Action in Guatemala.65 The project never really made much
of a dent in the horrendous poverty of the countryside which by 1964 was the second
worst in the Hemisphere after Haiti. Bringing more soldiers into contact with peasants
and Indians did not have the beneficial effect Kennedy Administration officials hoped
for either. Guatemala officers could barely conceal their contempt for Indians even
while they worked among them

Stuck in isolated villages for weeks at a time, they

often raped Indian women and confiscated food and drink.

Questionable polls

(conducted in virtually occupied villages) showed only a slight increase in respect for
the military among the populace during the projects which rapidly eroded once the
soldiers left. Peasants became cynical. "You have to have a guerrilla unit nearby to get
drinking water," one said.66 President Y digoras liked to throw handfuls of candy at
Indian children while visiting civic action sites in perhaps a fitting metaphor for the
whole program
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Guerrilla fighter Hernandez Mayen, a witness to U.S.-Guatemalan
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civic action as a child, said: "I was glad that the Army built the school, but I would have
liked it better if they had killed all the landlords .1168

If the Kennedy Administration could not wm the "hearts and minds" of
Guatemalan peasants , it was determined to win over those of the Guatemalan military.
By early 1962, the White House translated the intellectual theory of counter-insurgency
into a

comprehensive bureaucratic
program
..

In January, 1962, National Security

Memorandum 124 established the Special Group (Counter-insurgency) as a permanent
part of the administration's national security apparatus (See table below)
Table Vl 69

---------

President

-

Special Group
(Counterinsurgency)

I
-----------------

National

lecurity
Council

Executive Departments
and Agencies
Members

Members

President
Vice-President
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Director , Office of
Emergency Planning

State Department, Chairman
Attorney General
Department of Defense
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Central Intelligence Agency
Agency for International Development
United States Information Agency
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

OFFICIALS :
Special Assistant to the
President for National
Security Affairs
Executive Secretary
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The Special Group, which met every Thursday afternoon in the Executive Office
Building, centered on formulating security policy for several designated target
countries. Though numerous other countries were later added in 1962 only four here
mentioned by name in National Security Memorandum 124 -- Laos, Thailand, South
Vietnam and Guatemala.., When asked how trouble spots were singled out, Deputy
Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric replied:

Well, usually either State of CIA or once in a while AID or Defense
would come up with a program which some desk officer had honed in
on. It wasn't a very scientific process ...It really reflected what was
happening in the world at a particular time and what particular area
offices were interested in...70

This Special Group (Counter-insurgency) structure proved important because it
was duplicated at the U,S. Embassy in Guatemala City (and many others) with Special
Group

(Counter-insurgency)

Country

Teams.

These

comprised

the

chief

representatives of the embassy, the military attaches, the USIA, the AID, the CIA,
military missions (or MAAGs) and other agencies represented in Guatemala.

The

Guatemalan Special Group Country Team met frequently under the close supervision
and leadership of the Ambassador, John 0. Bell.71

This whole process further

militarized U.S. embassies. Instead of being diplomats, ambassadors like Bell became
quasi-military leaders.

The whole concept of

counter- insurgency contained a

conspirational, cloak and dagger flavor which appealed to the Kennedy sense of style.
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The very concept helped lead ambassadors like Bell into clandestine midnight meetings
with the Guatemalan military and opposition political leaders, ever deeper into the
internal affairs and political morass of Guatemala. The cult of counter-insurgency
encouraged an underhanded, manipulative approach to foreign relations.

"Every

member of the embassy b~came an operative. We really started to think that we could
control events in what was really an uncontrollable society,"72 one official in the
Guatemalan embassy later admitted. The Kennedy Administration's entire view of the
world was that of a giant conspiracy which could only be mastered from great centers
of power.

Before an actual guerrilla movement erupted in February 1962, the Guatemalan
counter-insurgency program focused mainly on training the Guatemalan army in
preparation for this new style warfare. The Department of Defense erected a complex
new counter-insurgency bureaucracy to match the White House's which reached down
from the Pentagon to the lowest individual Guatemalan conscript. ( See table on next
page.)
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TABLE VII 73
COUNTER-INSURGENCY AND CMC ACTION
ORGANIZATION MODEL FOR TRAINING
Secretary of Defense

Assistant for Special Operat ions

Secretary of Army

'
Chiefs of Staff

Counter-insurgency Assistant
'

Special Assistant for
Counter -insurgencv

Army General Staff

Continental Army Command
(CONARC)

Deputy Chief of Staff

Assistant Deputy
Chief of Staff for
Special Opera tions

School of the
Americas
(Canal Zone)

Special Warfare
School
(Fort Bragg)

Director for Special
Warfare
(Counter- insurgency )

Director for Civil
Affairs
(CivicAction )

Civil Affairs
School
(Fort Gordon )

Tue majority of out-of-country counter-insurgency training for Guatemalan
officers and enlisted men took place at the U.S. Army Caribbean School in Panama ,
renamed the United States School of the Americas on July 1, 1963. President Kennedy
placed particular emphasis on this school, vastly increasing its faculty, training facilities,
curriculum, and enrollment. 74 The school's normal student load at one time consisted of
about 500 Latin American students (as opposed to 90 during the Eisenhower years).
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and specialists from the United States military though Latin American officers also took
part . The school had two instructional departments -- the internal security department
and the technical department. The former's course work was taught almost exclusively
in Spanish and included counter-insurgency operations, military intelligence, military
police, command and staff: infantry operations, jungle warfare, and airborne assault.
The department , according to its own handbook, provided "instruction in every aspect
of

counter-insurgency :,

military,

paramilitary,

political,

sociological,

and

psychological. "75 The school provided additional jungle training for Guatemalan cadets
at the United States Air Force Tropical Survival School located a the nearby Albrook
Airbase in the Canal Zone . The U.S. Army's Eighth Special Forces Group which
Kennedy permanently deployed to Panama in 1962 supplied instructors. 76 The table
below shows the number of Guatemalan graduates from the School of the Americas
1961-1964, approximating the Kennedy years.
TABLE VIII 77
Central American Graduates
United States School of the Americas 1961-1964
Number
1,639

Country
Costa Rica
El Salvador

358
958
810

Guatemala

Honduras
Nicaragua
Panama

2,969
1,420

TOTAL FOR CENTRAL AMERICA
TOTAL FOR LATIN AMERICA
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8, 154

16,343

Guatemala did not represent the highest number of graduates, largely because
alone of all the Central American countries, it maintained a U.S. Green Beret operated
counter-insurgency training base on its own territory, secretly established in Maricos in
May, 1962. By then Guatemala, unlike her sister republics, did not need to ship so
many officers and enlisted men to Panama for the latest, up-to-date instruction. Also of
note in the chart is the fact that nearly half of all Western Hemisphere School of the
Americas graduates came, from Central America even though their nations represented
only a tiny percentage of the total Latin American population. The proximity of the
region to both Cuba and the United States, plus the budding insurgency in Guatemala,
heightened the Kennedy White House's security concerns for the region.

Walter

LaFeber, one of the leading revisionist historians on U.S.-Central American relations,
refers to the U.S. School of the Americas as the School of Golpes (coups) in his 1984
work Inevitable Revolutions. A Mexican official remarked: "Give me the names of the
first 60 students and I'll pick your presidents in Latin America for the next 10 years. "78
Indeed, numerous officers trained there led revolts against democratically elected
governments in their home countries. While the Kennedy Administration initially hoped
to graduate professional, democratic minded young officers from these huge academies,
the emphasis on anti-communist ideology and counter-insurgency turned out a throng
of authoritarian rightists. Worse, their activities increased anti-Americanism throughout
the Hemisphere. These new Kennedy trained Latin American soldiers wore United
States-style uniforms, insignia, and helmets, carried United States weapons, and in the
case of Guatemala, were led by United States advisors. Who they represented was all
too apparent to embittered, impoverished campesinos.
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The

cream

of the

Guatemalan

young

officer

corps

received

further

out-of-country U.S . counter-insurgenc y instruction at the U.S . Army Special Warfare
Center and School at Fort Bragg , North Carolina . Unlike the School of the Americas ,
the Fort Bragg facility furnished training for primarily American troops and officers .
The United States bestowed a particular badge of honor on the select Latin American
officers (usually the brightest of their own service academies) that it invited to this
school. 79 (See table below.)
TABLE IX 80
LATIN AMERICAN GRADUATES
UNITED STATES ARMY SPECIAL WARFARE CENTER
AND SCHOOL (FORT BRAGG)
1961-1963
Country
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Haiti
Honduras
Mexico
Nicaragua
Peru
Venezuela
TOTAL

Number
19
23
2
6
5
1
14
1
13
1
1
3
8
4

11
112

Again for a country of only four million, Guatemala's 13 graduates indicate a
disproportionate representation . Graduates from this elite center invariably rose high in
the ranks of the Guatem alan military to command positions and political office (Lucas
Garcia and Rios Montt , presidents of Guatemala from 1978-1982
respecti v ely, both attended this school in the early 1960s ). 8 1
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and 1982- 1983

The United States also trained selected Guatemalan officers in civic action at the
Army Civil Affairs School at Fort Gordon, Georgia; in close support and napalm
bombing at the United States Air Force School at Albrook Air Base in the Canal Zone,
in Air Force Special Operations at the Air Commando School at Howard Air Force
Base in the Canal Zone and at the Special Air Warfare Center (SAWC) at Elgin Air
Force Base, Florida. 82
In 1962 on Presid1;nt Kennedy's expressed recommendation, an Inter-American
Defense College was established at Fort Lesley McNair in Washington, DC from which
16 Guatemalan cadets graduated by 1964.83 The proximity with the capital gave a
number of these young Guatemalan officers the chance to forge close links with
government officials, Congressmen and U.S. military officers at a number of
professional and social functions. 84
Another

important

component

m

U.S .

sponsored

Guatemalan

counter-insurgency training was the U.S. Army Special Forces Mobile Training Teams
(MTTs) . These consisted typically of twelve to thirty-six men squads of Green Beret
specialists who were flown in from the United States Eighth Special Forces Group at
Fort Clayton in the Canal Zone to train Guatemalan non-commissioned officers in
weapon use, equipment maintenance, paramilitary techniques , and anti-guerrilla
operations .85 A great advantage of the MTT concept was that it allowed the Executive
Branch in emergencies or otherwise to donate potentially vast amounts of specialized
training, equipment, even manpower, to Guatemala off budget.

MTT costs were

outside the Military Assistance Program (MAP) funding for a pa1ticular country such as
Guatemala .

They were billed instead to the Eighth Special Forces and Southern
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Command's budget in Panama. Equipment could be "lent" from the Eighth Special
Forces, training provided, even direct combat troops supplied without it ever showing
up as an overrun on Guatemala's MAP budget. The MTT program allowed both the
Kennedy and later Johnson Administration to circumvent Congressional oversight in
their counter-insurgency war in Guatemala.
Willard F. Barber and C. Neale Ronning's 1966 Internal Security and Military
Power in Latin America provides an excellent analysis of the Kennedy militarization of
Latin America in the early 1960s. An orthodox or neo-conservative work and nowhere
near as critical as later studies by Immerman, LaFeber, Stephen Schlesinger, or Rabe,
Internal Security and Military Power was, nonetheless, ahead of its time in calling into
question many assumptions of the Kennedy Doctrine. The authors proved prescient in
their delineations of said doctrine's contradictions. Another excellent work in this vein
is Cesar D. Sereseres' 1971 doctoral dissertation "Military Development and the U.S.
Military Assistance Program for Latin America."

Sereseres argues that Kennedy's

program did succeed, but only in transmitting military expertise, not democratic values,
to Guatemala.

All this vast panoply of inter-country training brought increased contact between
United States and Guatemalan military personnel. Part of the whole assumption behind
this effort (for Congressional sensibilities anyway) was that such contact had a
beneficial effect on the social and political views of Guatemalan officers. Secretary of
Defense Robert McNamara assured a Senate subcommittee that "the experience we
have had indicates that exposure of military officers to our schools acquaints them with
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democratic philosophies and democratic ways of thinking which they in tum take back
to their countries. 1186

How instructions on the proper method for slitting a guerrilla

suspect's throat with a K-bar knife fit into this scenario, the Secretary never elaborated .
Even within the Kennedy Administration, considerable skepticism existed on this point.
In 1963, Assistant Secretary of State Edwin Martin stated:
Theoretically we can put vast amounts of arms and riot equipment into
Latin American hands today to stamp out rebellion and shoot down the
Communist leaders and their followers. But in whose hands would we
put these arms? How can we be sure that the riot quellers of today will
not be the rioters of tomorrow? What good are arms and security
controls in a permanently unstable society? 87
These words could serve as the epitaph for the Kennedy Doctrine in Guatemala.
Senator Edward Gruening, a sharp critic of Kennedy's Latin American policy,
stated early in 1962:
Latin American military leaders contrary to the Administration's
misplaced faith in them, will continue to react to power struggles in their
own countries in accordance with their own estimates of the situation,
their own ambitions, their vested privileges, and their own heritage .
Democracy does not rub off by commingling of individuals or by grants
of military assistance. 1188
Since it would neither fundamentally change its investment and trade policy with
Guatemala, nor use its political and economic leverage to force through real agrarian
reform, the Kennedy Administration chose the military option together with some
largely cosmetic local improvement projects (this is not to say that the people involved
in these projects were insincere). It decided ultimately to bet on the Army and the
internal security system of Guatemala in order to achieve its over-arching strategic
goals . This militarization of policy was by no means unique to Guatemala. It took
place within a continental, indeed global, context. When Premier Khrushchev said in
1961, "We will bury you," he fed into the fears of the Kennedy Administration that
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Third World nationalism, both in Latin America and among the newly emergent African
and Asian nations, would naturally embrace World Communism and not the United
States . While in retrospect much ofKhrushev's rhetoric can be seen as bb.1£::at the time
to many highly respected observers the communist movement seemed in ascendancy.
As William 0. Walker ill has pointed out in his excellent 1994 article, "Mixing the
Sweet with the Sour: Kennedy, Johnson, and Latin America," the 1962 Cuban Missile
Crisis combined with the ,frustration and failure of implementing reforms, pushed the
Kennedy Administration irrevocably in its last year or so towards a less idealistic, more
hard line stance in Latin America.

The White House accepted military coups in

Argentina, Peru and Bolivia without cut-offs of economic or military assistance, which
it had formerly employed in such instances.89 As one diplomat brazenly put it, Latin
American governments needed "less development and democracy, and more machine
guns.1190

The table below showed how massive and unprecedented a buildup the

Kennedy program embodied in the Western Hemisphere.
TABLEX 9 1
UNITED STATES MILITARY AID TO LATIN AMERICA 1952-1963
Amount (in dollars)

Fiscal Year

200,000
11,200,000
34,500,000
31,800,000
30,400 ,000
43,900,000
47,900 ,000

1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963

54 ,600,000

53,700,000
91,600,000
123,200,000
149,700,000
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While a gradual buildup

already commenced under the Eisenhower

Administration (the huge leap from 1953 to 1954 was at least partially attributed to the
anxieties surrounding the 1954 Guatemalan coup), the virtually 300% increase from
1960 to 1963 remained striking. With the advent of the Kennedy Doctrine, the Cold
War had truly come home to Guatemala and substantial other parts of Latin America.
The Kennedy Administration's

creation

of an almost parallel secret

Counter-insurgency State stretched out both vertically and horizontally from the lofty
heights of the White House to the Department of Defense, the Agency for International
Development, the FBI, CIA, to the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala City, the National
Palace, seat of the Guatemalan Government and Military, to Training Centers and
Academies all over the world, and finally to individual nineteen year old Guatemalan
officers and conscripts and Mayan couples and their impoverished children drinking
dirty water from empty U.S. ration cans. The immense scope, bureaucracy and import

of this effort testified to the enormous influence the United States imposed on
Guatemalan society at every level in the early 1960s. The contrast was even more
striking compared to the 1940s and 1950s when, as one State Department official put
it: "Except for an occasional flare-up, the Latin American Desk was always a good
place to take a nap. "92 By the early 1960s, the Kennedy White House saw to it that no
one was sleeping.

The vast expanded machinery of statecraft kept grinding

remorselessly well into the night with all its attendant consequences. The Cuban Missile
C1i.sishad shown that the war for the soul of Latin America could indeed be a war to
the death, involving vast global stakes. The outbreak of leftist insurgencies throughout
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the region, combined with the immense increase in U.S. military assistance , set the stage
for over three decades of "dirty war" in the Western Hemisphere. That war would first
commence in Guatemala.
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CHAPTER IV

U.S. RESPONSE TO INSURGENCY AND POLITICAL CRISIS
IN GUATEMALA 1962-1965
On the morning of February 6, 1962, a force of about fifty Guatemalan

guerrillas attacked and captured two army outposts, one in the town of Morales, the
other in Bananera, the headquarters of the United Fruit Company's Atlantic Division.
The guerrillas seized weapons and money from the military posts and robbed the United
Fruit office of $18,000. The leader of both groups was the former Lieutenant Marco
Antonio Yon Sosa, one of the key participants in the November 13 1960 military revolt
against Y digoras. Along with his compatriot Luis Augusto Turcios Lima, Yon Sosa
launched a guerrilla insurgency which unnerved

the Kennedy and Johnson

administrations, turned both rebels into popular heroes and touched off what amounted
to a thirty-year civil war Guatemala. As a sign of the desperate,

devil-may-care

recklessness of the Guatemalan guerrilla movement, Yon Sosa commandeered a transit
bus that same day making all the passengers (many of whom cheered him) get off along
a dirt road. He then crashed through a military roadblock with the bus, shooting out all
the windows in a wild fire fight from which he narrowly escaped with his life. It would
prove the first in a series of hairsbreadth escapes which only further enhanced his legend
and frustrated the Guatemalan military's attempt to capture him 1
Yon Sosa and Turcios Lima were only twenty-two and nineteen respectively
when they joined the November 1960 revolt. Graduates of the Polytechnic School,
Guatemala's military academy, they had both received training in guerrilla warfare at
United States Army facilities as did most young Guatemalan officers; Turcios Lima at
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the Ranger school at Fort Benning, Georgia and Yon Sosa at Fort Gulick in the Canal
Zone. Turcios Lima in particular enjoyed his sojourn in the United States. "Sure I liked
it. We had the officers' club, 15 ounce Texas steaks, good clothes, the best equipment.
Plenty of money, too; every month I sent $150 to my mother. What worries did I
have?"2
Neither Yon Sosa nor Turcios Lima embraced a coherent political philosophy at
the time of the revolt, aside from the hyper-nationalism prevalent among young
Guatemalan officers. Neither communis~ socialism nor any long term societal reforms
interested most of the rebels. Their three principal demands included the resignation of
Y digoras, the cashiering of politically appointed senior officers and the transformation
of numerous military bases into educational centers.

Indeed, on the morning of

November 14th, when some eight hundred peasants presented themselves to the rebels
at the Zacapa base and asked for arms, the officers refused to issue them 3

A

correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor wrote from Guatemala City that
December:
It was the very limited scope of the movement's political orientation that
caused its military downfall; having a huge arsenal and a military zone
under its command signified nothing, so long as the military leaders did
not understand clearly why they were fighting and towards what goal
they were moving.4
Faced with the prospect of execution or lengthy imprisonment if captured, the
more daring rebel officers escaped into the countryside. Yon Sosa fled to Honduras,
while Turcios Lima managed to cross the border into El Savador. Along the way they
frequently sought refuge among peasants and it was through this experience that
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Turcios Lima and Yon Sosa began their political conversion to Communism Cesar
Montes , a later guerrilla leader, explained::
In Guatemala, as in Honduras and El Salvador all the peasants helped and

protected the rebels, tried to influence them and win them over to their side.
The peasants' motive was not only to offer them solidarity and sympathy but
also to win allies and leaders in their struggle for land. The peasants had done
this with many rebel leaders over and over again; they had been doing it for
years, for centuries. Many of the rebels did not respond but the effort was not
in vain; the influence was felt by some, although not immediately. Yon Sosa and
Alejandro de Leon's companeros did not jump to conclusions but little by little
the peasants won them over. 5
In the spring of 1961 Yon Sosa and Turcios Lima slipped back into Guatemala

and made several secretive forays to the capital. There they held talks with leaders of
Guatemalan political organizations. Of the "mainstream" political parties in Guatemala,
the Revolutionary Party (PR) was the most leftist oriented and one would assume
sympathetic to the rebels' cause. The PR had been the party of the progressive liberal
presidents Juan Jose Arevalo and Jacobo Arbenz, that had dominated Guatemalan
politics during the revolutionary period, the so-called "ten years of spring" between the
1944 revolution and the 1954 U.S. backed coup.6
At this stage of its development, however, the Revolutionary Party frowned
upon direct involvement with the violence prone rebels. Repression under both Castillo
Annas and Y digoras had decimated its ranks, imprisoning, executing and forcing into
exile its most militant members. While the party detested Y digoras, it hoped to replace
him constitutionally in the 1963 elections. Turcios Lima and Yon Sosa could not wait

that long.
In April 1961 Fidel Castro defeated the American sponsored Bay of Pigs

invasion. This David over Goliath victory against the great imperialist enemy enthralled
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communists, socialists, revolutionaries, and common people throughout Latin America.
Yon Sosa and Turcios Lima were no exception. Tue victory also moved Cuba into a
tighter alliance with the Soviet Union. In July 1961, the two young Guatemalan rebels
began talks with the Partido Guatamelteco del Trabajo (PGT), Tue Guatemalan
Communist Party. "They were different from the others," Turcios Lima later told an
interviewer:

"They really cared about the people. "7

From the very first meeting

according to Turcios LiJv.a "a close collaboration began between the PGT and the
military rebels."8 But still in these first few years the Communists did not dominate the
rebels' fairly broad based supporters. Guerrilla leader Camilo Sanchez recalled that
when he joined the rebels he discovered "not only Communists but also sincere
revolutionaries, Catholics, socialists, anarchists and people whose only aspiration was
to overthrow the regime in order to replace it with something more equitable. "9
In the same month of July 1961, Y digoras' government executed one of Turcios

Lima's and Yon Sosa's closest military comrades -- Alejandro de Leon who had been
captured by the chief of the Secret Police. This act precipitated a marked hardening in
the resolve of the rebels to embark on a program of violent revolution rather than seek
the political solution advocated by the Revolutionary Party. Tue rebel group called
itself the Guerrilla Movement Alejandro de Leon - November Thirteen (MR-13) - a
name that commemorated both their fallen comrade and the abortive revolt of 1960. In
their February 1962 opening statement, broadcast over a secret radio transmitter and
printed on thousands of leaflets distributed throughout Guatemala City, the guerrillas
declared:
Democracy vanished from our country long ago. No people can live in a
country where there is no democracy. That is why the demand for
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change is mounting in our country. We can no longer carry on in this
way . We must overthrow the Y digoras government and set up a
government which respects human rights, seeks ways and means to save
our country from its hardships, and pursues a serious self-respecting
foreign policy.10
This statement contained little in the way of Marxist ideology yet the Y digoras
government immediately branded MR-13 a Castro-Communist movement hiding behind
a progressive mask "to better dupe naive supporters and lull the United States into
complacency . 1111 Richard ,,Gott's 1970 Guerrilla Movements in Latin America is one of
the first revisionist studies of the guerrillas in Guatemala. It paints a complex portrait of
the various guerrillas' motivations and ideologies. Though clearly leftist, even Marxist
in orientation , the Guatemalan insurgency, according to Gott , was never Moscow or
even Havana controlled. Still it would later derive considerable moral and ideological
support form the world wide communist movement. Unlike Marxist writers , Eduardo
Galeano and Adolfo Gilly, Gott correctly perceived no inevitability to the guerrillas'
success and is frank about their relative weakness in the 1960s.

Though their initial attacks were militarily insignificant, the guerrillas succeeded
in electrifying the anti-Y digoras forces within Guatemala and precipitated the first of
numerous political crises. A further collapse in coffee prices and government losses in
the December 1961 National Assembly Elections contributed to the social and political
tensions . After leftist gunmen assassinated his universally despised Secret Police chief:
Colonel Renulto Gonzalez , on January 24, 1962, Ydigoras declared a state of siege,
shut down the University of San Carlos and flooded the capital with troops. 12 When the
guerrillas began their attacks a few days later, students , labor unions and rebel
77

sympathizers organized large demonstrations and strikes throughout Guatemala. In the
capital the demonstrations turned to riots. On February 16th student militants captured
two radio stations in the capital and began broadcasting various Castroite and
anti-Y digoras tracts. 13 In early March another guerrilla front, this one led by rebel
Colonel Paz Tejada, called the "October 20th Front" in honor of Juan Jose Arevalo's
1944 revolution,

began attacks on the government from Honduras.

Sympathizers

detonated bombs throughout the capital.14 Ydigoras called up 20,000 reservists and
stationed scores of soldiers in U.S. provided armored vehicles on every street comer of
Guatemala City. U.S. Ambassador John 0. Bell feared the President was losing his
gnp.

He wired the military authorities in Panama "to prepare for emergency

measures. '15 On the recommendation of the Commander in Chief Caribbean, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff dispatched a carrier group to Guatemala and ordered six additional
C-130 transport planes to reinforce already alerted paratroopers and Special Forces in
the Canal Zone . 16 Outraged Guatemalan political demonstrators continued to call for
the President's resignation. These included not just the centrist Revolutionary Party

(PR) and the Christian Democrats (CID) but even the right-wing National Liberation
Movement (MLN) which held Y digoras responsible for the revolutionary chaos and
resented his recent extremely modest land reform and tax proposals. 17
With both the right and left against him, all Y digoras really had to turn to was
the Guatemalan military and the United States. Fear of a second Cuba gripped both the
State Department and the National Security Council which met on March 1st to discuss
the crisis in Guatemala. The prospect of the Guatemalan government falling in a coup
to leftist, possible Communist guerrillas and their political supporters, constituted the
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ultimate nightmare of the Kennedy Administration.

Its entire doctrine had been

designed to prevent this. Y digoras played "the American card" masterfully. He wrote
President Kennedy on February 28, 1962, advising him that "the Cubans will be here in
a matter of days." 18
In April 1962, the Kennedy Administration took its first serious political step in
Guatemala when it encouraged U.S. ambassador John 0 . Bell to broker a political
agreement whereby the ,Guatemalan military assumed virtual control of Y digoras'
government. Increasing U.S. support for praetorianism or de facto military rule within
the Guatemalan government can be traced from this date. The Guatemalan military was
so concerned over the unrest it probably would have taken this step in any case. But
U.S. support steeled their determination. "I conveyed to the military chiefs the United
States understanding of the need for drastic measures in such a crisis," John Bell wrote
to Secretary of State Dean Rusk. 19
Y digoras replaced under pressure ten of his eleven civilian cabinet ministers with
military officers, an unprecedented step in Guatemalan history. Only his civilian foreign
minister, Unda Murillo, remained.20 The most powerful of these appointees was the
Minister of Defense Colonel Enrique Peralta Azurdia, the Guatemalan officer with the
strongest ties to the United States, who had most vigorously advocated the U.S.
military doctrines of civic action, counter-insurgency, and out-of-country U.S. training
for Guatemalan officers.

Peralta had served as Chief of Delegation on the

Inter-American Defense Board at Fort McNair, Washington, DC. He had also been
chief military

attache to the Guatemalan Embassy in Washington, 1957-1959.2 1 In a
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.)

comparison with a similar scenario unfolding in South Vietnam at almost the same time,
ifY digoras represented the Diem of Guatemala, Peralta Azurdia was the Ky.
The bulk of the Guatemalan military remained estranged from Y digoras despite
his belated efforts since the November 1960 revolt to regain their favor. Y digoras
especially indulged his Air Force. Well aware that most Latin American coups began
with the bombing of the Presidential Palace , he doubled Air Force salaries, issued
smart, distinctive blue uniforms and allowed pilots to supplement their incomes by up to
•
$20,000 a year through crop dusting.

His pampering of the Air Force widened the rift

between the two services which had intensified due to the alacrity with which the
Guatemalan Air Force bombed rebel Army officers during the November 1960 uprising.
The Guatemalan Army long regarded the Air Force established during World War II by
American advisers as a largely U.S. creation. 22 Nicknamed the "old Fox" , Ydigoras
used these tactics of "divide and conquer" not only against his political rivals but against
his own military, as did Diem, Ky, and Thieu in Vietnam
training

of the

U.S .

Guatemalan military, combined with the

indoctrination

and

general ideological

demonization of Castro presented in all U.S. service schools, contributed to the
combined messianic and siege mentality of the Army's leadership in the crucial
February-April 1962 crisis. Leading officers felt they had to take command "to save
their country from the clutches of diabolical Castro-Communism "23 Aside from radio
broadcasts of moral support, however, few credible links existed between Castro and
the demonstrators.
The increased flow of U.S. milita1y equipment, training and technology greatly
enhanced the prestige of the Guatemalan military, boosting its power and influence at a
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time when other segments of Guatemalan society appeared weak and fragmented . With
most of its reform elements either dead or radicalized, the military's nationalism became
wedded with a sharp distrust of all left leaning social reform. In a similar situation in
October 1944, the military responded to the popular will and overthrew the tyrannical
regime of Jorge Ubico, ushering in ten years of democracy . In April 1962, the officers
closed ranks around the unpopular Y digoras and crushed the general strike.
Their appetite fo~ political power whetted, indeed sanctioned, by the United
States, segments of the Guatemalan military next plotted the overthrow of Y digoras
himself to be replaced by a military junta. An interesting aspect of this process was the
United States' constant denial of the effects of its own collaboration with the military at
virtually every step of the way. In a telegram to the State Department dated August 14,
1962, Ambassador John 0. Bell stated:
I believe close U.S.-Latin military association does contribute something to the
development of Latin American military respect for democratic and progressive
policies and a great deal to their understanding of the dangers of communism I
do not suppose this or any other association likely to persuade the military of
the desirability of adhering to "Constitutional principles" if such adherence
appears to them the equivalent of delivering themselves and their country into
hands of radical regimes apt to produce Castro-type government...While there
may be some truth to the notion that U.S . equipment used increase military
prestige and increases the capability to suppress the citizenry whether such
increased capability will or will not be used to suppress democracy or
democratic elements is determined by attitudes and not the possession of
non-possession of U.S . equipment.Recent MAP policies accentuating internal
security mission and encouraging civic action seem right to me ...24
After his second close call in February-April 1962, Ydigoras still displayed
amazing political survival skills.

Realizing that once he crushed the small rural

insurgency in Guatemala, his usefulness to the United States might end, he cleverly
dithered on the anti-guerrilla front to the disgust of both the Guatemalan military and
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the U.S. embassy's Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) 25

In late October

1962, once again playing the reformer, he even enacted the country's first income tax. 26
This proved too much even for his favorites in the Air Force. On November 25, 1962,
encouraged by members of the oligarchy and upset over the possible return of the
liberal former president Arevalo, a number of pilots bombed the National Palace.
Y digoras emerged, covered with plaster and according to his own questionable account
(he was sixty-six at the tii:µe), began firing at the jets with a machine gun from the roof
of his palace. 27 Again Y digoras' byzantine intra-service tactics paid dividends. The
Army, long jealous and resentful of its sister service's numerous perks, enthusiastically
put down the revolt. Several senior Army officers, Colonel Peralta among them, feared
a leftist takeover if the President was suddenly and violently overthrown. They planned
on getting rid of him much more gradually themselves. 28

James

Dunkerly's

1988

post-revisionist work, Power in the Isthmus, supplies a detailed view of Guatemala's
internal politics throughout this period . Unlike earlier revisionists, such as LaFeber,
Immerman, Stephen Kinzer and Stephen Schlesinger, who tend to attribute almost all of
Guatemala's problems to outside manipulation, Dunkerly explores the inner workings of
Guatemalan domestic politics, the influences of both Spanish and Indian culture, and the
complexities of class, race and ideology as they relate to Guatemalan society. While he
views U.S. influence as a predominant constant , Dunkerly convincingly demonstrates
that Guatemalan politics provide the crucial catalyst for virtually all U.S. interventions .

The proposed return of former liberal progressive president Juan Jose Arevalo
from exile in Mexico to run in the 1963 presidential election, lent additional urgency to
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the military's plans to oust Ydigoras. Ydigoras seemingly went along with Arevalo's
political comeback, announced by the exiled president on Mexican radio. The "Old
Fox" apparently wished to play the various political parties in Guatemala off against one
another by maintaining the "Arevalo option."

Speaking to rightist,

Y digoras

condemned Arevalo; when addressing leftists he praised his reforms. Yet he took no
definitive stand one way or the another to either ban the ex-president or let him run.
The Guatemalan military took an extremely dim view of Arevalo. In the highly charged
•
reactionary atmosphere of the Cuban Missile Crisis and an ongoing insurgency, it
regarded even a largely centrist figure like the ex-president
crypto-Communist ."29

as a "dangerous

Arevalo made his own contribution to the historiography of

U.S.-Guatemalan relations with his early 1963 "dependency school" work, The Shark
and the Sardines.

Along with its title, Arevalo's overall viewpoint can best be

encapsulated in a rough translation of one of his book's chapters: "The Pentagon, Wall
Street, and the State Department -- Three Words for the Same Thing."
understandably bitter anti-American analysis

His

equated U.S. policy with outright

imperialism. He would soon face one wing of his designated unholy trinity.
The U.S. Embassy in a secret memorandum to the State Department, dated
November 12, 1962, ominously entitled "The Possibility of a Preventative Coup," noted
that the Military are determined to prevent the ascension of Arevalo to the
presidency ...No one should predict Ydigoras' early downfall... [but] the introduction of
the fear of Arevalo adds an additional element of danger to the equation. Recent steps
on Y digoras' part to demonstrate that despite his many contacts with Arevalo, he is
really anti-Arevalo, probably were calculated to ease military minds."30
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Student and labor groups stepped up their demonstrations throughout the winter
of 1962-1963 as the Guatemalan left anticipated the return of their hero, Arevalo, the
father of the 1944 revolution .
increased

Yon Sosa, Turcios Lima and Colonel Paz Tejada

their hit and run guerrilla attacks in the Sierra de las Minas mountains,

frequently cutting commercial traffic along the main Atlantic Highway. All the guerrilla
opposition movements in Guatemala united in December 1962 into the Fuerzes
Armedes Rebeldes (FARh Rebel Armed Forces. 31 Ydigoras further piqued the U.S .
military mission at this juncture by forbidding the creation of a heavy armored battalion
for continental defense. 32
proved prescient.

He feared it would be used against him and his instincts

The United States acquiesced and perhaps even conspired with

Y digoras' defense minister Colonel Peralta Azurdia in the March 1963

plot to

overthrow the president .
Ambassador John 0. Bell met with Y digoras for the last time on March 25,
1963. In a telegram summarizing their meeting, Bell stated:
I told him in my view neither Guatemala nor the United States could accept the
control of the government of Guatemala getting into hands which would be
likely to deliver the country to communism again ...Certainly if it were possible
to defeat Arevalo in a honest and clean election that would be a ideal. However
there was a great danger that Arevalo might win the election either because the
issues weren't clear, the opposition was too divided or the people might be
deceived as to his character. 33
Bell went on to say that Y digoras' position on "alternatives to the elections were
guarded and unclear." Worse, Bell mentioned Y digoras' saying that "Arevalo according
to the Constitution had a legal right to enter the election."

A follow-up CIA report

accused Y digoras of "collusion with the Marxist orientated Arevalo. "34
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Five days previously Y digoras had met with President Kennedy at the Central
American Presidents Meeting in San Jose , Costa Rica.
Y digoras, was noticeably "chilly" towards him

Kennedy, according to

CIA reports of the period persistently

questioned Y digoras' "reliability" -- notoriously dangerous words in the intelligence
community. 35 On March 27, Arevalo arrived secretly in Guatemala City, setting off
huge political rallies and numerous , according to the Office of Public Safety accounts -"anti-American disturbances. "36 This new crisis took place at a time when the United
~

States was obsessed with the deterioration of another of its authoritarian allies -- the
Diem regime in South Vietnam
A constant shuttle of Guatemalan high ranking military officers to and from the
U.S . Embassy followed until on the morning of March 31st, Y digoras awoke to a
Sherman tank crashing through his residence's front gate . Defense Minister Peralta
Azurdia announced a suspension of the 1956 Constitution , declared a state of siege and
then almost as an afterthought proclaimed himself "Chief of State. "37
An absolute "smoking gun" of U.S . complicity in the coup has yet to be

declassified . "Citing top sources within the Kennedy Administration" journalist Georgia
Anne Geyer in a December 24, 1966, article in the Miami Herald disclosed that
President Kennedy chaired a secret meeting in early January, 1963, which "gave the
green light" for a coup against Y digoras .38 Two of the five alleged participants denied
the meeting took place.

One, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Edwin

Martin , insisted the United States never approved an overthrow . "No initiative was
required for the military to oust Y digoras ," he told interviewers . He later admitted:
"We decided not to try to stop the military if they moved to overthrow Y digoras, a
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quite different thing from initiating a coup.1139 Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer
in their 1983 Bitter Fruit provide one of the better accounts of U.S. machinations in the
1963 coup though they slight Guatemalan participation.

The whole 1963 episode

remained strikingly similar to the November 1963 Diem coup in South Vietnam In
both cases evidence from the conspirators supports the notion that at the very least the
United States could have stopped either coup if it so desired. The military plotters in
both cases would not ha':;e dared to act without the expressed sanction of the United
States. Y digoras fared better than the assassinated Diem

The military exiled him to

Nicaragua, where he sulked and wrote his memoirs.
In an April 3, 1963, news conference, a reporter asked President Kennedy in

direct reference to the coup: "Are we going to have any consistent or uniform policy on
whether or not to recognize governments that take power by force?" Kennedy replied:
"No, we haven't got a consistent policy because circumstances are sometimes
inconsistent ...This government that has taken over in Guatemala has indicated that it
will eventually provide a return to civilian rule ..."40 In reality "civilian rule" would not

return for three more years. On April 17, 1963 the United States recognized the new
"government" a mere 18 days after the coup.

In fact, by this time the Kennedy

Administration did have a consistent policy on military coups in Latin America: if the
officers involved expressed a strict anti-communist line, their government would be
recognized; if the officers endorsed a leftist program, as in the 1963 military revolt in
Bolivia, the United States withheld recognition and cut all aid. By 1963 the White
House regarded the promotion of democracy in Latin America, so prevalent in its 1961
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rhetoric, as impracticable given the exigencies of the Cold War.

The Johnson

Administration's Mann Doctrine of 1964 would crystallize this transformation.
Ironically Colonel Peralta Azurdias' military government which the Kennedy
Administration hoped would immediately attack the guerrillas hesitated to unleash an all
out counter-insurgency war. The reasons proved complex. First, Peralta may have
genuinely desired a rapprochement with the guerrillas. Though he had not taken part in
the 1960 revolt, Peralta had a reputation as a mentor and confidant of many of the
,
younger rebel officers. He regarded a number of them as misguided youths who might
yet be brought back into the fold now that their arch-nemesis, Y digoras, had been
usurped.

Military solidarity and fraternity were intense throughout the Guatemalan

Armed Forces and in the early phases of the insurgency, many officers hesitated to fire
upon brother officers, a phenomena which also occurred in the early months of the
American Civil War. Second, Peralta, by all accounts a consummate professional, didn't
feel his military was ready yet to take on a large-scale counter-insurgency campaign
whose failure might cast a negative reflection on him. Third, like Y digoras, Peralta
recognized the advantages to having a troublesome if not especially virulent guerrilla
movement in Guatemala. It guaranteed continuous large scale U.S. economic and
military aid and tended to portray him as a heroic, embattled free world leader. Peralta
was also something of a nationalist who didn't like being ordered about constantly by
the United States Military Mission.41 The notion that all Latin American military leaders
were hopeless dupes of the United States is far too simplistic a characterization. Despite

its strong alliance with Washington, the Guatemalan military possessed a fierce
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nationalist tradition which often complicated its relationship with the United States .
The U.S . in tum grew increasingly frustrated with the new junta.
Peralta in any event proved a much more serious commander-in -chief than
Y digoras. He cracked down on corruption and brought in a new breed of efficient,
largely military administrators, engineers and specialists establishing a sort of "military
technocracy."

In May, 1962, in his capacity as Defense Minister , Peralta had already

authorized the construction of a secret counter-insurgency base in Maricos, Izabal, in
'
the heart of guerrilla country. Members of a U.S. Special Forces Mobile Training Team
(MTT) , consisting of three officers and three enlisted men, supervised anti-guerrilla
training at the base. All were Vietnam veterans and of Puerto Rican or Mexican
descent, chosen for their language skills and presumably to keep the operation less
conspicuous. Fifteen hand-picked Guatemalan officers, trained in counter-insurgency at
the U.S. Army School of the Americas, augmented the American staff.

This base

constituted the first counter-insurgency training facility outside United States territory
in the Western Hemisphere .42 It became a model for dozens of others, installed in Peru ,
Colombia, Bolivia, Honduras , Chile, Ecuador and Argentina in the 1960s and 1970s
during the Johnson and Nixon Administrations. The base provided the embryonic seed
for the larger Guatemalan Army's counter-insurgency battalions which would wreck
such havoc in the countryside in the mid-1960s .
In the fall of 1962, Peralta tested some of the smaller units trained at this
specialized facility. Transported by helicopter, led by Green Berets and reinforced with
U.S . paratroopers, they effectively wiped out Colonel Paz Tejada's "October 20th
Front". Pleased with these results, Peralta agreed to an expansion of the program
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In

the years of the military government, 1963-1966, Peralta with the principal aid of the
United States instituted a large specialized military build-up and modernization program
for all of Guatemala's armed forces.43
In January 1963, the U.S. Congress approved the FY 1963 U.S. Military
Assistance Program (MAP) for Guatemala budgeted at $1,667,000. This was revised
upwards after the March 31, 1963 coup to a total of $2,524,000. (The 1960 allocation,
Eisenhower's last, was $313,000.) The U.S. further boosted assistance by "windfall
-~

funds", monies provided under an AID "Civic Action" budget, raising the total dollar
value of the package $325,000 to $2,849,000.44 The Department of Defense disbursed
additional grants to this amount in the fall. Overall this constituted a roughly 900%
increase over the FY 1960 allocation. AID's Office of Public Safety's Guatemalan
budget for 1963 was $382,000, a 550% increase over the $71,000 spent in 1962.
(There had been a considerable drop in :fundingfrom $271,000 in FY 1961 to $71,000
in FY 1962, attributed both to overgenerous investments the previous two years and
U.S. disenchantment with Y digoras after the February-April 1962 uprising which the
Guatemalan military, not the OPS funded police, put down.) The United States made
another huge totally unrecorded contribution to the Guatemalan military in this period .
The CIA donated some $5 million in military hardware (planes, landing craft, mortars,
bombs, ammunitions, and small arms) left over in Guatemala from its failed 1961 Bay of
Pigs Invasion. Rather than crate and cart the equipment back to the United States, the
CIA simply gave it to its faithful collaborator, Y digoras.

The crafty president

apparently warehoused much of it, fearful of his own military and planning to dole it out
judiciously to individual officers for political favors. After the March 1963 coup,
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Peralta distributed all of this considerable cache to his Army, Navy and Air Force,
further engorging them with weaponry.45
Total funding for the United States' military assistance to Guatemala dropped
briefly in the years 1964 to 1966 before rising again in 1967 at the height of the
counter-insurgency war. But 1963 was a peak year of heavy U.S. investment. (See
table below.)

TABLE Xl 4 6
MILITARY AID TO GUATEMALA: 1962 - 1969
(Millions of dollars)

TOTAL MAP
Material
Training
Supply
(US logistical aid)
Excess Grants
Military Sales
TOTAL
MILITARY AID

1962
2.072
1.402
.49
.180

1963
2.35
1.675
.475
.205

1964
2.063
1.414
.520
.129

1965
1.339
.667
.528
.800

1966
1.489
1.044
.305
.100

1967
2.247
1.710
.436
.400

1968
1.225
.779
.336
.260

1969
1.993
1.649
.244
.050

.600
.106

1.100
.027

.200
.276

.800
.448

.100
.600

.400
.334

.200
.210

.050
.590

2.539

2.587

2. 189

2.981

1.635

2.583

2.666

3.482

Army and Air Force equipment and ammunition levels attained new heights as
well. The Air Force acquired 4 T-33 jet trainers and 4 C-47 aircraft, both particularly
suited for counter-insurgency operations.
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The Army received its first 4 U H-2

helicopter gunships, as well as trucks, radios, walkie-talkies and small arms. By the end
of 1965, five elite Guatemalan infantry battalions designated interestingly enough "MAP
units" reached full strength under the Peralta Administration. They were equipped with
the latest U.S . weaponry including .45 caliber pistols, .30 and .50 caliber machine guns,
60 and 81 mm mortars, M-16s, recoilless rifles, infrared night vision scopes , smoke and
explosive grenades, even guerrilla sniffing German shepherds. 47

Critics of the theory that U.S. military aid has a strong influence on the doctrine ,
capabilities and political predilections of Latin American militaries, such as Cesar D.
Sereseres, point out that U.S. military aid is usually a relatively small percentage of the
overall Latin American defense budget.

And this is certainly true in the case of

Guatemala. As the chart on the next page shows in the year in question , 1963, when
the United States funded the Guatemalan military with approximately $3. 5 million in
military aid, the government of Guatemala itself spent $9. 9 million on its own defense
budget.
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TABLE XII 4 8
GUATEMALAN DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS
(in millions of dollars)
1961
Presidential Office
.842
General Staff of the President
Presidential Guard
.247
Ministry of Foreign Relations
Central American Defense Affairs
(CONDECA)
8.804
Ministry of National Defense
"'
5.170
Personnel Services
1.965
Salaries for Officers
1.800
Salaries for Specialists
.840
Salaries for Enlisted
.565
Commissions and Pensions
3.504
Regular Operations
3.285
General Services-Food,
Medicine, FueL etc.
.168
Maintaining Students and
Attaches Abroad
.050
Military Life Insurance
Center for Development of Public
.001
Administration
Maintaining •Students at Escuela de
Applicacion
.130
Investment and Construction
Construction/Navy Headquarters .130
Construction/National Monument -Acquisition of Vehicles

1962
.798
.282

1963
.674
.259

1964
.608
.279

9.124
5.167
1.965
1.740
.863
.641
3.778
3.560

8.988
5.285

10.994
6.026

4.504

5.196

.781
3.653
3.434

.830
4.968
4.750

.168

.168

.150

.050

.050

.050

.001

.001

.001

.178
.130
.010
.038

.050

10.204

9.921

TOTAL FUNDS APPROPRIATED
FOR ARMED FORCES

9.893

11.881

But as the above Guatemalan Defense Appropriations chart demonstrates , the
vast majority of the nation's own defense funding went to salaries, maintenance of
facilities and equipment, food, fueL pensions, health care, insurance, and the like.
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Thus, while the U.S. proportion of the $13.4 million spent on defense in
Guatemala in 1963 (Guatemala's $9.9 million plus the U.S .'s $3.5 million) was only
26%, it provided the crucial 26% comprising all the new equipment and specialized
training

for elite counter-insurgency units, the so-called "tip of the spear" of the

Guatemalan Army. This $3.5 million imposed United States military doctrine on the
Guatemalan Armed Forces with its emphasis on counter-insurgency and civic action.
The bulk of Gua~emala's roughly 10,000 man Army were largely defensive,
maintenance, and administrative troops. The "MAP units", on the other hand, made up
an elite anti-guerrilla strike force . They consisted of five battalions . The Army based
three of them in Guatemala City: the two principal infantry battalions, Brigada Mariscal
Zavala and Brigada Guardia de Honor, as well as an elite military police battalion .
These were crucial because U.S. military advisors hammered home the importance of
maintaining absolute control in the capital city. Similar to Saigon in South Vietnam,
Guatemala City was the nerve center of the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group
(MAAG), the U.S . Embassy, the seat of the Guatemalan government and military
command, the vital political, economic and communication center of the nation . As in
Vietnam, U.S. and allied forces could afford to give up considerable portions of the
countryside , but always had to be able to hold the capital and put down any popular
insurrection or internal coup there "with first rate politically reliable troops ."49
In the key rural guerrilla areas, the Guatemalan military stationed their
remammg two elite battalions, the Brigada General Manuel Lisandro Barrillos in
Quetzatenengo and the Brigada Capitan General Rafael Carrera at Zacapa.

These

battalions were not numbered as were all others in the Guatemalan Army, but rather
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were named after former Guatemalan nationalist and military heroes, signifying their
elite status. In addition to these larger anti-guerrilla battalions, the United States helped
develop several smaller specialist units for counter-insurgency watfare. These included
the 1st Airborne Infantry Company, made up of elite paratroops modeled on the U.S.
Army "Rangers"; the 1st Special Forces Company called "Kaibiles" (Ixal for Tigers)
based on the U.S. Army "Green Berets"; a counter-insurgency unit menacingly referred
to as "the CT Detac~nt"
"Counter-Terror",

- "CT" teams in Vietnam during this period meant

and a "CI", Counter-Intelligence

Detachment.

Overall, these

specialty units included about 800 airborne and airmobile troops in the Special Forces
and Airborne infantry units, comprising the counter-insurgency shock troops of the
Guatemalan Army. U.S . Vietnam veteran Green Beret advisors trained, groomed, and
often hand-picked, each of these 800 "Tigers". 50
On United States advice, the Guatemalan military emphasized the para-military

side of the counter-insurgency equation as well. In 1963, Chief-of-State Peralta began
a massive revamping and expansion of the comissionados militares or military
commissioner system.

These had formerly consisted of part time, unpaid, regional

positions given typically to retired military or police personnel. Military commissioners
could not bear arms, had to live in the district in which they served and were often
appointed or even employed by local land-owners.

They registered and called up

military conscripts in their areas and reported on any local problems (i.e. political
dissidence) to the Army.

In 1963 they numbered 300. By 1966 there were 9,000 of

them, armed and paid members of the military reserve, writing comprehensive monthly
reports to the Army on subversion in their districts. They conducted surveillance of
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suspected enemies of the state, drew up lists of "peasant cooperative leaders, Indian
union leaders, guerrilla sympathizers and leftist malcontents".51

The military

commissioners became the eyes and ears of the Guatemalan Army deep in the
countryside where the military seldom penetrated. Their force structure was actually
even larger than the 9,000 men paid. Each commissioner normally had an informal
group of supporters consisting of landowners and their sons, plantation foremen and
overseers, businessmen, even local cantina toughs and hoodlums who could be counted
•

on to join him in any vigilante action. 52

Similar to the Civil Guard and Phoenix

programs in Vietnam, the military commissioner system provided the Guatemalan
military with a low cost, easy maintenance right wing hit squad in virtually every village
in the country. Richard N. Adams in his 1970 Crucifixion by Power and numerous
Latin American historians, particularly Alejandro de Coro in his suberb "Los
commissionados militares en Guatemala, 1963-1966," emphasize the significance of this
commissioner system in muzzling all political dissent in the countryside during the
Peralta regime and afterwards.
Peralta also fit his new security apparatus into the larger regional context. Here
the United

States applied pressure though Peralta, who had served as his nation's

delegate on the Inter-American Defense Board (IDB) appeared genuinely enthusiastic.
On December 14, 1963, representatives of five Central American nations - Guatemala,

Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Panama signed a treaty in Guatemala City
creating

the

organization

acronymed

CONDECA

(Consejo

de

Defensa

Centroamericana) -- the Central American Defense Board . In a speech at the elaborate
signing ceremony, Peralta said:
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A plan for the Defense of the Continent has been drawn up, presenting
as the single and exclusive enemy -- Russia. The Central American
Isthmus in this Plan...is considered as a unit not as five or six separate
units. As a consequence what is required is a military organ formed of
representatives of all the Armies of the Isthmus ...53
Peralta's designation of Russia as the principal enemy of CONDECA was
patently ludicrous and largely a political cover story.

With the preponderance of

American air, naval and amphibious power in the Caribbean, the idea of the Soviet
Union, or for that mattey Cuba, attempting an invasion of Central America defied
credulity.

Clearly the United States and Central American militaries created

CONDECA as a larger more efficient instrument for coordinating internal security.
Guerrillas in this period frequently displayed the annoying habit of crossing borders for
sanctuary. Despite its attempts to publicize itself as a sort of NATO or SEATO for
Central America, the organization was simply a larger regional counter-insurgency
mechanism as U.S. Department of Defense documents confirm. CONDECA called for
"a greater coordination of military and police operations against Communism" and "an
interchange of information and intelligence as a contribution to the fight against regional
subversion."54 In the first official meeting of CONDECA, held again in Guatemala City
in 1964, Peralta, who had come to power in a military coup, praised its potential as "a
rampart for the protection of the democratic system "55

While a supposedly

"independent security arrangement" CONDECA proved about as independent as the
Organization of American States. Though not an official member, the United States
through military aid, training and administrative command and control, effectively
dominated the organization.
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Also in 1964, as part of this larger regional military integration , Guatemala
joined the new U.S . constructed CAPT SN System, Central America and Panama
Telecommunication Network which linked all the Central American military and police
communications to the United States Southern Command in Quarry Heights , the Canal
Zone .56

Public

Safety Communications

Advisor , Alfred Nauracki,

an old

communications hand from Vietnam, helped construct this system within months of his
arrival in Guatemala in August , 1964. In a Public Safety Report dated October 13,
1966, the system is described as:
A totally secure radio-teletype network which interconnects on a private
frequency the principal officials of the Guatemalan National Police, Treasury
Police , Judicial Police, Detective Corps, Ministry of Defense , the President ial
House and the Guatemalan Military Communications and Command Center
with all analogous headquarters in the other four CONDECA nations as well as
the United States Southern Command.57
Guatemala was now a full member of the Central American Counter-insurgency
Internet. Along with the United States, it had in fact created the network. In his 1985
work , The American Connection : State Terror and Popular Resistance in Guatemala ,
Amnesty International activist, Michael McClintock , painstakingly reconstructs the
United States military and security assistance to Guatemala in the mid-fifties to early
1980s. It is McClintock's contention , which dovetails with Latin American military
specialists, Edwin Lieuwen and Morris Janowitz's opinions that the exportation of the
Kennedy counter-insurgency doctrine , equipment and training played a vital role in the
creation of a number of brutal military governments which sprang to power in the
region in the 1960s. In 1961 only one strictly military government held office in Latin
America , that of Paraguay. By 1964 there were nine, Guatemala foremost among them.
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In the crisis years of 1962 and 1963, the unstable yet elected government of
Miguel Y digoras Fuentes staggered through innumerable political crises before it
ultimately collapsed to a military coup. How legitimate the Y digoras government ever
was is clearly open to question. The March 1958 election that brought Ydigoras to
power has alternatively been described as "a massive hypocritical fraud" and "one of the
fairer elections in Guatemalan history. "58 When analyzing a Guatemalan election in the
1950s, it is important to remember that about half the electorate (illiterate Indians)
'
could not legally vote and the 20% of Indians who could were usually too frightened of
authorities to go near the polls. Therefore, if Y digoras was a legitimate president, he
was so only in the sense that say John Stennis of Mississippi was a legitimate senator in
the 1950s. That having been said, Ydigoras' regime, however corrupt and repressive,
was the constitutional government of Guatemala when military officers at the
instigation, or at the very least, with the approval of the United States, overthrew it.
The United States sponsored military build-up in Guatemala had been proceeding apace
before the assumption of power by a military government, but it clearly took off on a
substantially higher, more specialized trajectory afterwards. The United States put
very little pressure on the Peralta regime in the years 1963-1965 to hold elections and,
in fact, appeared much more at ease with his military caretaker government than with
the volatile Y digoras. Peralta did bring a measure of stability to Guatemala from 1963
to 1966, but at a considerable price. Internal repression soared and the military grew in
power to a proportion far exceeding its traditional role in Guatemala society. The U.S .
obsession with the rather small 300 man Guatemala guerrilla movement led to a
monstrous example of military overkill and to the acceptance of a government that
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violated all the ideals of the Alliance for Progress. This shift in Washington's policy was
most fully embodied in the Johnson Administration's Mann Doctrine which will be
analyzed in the next chapter.

IBtimately, the United States sacrificed its hopes for

economic and political reform in Guatemala like some ancient Mayan captive on the
altar of counter-insurgency .

Few State Department US AID, USIA, MAAG, or

CINCSO documents questioned the absurdity of the United States spending an annual
average of $5 83 per Guatemalan soldier in a country where per capita income was $181
(see table below) .
Table Xill 59
U.S. Military Assistance to Central America
Cumulative U.S. Military Aid, U.S. Military Aid per Member of
1952-1962
(Millions of dollars)

Country
Nicaragua
El Salvador
Honduras
Guatemala
Panama
Costa Rica

3.813
1.136
2.324
5.311
.929
.832

Armed Forces 1962
(dollars)
930
169
529
583

n.a.
n.a.

But as Communist guerrilla leader Caesar Montes said, "As long as there was
one rebel left bloody and ragged still fighting in the jungle, no landowner, no Yankee,
no generalissimo could ever sleep in peace . 1160 All three of these distinct interests would
unite for different reasons in the final phase of the Guatemalan counter-insurgency war

of the 1960s.
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CHAPTERV
VIETNAM ON THE ISTHMUS: THE U.S. LED COUNTER-INSURGENCY
WAR IN GUATEMALA 1966-1967

At midnight on March 3, 1966, some one hundred and fifty members of the
Guatemalan Judicial Police, led by U.S. trained military intelligence officers, raided
three residences in Guatemala City. The central committee of the outlawed Guatemalan
Communist Party (PGT) conducted its monthly meetings in the first house. In the other
two residences, members of the legal Federacion Nacional de Campesinos (FNC),
Guatemala's largest peasant union, gathered to discuss strategies for the upcoming
Presidential election, only three days away. The Judicial Police arrested twenty-eight
men from the three houses, among them Victor Manuel Gutierrez, secretary-general of
the Communist Party, and Leonardo Castillo Flores, Guatemala's most famous union
leader and the head of the FNC. 1
The police immediately took about two-thirds of "the twenty-eight" to a secret
military post in the countryside where they summarily executed them.

The more

important of the "twenty-eight" were interned in basement cells at Judicial Police
Headquarters . There, over the course of the next three days, the police interrogated,
tortured and eventually executed each and every one of them. Some of the bodies were
apparently flown to remote jungle locations where they were hacked to pieces with
machetes and their fragments strewn over a number of burial pits, the standard Judicial
Police method for disposing of political prisoners. In the case of the more important
personages,

Gutierrez and Flores, reports later surfaced that the military flew their

bodies out over the Pacific in American UH- I helicopters and dumped them into the
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sea, a technique commonly used against captured Viet Cong (VC) and National
Liberation Front (NLF) leaders in South Vietnam 2

In any case, none of the

twenty-eight were ever heard from again.
1bis strike, the first major offensive by the new elite U.S. trained CT
(Counter-Terror) Detachment and CI (Counter-Intelligence) Unit ushered in the start of
a savage new phase in the counter-insurgency war in Guatemala, prosecuted by both the
United States and .Guatemalan militaries. 1bis escalation to all-out war in Guatemala
eerily mirrored a similar process occurring eight thousand miles away in South Vietnam
There, too, by the mid-1960s, the Johnson White House eschewed earlier more surgical
methods of increased internal repression, military advice and training, air and combat
support in favor of direct military intervention by U.S. ground forces. The numbers of
U.S. troops deployed in Guatemala remained classified and controversial to this day,
but the Johnson Administration clearly opted for a more direct approach to attain its
politico-strategic goals just as it did in Southeast Asia and the Dominican Republic in
1965.
Johnson's Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs, Thomas Mann,
became the chief architect of the President's departures from the Kennedy Doctrine in
Latin American policy. Although an early enthusiast for the Alliance for Progress in
1961, Mann had a reputation as a veteran, hard boiled pragmatist when it came to the
Cold War in Latin America. He announced in 1964 that the United States would adopt
a more "realistic policy for dealing with Latin American military governments." There
would be "no more good guys and bad guys." All military juntas would get carrots and
Washington virtually threw away its rather seldom used stick. Preoccupied with the
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civil rights movement at home and military escalation in Southeast Asia, Johnson lost
interest in social reform south of the Rio Grande . Stepped up counter-insurgency war
proved the natural result of the Mann Doctrine , not just in Guatemala, but in Venezuela
in 1964, in Colombia 1964-1968, in Peru in 1965, and in Nicaragua , Honduras and
Bolivia in 1967.

The U.S. run Murder Incorporated Johnson expressed shock at

discovering in the Caribbean soon spread to the entire Hemisphere.

Johnson's

increasingly militaristic a1wroach to Latin America, forgotten due in part to all the
opprobrium heaped upon him for the Vietnam War, more closely resembled Ronald
Reagan's

than

any recent

counter-insurgency

wars

president.

Indeed,

while

in Latin America, Johnson

Reagan

conducted

fought

four

eight.

His

administration soft peddled economic development as the cure for Latin American
instability and increasingly brought out the heavy artillery in support of authoritarian
regnnes.
Peralta's so-called "military caretaker" government gave only a limited stability
to Guatemala in the years 1963-1966. Under Colonel Peralta , the military emerged as
a dominant force though it still ruled with the acquiescence of a larger coalition of
interests.

Senior officers occupied the center of this coalition which also included

foreign and domestic econoilllc interests and a newer breed of technicians and
administrators that arose ironically as a consequence of Alliance for Progress economic
investments and reforms .3
The Kennedy Administration's emphasis on technical training and education for
Guatemalan civilians (as well as the military), combined with the increase in
development and the expansion of the Guatemalan government , created a need for a
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new indigenous class of managers and technicians. Most of these bureaucrats and
specialists were ladinos and by the mid-1960s emerged as a crucial, new political
group.

What proved ironic is that this technocratic class, which the Kennedy

Administration

banked on to lead Guatemala to democracy, became among the

strongest supporters of military rule. They were, after all, committed and dependent
upon capitalist economic development and investment (many were lower and middle
level managers of U.S. o,wned Guatemala based firms) and an expanded government
bureaucracy ( others were civil servants for the government's new tepid social
programs).

These middle-class technocrats regarded the prospect of a socialist

revolution in Guatemala, the guerrilla program, with as much trepidation as the U.S.
trained military.4
The traditional landed oligarchy also supported the Peralta regime as a bulwark
against Communism or even worse, serious reform. But beginning in the mid-1960s,
the U.S. emboldened military increasingly shunted the oligarchy aside and usurped it as
the real political ruler of Guatemala.

As Mexican political scientist Edelberto

Torres-Rives put it, "Once the Army needed the oligarchy but now the oligarchy,
surrounded by guerrillas and caught up in a changing economy, needed the Army. "5
Peralta appointed scores of officers to key cabinet and top level government
administrative posts . While Peralta relied on the expertise of civilian technocrats, he
always wanted military officers above them

Indeed the civil administration courses

taught to Guatemalan officers at the U.S. School of the Americas encouraged this
trend. Peralta increased military salaries and encouraged officers to acquire plantations,
cattle ranches and private businesses of their own. One of the striking aspects about
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Guatemalan officers until the 1960s was -- with the exception of a few corrupt generals
-- how poor they all were. Though proud of their traditions, insular, clannish and elitist,
the majority of officers lived in substandard housing on military bases with their
families. Many "moonlighted" on the side as maintenance workers and night foremen to
supplement meager salaries. 6
In 1965 under Peralta, the military acquired their own bank, named quite
brazenly Banco de Ejercito (Army Bank) which invested heavily in U.S . manufacturing
~

and food processing franchises .

Peralta established a huge pension and military

investment fund called the Institute for Military Social Security (1PM). The IPM
provided start-up capital for the Guatemalan Bank of America.7

Officers began

drawing double salaries as body guards and security personnel for U.S. businessmen,
landowners and corporations. They charged "security fees" for new foreign enterprises.
With opposition newspaper

increasingly shut down and censored the Army's

newspaper, Ejercito , gained a larger prominence and circulation. In 1965 the military
established its own political party, the Partido Democratico Institutional, Democratic
Institutional Party (PID) which almost overnight became a major player on the
Guatemalan political scene. In 1966 the PID fielded a presidential candidate and a full
slate of congressional candidates .

Its positions on domestic issues often proved

sacrosanct. As one Christian Democratic leader, Danilio Barillas, complained "we can
get out the votes, but they (the PID) can get out the tanks .118 Richard N. Adams' 1970
Crucifixion by Power and Jerry L. Weaver's 1969 "The Military Elite and Political
Control in Guatemala 1963-1966" in Social Science Quarterly illustrate the corporatist
nature and political ascendency of the Guatemalan military in this period . Their analysis
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of the military's institutional expansion and unprecedented political opportunism could
serve as a model for similar government take-overs by generals and colonels throughout
Latin America in the 1960s. Jim Handy, in his underrated 1985 Gift of the Devil takes
a post-revisionist approach to the creation of a garrison state in Guatemala, bringing in
larger cultural, historical, racial, and even religious elements which helped the
Guatemalan military to view itself as the only possible savior of the nation.
By the early 1970s this trend of the military becoming an economic corporation
~

indivisible from the state reached full flower. Military men ran 46 semi-autonomous
state institutions.

They owned a cement factory Cementos Gustatoya, a radio and

television station, several factories and mining operations as well as the 800 unit Santa
Rosita housing project and a multi-storied parking building in downtown Guatemala
City.9 Like the Kennedy Administration, the Johnson White House supported the
Guatemalan Army as the one institution best capable of managing Guatemala. "The
military forces are the decisive power element and determinant of stability," a State
Department memorandum to the White House read. In a racist twist it continued
"...popular opinion and interest in democracy as a whole tends to be apathetic in
Guatemala. Only in the heat of a well publicized campaign or when the mass man
himself comes under unusual stress does he arouse himself to make his opinions felt.1110
But even the new administration was taken aback by the acquisitive corporate greed
that military rule eventually spawned.

"The military are beginning to take on a

vulture-like aspect," a later CIA report stated, "in acquiring properties from arrested
and executed suspects. "11
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Traditionally the Guatemalan Army had been an arbiter between various political
and economic factions within Guatemalan society, the conservatives and the liberals, the
landowners and the growing urban business elite. The Army was often a political
stepping stone for ambitious officers like Jorge Ubico and Miguel Y digoras Fuentes to
run for the presidency. At times the Guatemalan Army attached itself to a particular
political party or figure in order to maintain the balance of forces within Guatemala
such as when it supported the Revolutionary Party of Arevalo and Arbenz during the
"

Revolutionary "ten years of spring", 1944-1954. At this juncture the Army felt its
traditional benefactor, the landed oligarchy, had become too dominant. 12
By the mid-1960s, however, due in no small part to the United States' military
aid and indoctrination, the Guatemalan military had gone from the guardian of political
order to the absolute masters of Guatemalan society. Proud landowners and even
foreign corporations bowed as supplicants before Peralta and his junta, seeking support
and favors from a military they had once controlled. Had the U.S . not built up the
Guatemalan military into such a powerful, modern, highly skilled and uniquely equipped
institution, the new technocratic and educated ladino civilian class might have
eventually gained dominance over the landed oligarchy and instituted at least some
meaningful reform. But by its elevation of the military to the supreme seat of power,
the United States perhaps even unwittingly choked off this last possibility for peaceful
reform in Guatemala.
As the Guatemalan military became a major economic player, it increasingly
regarded the rising ladino elite as a competitor and its rather moderate reform
sensibilities as treason . Thus the United States warped economic development at the
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same time as it encouraged it.

The frustration of the educated ladino engineers,

teachers, managers, and administrators intensified by the late 1960s as the military
subordinated them to political impotence and turned violently against any who dared to
speak out. A guerrilla leader, Camillo Sanchez, crystallized this conflict:
If you keep giving one group of men more and more guns and you keep giving
another group of men more and more books, who do you think is going to
become the most powerful? And who do you think is going to become the most
frustrated? You Americans have created your own revolution so I cannot feel
sorry for you. 13
The political and social crisis which led to open warfare in 1966 actually began
the previous year. Peralta and the United States' steady yet measured build-up of the
Guatemalan military and security forces brought increasing repression especially in the
countryside and among Guatemalan students at the University of San Carlos.

One

political analyst noted that during the eight-year period between January 1962 and
January 1970, the Guatemalan people lived under a government instituted state of siege
for 58 out of 96 months. 14 Raids and security sweeps of the University became an
almost daily event with respected professors dragged out of packed lecture halls at gun
point and student leaders beaten to a bloody pulp in their dorms. In the countryside to
the already increased repression of the vastly expanded military commissioners system,
the Peralta regime added the Policia Militar Ambulante (PMA) or Mobile Military
Police . Formed in 1964, this new counter-insurgency police force of 1,000 men was
established by Decree Law 332 "to lend police service in the rural areas of the
Republic." Articles 5 and 6 of the Decree stated:
The PMA shall lend assistance in cases of emergency , to the owners and
administrators of estates, haciendas, agricultural lands, forests and all rural
properties ... [and] observes all activity that tends to inflame passions among the
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peasant masses or in the rural communities and when necessary repress through
licit means any disorder that shall occur. 15
In response to the government's ever tightening grip in the countryside, Yon
Sosa's and Turcios Limas' guerrilla groups stepped up their attacks focusing on
assassinating well-known brutal landlords and kidnapping others for ransom

The FAR

raised some $500,000 from kidnapping and robberies between 1964 and 1966. 16 These
funds helped purchase more weaponry and also funded "the April 12 Front," a student
resistance movement in the capital. Not all of Washington's concern over Castroite
links with the guerrillas proved unfounded.

Castro gave moral and political support,

some money , and tactical and strategic advice to the guerrillas . Turcios Lima traveled
to Havana in 1965 to meet with Castro.
"Guatemalan Revolutionaries

David A Crain's insightful 1975 article

and Havana's Ideological

Offensive of 1965-1968"

supplies the best account of Cuban-Guatemalan guerrilla links . He beautifully illustrates
the irony of the supreme anti-imperialist Castro attempting to dominate all the guerrilla
movements of Latin America. While the Guatemalan guerrilla movement was still
relatively small at this stage, CIA and State Department officials no doubt remembered
that Castro and Che Guevara had started out with only a handful of men in the Sierra
Maestra in Cuba in 1955 yet eventually overthrew Batista's regime and its 50,000 man,
American

equipped

indoctrination

army.

The

guerrilla

movement's

increasing

Communist

alarmed Washington and ended the trivializing of the movement by

dissenting analysts as "basically a bunch of bandits. "17
In 1965 the two main guerrilla movements split due to political bickering and
Yon Sosa's disgust with the lethargic Guatemalan Communist Party .
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Yon Sosa's

MR-13 broke away from FAR and espoused a Trotskyite , pro-Chinese line while
Turc ios Lima's "Edgar Ibarra Front" (named for a murdered student) remained in the
FAR and continued to align itself with the Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT) ,
Moscow and Havana. 18 Neither the Guatemalan nor United States governments has yet
to document a substantial weapons link between the guerrillas · and Castro.

The

Guatemalan guerrillas stole or bought about 80% of their weaponry from the
Guatemalan Army •(the remaining 20% came from private arms purchases in Mexico
~

and Costa Rica). 19

In another similarity with Vietnam, American military advisors

frequently expressed outrage at how many U.S . weapons ended up in the hands of
guerrillas due to corrupt or politically sympathetic Guatemalan officers . The Viet Cong
also fought and killed numerous U.S. advisers with M-16s and American made hand
grenades and mortars in this period purchased from the Army of the Republic of Viet
Nam (ARYN) .

Castro did send some medical supplies and small amounts of

ammunition to the guerrillas . A few Cuban volunteers fought with the FAR but even
CIA Intelligence estimates discounted any substantial Cuban role. 20 Whether Cuban
support might have increased in the future remained a legitimate concern for American
advisers.

Castro had a documented record of adventurism in Latin America , in

Venezuela in 1963 and Bolivia in 1967, and loved to stir up trouble for the United
States wherever possible but from his vantage point , having survived one invasion ,
numerous sabotage attacks and several assassination attempts by the CIA , Castro
probabl y regarded his own limited inteiventions as morally justified.
On February 5, 1965, MR-13 urban gunmen assassinated the chief of the United

States military mission, Colonel Harold Hauser , in his car while he was driving home
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from the U.S . Embassy . In a public statement MR-13 , cognizant of the links between
U.S . policy in Guatemala and Vietnam, claimed the act "constituted the response of the
Guatemalan people to the criminal acts of Yankee imperialism in North and South
Vietnam "21 Peralta declared a state of siege (the last one had just ended two months
previously) and suspended even the 1964 military constitution. A day later rebels burnt
down the United States Agency for International Development's (AID) motor pool
garage . They threw a hand grenade at Peralta (it bounced off his jeep and landed in a
~

crowd of civilians, killing several) and blew up Army trucks in the capital. In April and
May they machine-gunned the Guatemalan Army headquarters and the U.S. Consulate.
On May 21, they assassinated the Deputy Minister of Defense, Colonel Erresto Molina
Arreaga, near his home. In June, MR-13 launched bomb attacks against seven Latin
American Embassies in the capital, all belonging to nations that supported the U.S .
invasion of the Dominican Republic.22

The Guatemalan guerrillas regarded the

Dominican Invasion as a crucially significant event which might presage a U.S . invasion
of Guatemala or even Cuba.

Occurring as it did at the very moment the Johnson

Administration decided to introduce U.S. ground combat troops to South Vietnam, it
seemed part of a larger all-out American offensive against Third World nationalism
under the familiar guise of anti-communism

The Johnson White House was also

cognizant of the significance of this step. The invasion amounted to the first clear-cut
violation of the thirty-two year old Good Neighbor Policy of Franklin Delano
Roosevelt.

Unlike the 1954 Guatemalan coup and 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, which

largely employed surrogates, the Dominican Invasion deployed U.S . combat troops -22,000 of them.

It also violated the Organization of American States' Charter on
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non-intervention.

Troubled by the escalation in Vietna~ yet criticized by domestic

conservatives for not standing up enough against communists, Johnson apparently
hesitated to make this commitment. Mann and Rusk, on the other hand, urged him to
send in the Marines and paratroopers.

This invasion actually constituted the logical

outcome of Washington's obsession since 1959 of deterring a "second Cuba," the
essence of the whole Kennedy Doctrine in Latin America.
Confronted • with the Guatemalan military government's apparent impotence
"
before the guerrilla offensive, the White House's initial enthusiasm for Peralta began to
wane . A June 22, 1965, CIA National Intelligence Estimate sent to President Johnson
stated:
The Peralta regime, despite its effectiveness in reducing corruption has been
unable to take any affirmative decisions in the economic and social fields which
would have contributed to progress and to reduction of counter-insurgency
problems. The Government has been unable or unwilling to eliminate guerrilla
groups although sporadically aggressive patrol activity by the military has
succeeded in keeping them somewhat off balance ...
The U.S . should undertake in various low key ways, including direct personal
contact to make known to Peralta the U.S. view that an early return to
constitutional government is essential and emphasizing the U.S. concern that
failure to move in this direction enhances the possibility of subversion or civil
war. ..Further the U.S. should encourage Peralta to permit all "middle of the
road" political parties to present candidates for the presidency.23
By the fall of 1965, the Peralta government agreed, with some reluctance, to
hold presidential elections in March of 1966. Several underlying reasons can be listed
as to why Peralta decided to relinquish at least some of the reins of absolute power and
why the United States wanted a "more legitimate" government as well. First, Peralta
was confident that the military would retain most of the instruments of power even
under a civilian president just as the military had in the last year of Y digoras' reign.
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Second, Peralta and his advisors felt their governmental party, the PID, had a
reasonable chance of winning the election. Indeed in the final tally, the Institutional
Democratic Party (PID) polled second to the Revolutionary Party (PR) winner, Julio
Cesar Mendez Montenegro . And since the military government ran the election, there
always existed the possibility it could rig the results right up until election day. Third,
Peralta remained unwilling to assume a permanent position as Chief of State. Though a
ruthless anti-Communist, and a fierce champion of the Guatemalan military, Peralta had
..
a reputation for personal integrity. Unlike his two predecessors, he did not enrich
himself in office, lived modestly, and weeded out considerable corruption as even his
opponents grudgingly admitted. "Peralta was a bastard," guerrilla Pablo Momsanto
said, "but he was an honest bastard ."24 Fourth, the influence of the United States helped
force the military's hand.

A stiff necked nationalist, Peralta often rejected and

obstructed U.S. policy in Guatemala, yet with a military and an economy as dependent
as his on Washington, he had to take the American viewpoint into account.25
Its reputation still stinging from the angry Latin American denunciation of its
Dominican Republic invasion, the Johnson Administration sought some political cover
in a Guatemalan free election, the first in eight years. It hoped a civilian government
would diffuse guerrilla resistance and perhaps even implement some economic reforms
to further negate the social causes of insurgency.

More cynically, the Johnson

Administration realized conducting a savage counter-insurgency war under the guise of
a civilian government could prove more politically palatable than under a military one.
Frustrated with Peralta's obduracy, the White House felt it could achieve its military
aims more easily under a pliable civilian government, vulnerable to a military coup and
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dependent on U.S. political support for survival. "A civilian government might prove
much more amenable to our security needs," the new U.S. Ambassador, John Gordon
Mein, wrote to Dean Rusk. 26

Even before the actual election, the U.S. showed a

propensity for influencing and manipulating the leading candidate, Mendez Montenegro,
a former law professor at the University of San Carlos. A State Department telegram
to the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala City, dated February 14, 1966 stated:
We wonder whether the confidence gap between MM (Mendez Montenegro)
and the military- conservatives cannot be bridged . We wonder for example
whether MM could not reassure the business community on how far he
proposes to go in economic and social reforms and the military establishment on
the future status of their programs and control of communist activities. We
recognize that the mechanism for accomplishing this may be difficult to
assemble ... 27

Through its savage, sudden annihilation of "the 28", the Guatemalan military
delivered an unmistakable message to all political parties

that

it would

continue to

manage the domestic security affairs of Guatemala . The United States issued no protest
against this clear violation of human and constitutional rights and on the contrary
congratulated the government "on its recent success in disrupting communist subversive
activities. "28 The government held elections on March 6, 1966, in an atmosphere of
fear, terrorism and intimidation .
TABLE XIV 29
March 6, 1966 Guatemalan Presidential Elections
Candidate
Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro
Colonel Juan de Dios Aguilar
Colonel Miguel Argel Ponciano

PR
PID

MLN
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Votes

Percentage

199,545
145,863
109,386

43.9%
32.1%
24.0%

Since none of the three candidates gained an absolute majority, the National
Congress would have to decide the election in a special May 5 session. While the new
Constitution allowed illiterate Indians to vote for the first time since 1954, government
repression in the countryside discouraged even a moderate Indian turn-out. The table
below shows the problem of judging the legitimacy of Guatemalan elections in this
period .
TABLE:XV 30
,. Guatemalan Election Results 1958-1970

Winner

1958
1963
1966
1970

Abstention

Miguel Y digoras Fuentes
33.2%
Elections canceled
Julo Cesar Mendez Montenegro 43.7%
General Carlos Arana Osario
46.2%

Adult Population Voting for the
Winner
12.7%
10.0%
10.5%

Guatemala certainly qualified as an extremely "limited democracy", although it
should be noted that some of these figures are not far off from recent U.S. presidential
elections.
With no clear winner and the moderate-leftist Revolutionary Party in the lead,
rumors spread of a military coup to overturn the results and seat the Army's PIO
candidate and Peralta favorite, Colonel Aguilar. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, in a
March 10 telegram, instructed Ambassador Mein that a message be "conveyed to
Peralta that the White House would like to see the results fully respected and power
transferred peacefully."31
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The United States, through Ambassador Mein, helped broker an arrangement
between Mendez Montenegro and the military. A memorandum written by Bill Moyers
for President Johnson described the main points of the deal:
Peralta and other military leaders have worked out an agreement with Mendez
Montenegro under which Mendez will be allowed to assume office in exchange
for the following guarantees - 1) naming of the Defense Minister and other
heads of security departments by the military; 2) a continued and uninterfered
crackdown on Communists and subversives; 3) no prosecution of military
personnel for past misdeeds.32
It was later learned that this pact also included the military's right to appoint all
•

base and zone commanders, to have complete control over the military budget and not
to permit any radical elements, i.e., the supporters of Arevalo, Arbenz, Villagram
Kramer, and Lucas Caballeros (all four leftist-moderate political leaders) to participate
in the government. 33 This agreement clearly violated the Guatemalan Constitution and
created in effect two governments within Guatemala -- a civilian government
responsible for social policy severely restricted by the agreement; and a military
government which had the authority to wage its own private war, free from civilian
oversight.
Mendez Montenegro was no doubt aware of the Faustian nature of this deal.
Former admirers and allies on the left criticized him harshly for selling out his
administration before he even got started. Given his political weakness -- the military
and the U.S. held all the cards -- what real choices did the president-elect have?
Right-wing gunmen assassinated his brother Mario, the original PR's presidential
candidate, in October 1965 .

Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro demonstrated

considerable physical courage, picking up the mantle of his slain brother and running in
the election against a brutal

regime supported by numerous right-wing fanatics.
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Mendez Montenegro apparently hoped to isolate the more rightist elements within the
country and the military by broadening his moderate base of support through reform
legislation. With his liberal background, he also mistakenly expected to enjoy a special
relationship with the United States. But having helped install him, Washington quickly
left the president dangling in the wind, nudging him if anywhere to the right, particularly
on security issues.

Under its Mann Doctrine, the Johnson Administration preferred

strict anti-communists to liberal
political leaders, which the Kennedy Administration had
,.
at least lent some moral support.
At his inauguration on July 1, 1966, surrounded on the dais by military officers
and a throng of machine-gun toting commandos, Mendez Montenegro offered full
amnesty to any guerrillas who would give up the struggle and join the legitimate
democratic process.

Confidants of the president say he wore a bullet-proof vest that

day and carried a loaded .45 caliber pistol under his suit. He never went anywhere in
the next four years without being similarly equipped, not because he feared the
guerrillas, but because he feared his own Army bodyguards. 34 Following a drum roll
and orchestral flourish, U.S. Ambassador Mein congratulated the sweating president on
"the return of democracy to Guatemala. "35
The guerrillas rejected Mendez Montenegro's

amnesty offer and shortly

afterwards the Guatemala military attacked them with a savagery seldom witnessed
under Peralta's military regime. Paradoxically, as political scientist Cesar D. Sereseres
has pointed out, Mendez Montenegro had everything to gain and nothing to lose in
agreeing to the all-out U.S. supported final solution to the guerrilla dilemma. Fighting
a war in the countryside kept the military occupied and left them neither the time nor
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the inclination to launch a coup d'etat against his government.

Mendez Montenegro

shored up his position with suspicious rightists in the MLN and PIO by proving more
bellicose than Peralta in ferreting out and destroying Communist rebels. By instituting
an aggressive counter- insurgency campaign, Mendez Montenegro held his hand on a
lever that would enable him to demand more economic aid from the United States
government than ever before. Here, after all was a popularly elected law professor -- of
all occupations -- fightin,g a lone heroic battle against Communist guerrillas in the

Western Hemisphere. What conservative Congressional Committee could deny him all
the economic aid he requested? Any additional military aid garnered only boosted his
prestige with the Army.36

The war, however, rapidly escalated into a horrendous

tragedy in which the security forces butchered hundreds of Mendez Montenegro's
sincere supporters .

The president had concluded a truly Faustian deal whose

dimensions he probably failed to imagine the day he signed the pact at the National
Palace.
The Guatemalan Army, which between 1963 and 1966 had increased 50% from
8,000 to 12,000 men, struck hard on October 1, 1966, in the eastern departments of
Izabal and Zacapa. The counter-insurgency campaign was directed first at controlling
the vital and often attacked Atlantic Highway, then rapidly spread out to the adjoining
rural areas that had come under control of the FAR- Rebel Armed Forces. The
operation which had required months of logistical and training preparation proceeded
on an unprecedented scope and scale. The U.S. 1965 creation of a central maintenance
facility, a central supply depot, and a central Recruit Training Base proved an essential
logistical prelude to this operation. 37 UH-1 Army helicopters airlifted elite Guatemalan
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.•

paratroop and Special Forces strike units directly on top of guerrilla controlled villages.
Others flew into rapidly constructed airstrips on C-47 transport planes. Thousands
more drove in on trucks and newly supplied M-113 armored personnel carriers along
recently built civic action roads.

A few specialty units even launched amphibious

assaults in U.S. donated 40 foot CGUB patrol boats and 85 foot CPB amphibious
landing craft.38 "Suddenly from out of nowhere,"

one of the few rebel survivors,

Alvarado Lopez, recalleq, "there were thousands of soldiers everywhere.
parachuted from the sky, they landed in helicopters, they poured

They

in on armored

cars ...And always they were led by the American Green Berets. "39
How many U.S. Green Berets took part in this operation remains a matter of
considerable dispute.

Chicago Daily News correspondent Georgia Anne Geyer

reported up to a thousand Green Berets from the Eighth Special Forces Group in
Panama flew in for the operation (the unit had a strength of 1,400 men).40

They not

only led Guatemalan Army units but served as direct combat troops . Because of the
intensive rotation policy of the Green Berets, nearly two-thirds of the Eighth Special
Forces had Vietnam experience.

Tuey represented an indispensable, highly skilled

veteran anti-guerrilla force. The Defense Department denied the figure of 1,000 but
admitted to having nine Special Forces Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) in Guatemala in
the summer and fall of 1966. With a normal strength of between twelve and thirty-six
men, these nine MTTs could comprise over three hundred Green Berets. But according
to guerrillas, several U.S. correspondents and even members of the Guatemalan
military, the figure was much higher. The Pentagon admitted twenty-eight Green
Berets died in combat in Guatemala 1966-1967, supposedly while "advising
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Guatemalan units."

Again, these figures are disputed.

Green Beret Vietnam and

Guatemalan veteran Donald Duncan puts the figure at least three times higher.

41

The

Pentagon could have used several methods to lower the Guatemalan Green Beret body
count. One is by adding combat dead to those Eighth Special Forces soldiers who died
in training exercises in Panama in 1966-1967. Another even more novel concept,
according to Donald Duncan, was that the U.S. Army flew Green Berets rotating out of
Vietnam directly to the C,illlalZone and Guatemala. If they were killed or wounded in
the Guatemalan operation their names went onto the Fifth and Seventh Special Forces
Vietnam casualty lists.42 According to this theory perhaps as many as a score of the
Green Berets listed on the Vietnam Memorial in Washington died in Guatemala, not
Vietnam
The U.S.-led regular and elite troops swept through the villages of Zacapa and
Izabal and worked in close cooperation with paramilitary irregulars, Military Mobile
Police (PMA) as well as the crucial military commissioners. These paramilitary forces
walked along the lines of prisoners and pointed out guerrilla sympathizers or suspects in
the same manner as Vietnamese Civil Guard, Phoenix operatives and Kit Carsons
pointed our VC suspects to ARYN and U.S. military during village sweeps in the Delta
and Central Highlands. The PMA summarily executed most suspects. Others were
taken away for interrogation and internment in "Tiger Cages" (La Tigrera) at Judicial
Police Headquarters similar to those in the notorious Con San prison in Vietnam or in
cells known as "the Stables" (Las Cuardas) at National Police Headquarters. The police
used electronic and water torture methods commonly practiced in Vietnam 43
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The Army also relocated hundreds of Guatemalan villagers to resettlement
camps where they forced them to bear arms and vow their allegiance to the
government. Political scientist Susanne Jonas referred to these camps as "the strategic
hamlets of Guatemala."

The commander of the Zacapa operation, Colonel Carlos

Arana Osario, later known as the "Butcher of Zacapa," conducted a particularly brutal
scorched earth campaign in his department, burning villages, destroying crops, killing
livestock and turning guei,;rillasupport areas into wastelands. He referred to his efforts
in Vietnam double speak as a "pacification campaign."44

New Left historian, Susanne

Jonas, remains probably the foremost authority of human rights abuses in Guatemala in
this period and has compiled an impressive amount of research, beginning with the 1974
Guatemala, continuing with 19841s Guatemala: Tyranny on Trial and her most recent
1991 The Battle for Guatemala: Rebels, Death Squads, and U.S. Power. Jonas relies
heavily on Guatemalan sources, particularly oral histories of the victims of atrocities.
At times her work degenerates into flat-out anti-American diatribes with a strong
Marxist undertone, nonetheless, her studies provide invaluable data on the inhumanity
and barbarity of counter-insurgency in Guatemala which more conventional historians
often treat in far too clinical terms.

Many other military tactics used in Guatemala also fit into classic Vietnamese
counter-insurgency doctrine. The Guatemalan Army and Air Force supplied close air
support with UH-1 helicopters gunships and fixed wing aircraft. Tuey strafed, bombed,
defoliated and napalmed villages using the infamous Dow Chemical jellied gasoline for
the first time in the Western Hemisphere. Unconfirmed reports claimed United States
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Air Force bombers flying from the Canal Zone joined in on these operations.43 This

might not have even been necessary as MAP funding had furnished the Guatemalan
Army and Air Force with sufficient combat aircraft of its own. As Ambassador Mein
said in a ceremony upon the delivery of five new HU-lB jet powered helicopters:

These articles, especially the helicopters, are not easy to obtain at this time since
they are being utilized by our forces in the defense of liberty in Southeast Asia.
But liberty must be defended wherever it is threatened and that liberty is now
being threatened ifl. Guatemala.45
The Guatemalan Air Force designated areas fraught with guerrilla activity zonas
libres ("free fire zones") where extensive indiscriminate bombing and artillery barrages
were permitted. U.S. advisors from the Air Mission directed Guatemalan Air Force
operations and even participated in some of them

The death in a crash by U.S. Air

Force Major Bernard Westfall of the Air Mission in September 1967 while on a
bombing mission in a converted T-33 jet trainer (the most common U.S. donated
Guatemalan aircraft) confirmed this. Officially Westfall "died while testing the aircraft"
but according to Maryknoll missionaries and Guatemalan activists, Thomas and
Marjorie Melville, in Guatemala -- Another Vietnam?, "it was common knowledge and
a public topic of conversation that the Major [Westfall] often tested Guatemala aircraft
in strafing and bombing runs against guerrilla encampments in the northeastern
territory . "46
The United States set up a rotation system referred to jokingly as the
"Saigon-Guatemala Shuttle." According to the U.S. State Department records and the
Foreign Service Lists and Biographic Register, some twenty-eight diplomatic, AID, and
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Office of Public Safety personnel, previously stationed in Vietnam, were transferred to
the U .S. Embassy in Guatemala during the 1964-1972 period. Below is a list by year of
that personnel:
TABLEXVI

47

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS REASSIGNED FROM SOUTH VIETNAM
TO GUATEMALA 1964-1972
1964
1969
Newton B. Knox - ROCAP*
Russell L. Hale - deputy controller
1965
Stan W. Jorgensen - consular officer
Alfred N aurucki - public safety advisor
James L. Roush - public safety advisor
1966
Drayton Phillips - program evaluation
officer
Robert E . Zimmerman - USIA
1970
David Jickling - public safety advisor
Leo E. Crampsey- administration
specialist
1967
Gerald D. Brown - public safety advisor
Lucille E . Martin - admin . asst .
Nathan Rakahar - budget/acct. officer
F. R Worten - engineer
Robert E . Culberton - director AID
Dudley Burris - public safety advisor
Jack Force y - public safety advisor
1968
1971
Rudy V. Fimbres - multisector officer
Richard A Barth - auditor
Richard E . Kaegi- asst/dir . devl. operations Norbert F. Holz - multisector officer
Sara Shonk - disbursement officer
Karl L. Mahler - deputy exec . officer
Richard D . Van Winkle - pub/safety advisor Carl M. Fisher - hwy . engr . advisor
David Wright - political officer
Robert R Parker - multisector officer
1972 Raymond F. Burghardt, Jr. - political officer
*Regional Office for Central America and Panama
Six of the sixteen public safety administrators stationed in Guatemala during the
counter-insurgency war period 1966-1970 had been previously assigned to the Public
Safety Administration in South Vietnam

The CIA has not released records as to how

many of its Guatemalan operatives previously served in Vietnam but if the strong
pattern evidenced by the State Department is any indication, one can assume they were
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significant. Uruguayan journalist Eduardo Galeano, a close confidant of the guerrillas,
came up with his own short list in his book, Guatemala: Pais Occupado:
TABLEXVII
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CIA Agents Transferred from Vietnam to Guatemala.
Serving in Jutiapa Military Base
Headquarters
Richard Park Guthrie
John Chapleo Beckimon
Elton Nurmi
..
John Mess

Serving in lzabal Military
Robert Bemestein
Arnold Blechenger
Oscar Hunt Adams
Edward Thorton Floyd
Arthur Kerr
James McNamara
Edward Suarez

Three individuals on the State Department list, Gerald D. Brown, Alfred
Naurocki and Jack Forcey, served on the staff of the CIA's infamous pacification
agency in Vietnam, the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS),
which helped set up the Civil Guard, strategic hamlet and Phoenix assassination
programs.

Human rights activists identified two public safety advisors and one political

programs officer within the U.S. Embassy: Dudley Burris, Richard D. Van Winkle and
David Wright as CIA agents.

Several key U.S. military officers attached

to

Guatemala's MAAG had also served in Vietnam. They included the 1966-1967 head of
the U.S. military mission, Colonel Joseph Koontz, the 1967-1968 chief advisor, Colonel
John Webber, and the head of the U.S. Civic Action advisory staff during the
counter-insurgency campaign of 1966-1968, Major Frederick F. Woerner, "a combat
veteran of over fifty search and destroy missions in Vietnam. "49
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By the spring of 1967 the State Department judged the rural counter-insurgency
war in Guatemala "a huge success."50

U.S. and Guatemalan forces completely

annihilated whole units of Guatemalan rebels. Many of the rebels failed to maintain
proper security and lived openly in vulnerable villages. According to the rebels own
highly critical postmortem, new student recruits neglected to maintain watches or
apprise their units of government military movements. The guerrillas also failed to
establish a strong Indian_and peasant support base within Zacapa and Izabal. Tuey
didn't receive enough intelligence from the local population which in several cases
turned against them and cooperated with the Army.51
Mostly, however ,

the massive fire power and mobility of the U.S. led

Guatemalan forces simply overwhelmed the guerrillas. In a combined arms effort, the
U.S. brought thousands of seasoned, well equipped troops against the guerrillas' rather
amateurish and lightly armed 500 man force. Tue guerrillas also suffered a key loss of
leadership.

Turcios Lima died under somewhat mysterious circumstances in a

automobile accident in early October 1966, just as the government offensive opened.
His death decapitated the rebel movement at the very start of the campaign. Tue
government killed or captured some four hundred out of five hundred active guerrillas
in the first few months of the war, dealing a severe defeat to the rural insurgency that it
would really not recover from until the mid-1970s.52
In the wake of this counter-insurgency success government allied paramilitary

forces launched a reign of terror in both the cities and the countryside. They took
advantage of the wartime crisis atmosphere to settle old scores with political enemies
and even neutrals.

Besides the PMA, the military commissioners and the Judicial
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police, a number of "private groups" came to fore in this effort.

They included

Movimento Anti-Communista Nacionclista Organizado or MANO BLANCO, Nueva
Organizacion Anti-Communista or NOA, Consejo Anticommunista de Guatemala or
CADEG, as well as numerous others, RAYO, CRAG and ASA
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These groups,

comprised of retired servicemen and policemen, reservists, landowners, businessmen
and paid thugs systematically eliminated all individuals suspected of "communist
leanings."

They slaught~red hundreds of largely non-communist civilians -- labor

organizers, peasant cooperative leaders, agrarian improvement workers , rural teachers,
labor lawyers, leftist journalists, college students and professors , and just about
everyone who subscribed to any political beliefs to the left of the MLN. This terror
campaign effectively wiped out the few successful grass roots Alliance for Progress
programs in Guatemala and reasserted the oligarchy's unchallenged rule in the
countryside. Hard line paramilitary groups maintained strong links to the Guatemalan
military and its U.S. advisors.

In early 1967 they even began assassinating

Revolutionary Party mayors, councilmen and officials -- members of the President
Mendez Montenegro's own party. In the all-out counter-insurgency war of 1966-1968
and the counter-terror that followed it, 8,000 to 11,000 Guatemalan civilians lost their
lives.54
But the Johnson Administration's troubles had just begun for the Guatemalan
left rocked back on its heels, counter attacked with a ferocity that matched the right
wing paramilitary outrages . While the war continued smoldering in the countryside, its
main focus shifted to the capital where Guatemala City, like Saigon, soon faced its own
Tet Offensive.
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CHAPTER VI
TET COMES TO GUATEMALA: THE URBAN GUERRILLA CRISIS
1967 - 1969

The April 1967 Office of Public Safety Incident Report sent from Guatemala
City to Washington had a distinctively upbeat ring about it. It stat~d that April had
been "a fairly good month and a considerable improvement over March." In April the
report went on to say there had been "2 riots , 5 attacks on the police, 4 attacks against
~

police buildings, 9 attacks by guerrillas or organized bands other than on the police, 8
bombings , 7 assassinations , 5 political kidnappings and 7 reported incidents of
sabotage ." 1 All in all, for the Guatemalan government in 1967, a fairly calm month .
The first optimistic reports of success against the rural guerrillas in late 1966
turned markedly sour by spring. Due in no small part to the wave of assassinations in
the countryside by MLN allied paramilitary groups, new recruits joined the guerrillas as
fast as the security forces could kill them Left-wing retaliations increasingly spread to
the cities where a fairly effective "safe house" network afforded guerrillas some refuge
from the storm

A number of tactical advantages derived from taking the war to the

city, chief among them the reluctance of the military to bomb its own capital . Urban
warfare negated the government's overwhelming air advantage in the countryside .2
The U.S . led rural counter-insurgency campaign, besides wiping out several
hundred guerrillas , also killed thousands of innocent civilians caught in the crossfire of
napalm, mortar and artillery barrages , helicopter gunship raids, and heavy conventional
bombing. The death toll was estimated at 4,000, but it would more than double after
this strictly military phase of the campaign ended . The Guatemalan Army and its U.S .
134

advisors committed the classic counter-insurgency error warned against in its own
doctrine:
Military operations by large bodies of troops, as a non-selective method of
applying force are likely to inflict disproportionate hardship on the civil
population; it will be compounded if the troops regard themselves as in enemy
tenitory and behave accordingly. The result is likely to be popular bitterness
which turns fii.endly or neutral elements against the government. Large scale
operations directed against guenillas thereby tend by their very nature to
strengthen and widen the very insurgency they seek to defeat.3
With scores of villages and farms destroyed by the "pacification campaign", as in
Vietnam thousands of peasants fled to the cities depopulating their traditional
farmlands.

These rural refugees proved

fertile recruiting ground for the bomb

throwers , kidnappers and assassins of the left. They also supplied additional murder
victims for the hit squads of the right.
While the rebels may have suffered severe setbacks in the countryside, like the
Viet Cong and North Vietnamese in the winter of 1967-1968, they hoped to rebound
politically by taking the war to the cities and striking at the very bowels of the security
apparatus built to destroy them Although the Guatemalan left's tactics at times proved
as inflammatory, vicious and inhumane as the government's it is important to note that
the government launched the opening blows in this new "dirty war" phase of the
counter-insurgency and inflicted atrocities at a rate that can best be estimated at about
five to one in comparison to the left.4

The left's sporadic attacks tended towards

emotional response. The right's terror campaign proved much more systematic.
As early as June 1966 a full month before Mendez Montenegro's government
took office, the first ominous, unsigned leaflets appeared in Guatemala City proclaiming
the creation of anti-Communist "defense squads." Some seventeen paramilitary groups
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eventually sprang to life in the 1966-1967 period, many of them clearly fictitious
nomenclatures for Guatemalan military and police units.

While several of these

paramilitary groups may have been independently formed, they all maintained close ties
to the Guatemalan military and police as well as the National Liberation Movement

(MLN) , Guatemala's leading right-wing party

and President Mendez Montenegro's

chief political opponents .5
The MLN 's leade.r Mario Sandoval Alarcon pulled no punches in spelling out
his party's philosophy. "I am a Fascist and I have always tried to model my party after
the Spanish Falange. "6

Besides the larger, more infamous, terror groups such as

MANO BLANCO, NOA, CADEG , RAYO, ASA, a number of smaller groups surfaced,
sporting more flamboyant names: Ojo per Ojo (Eye for an Eye), Rosa Purpura (Purple
Rose) and El Buitre Justiciero (The Hawk of Justice).

In the 1970s many of these

groups took on religious connotations -- the Assassins of the Virgin Mary, the Army of
St. John the Baptist, etc., but in the 1960s most remained strictly political. 7 The MLN
and much of the oligarchy supported these groups quite openly. Wealthy businessman

Raul Garc~a Granados told the Guatemalan daily La Hora :
Of course, the death squads are organized under the patronage
the government and the Army . They have lists of people that
being communists and they kill them It's war, you see,
communists and anti-Communists . They have the sympathy
Guatemalan people .8

and approval of
are suspected of
a war between
of most of the

U.S . investors seconded Granados' opinion. Bank of America manager Keith
Parker said:

When you've got a situation like you have here you need the strongest
government you can get. If you use human rights in a country with guerrillas
you're not going to get anywhere ...What they do here is declare martial law.
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Then when you catch somebody, they go to a military court . Three colonels are
sitting there; you're guilty, you're shot . It works very well.9
This philosophy contradicted the official , prosaic anti-guerrilla rules laid out by
the Defense Department and Embassy MAAG that included such homilies as:
1. Pay the market price in cash for anything obtained locally .
2. Return anything you borrow.
3. Pay for everything you break.
4. Never walk on or needlessly damage growing crops.
5. Leave people's women along.
6. Be courteous and polite to people and help them when you can.
7. Use a minimum of\riolence and only as a last resort in selective situations .10
I

The president of the American Chamber of Commerce in Guatemala , Fred
Sherwood , took a more pragmatic view:
Why should we do anything about the death squads?
commies , our enemies. rd give them more power .
cartridges if I could , and every one else would , too.
enemies, which are also the enemies of the United
criticize them? 11

They're bumping off the
Hell, rd give them more
They're bumping off our
States . Why should we

Sherwood had a point. U .S. counter-insurgency doctrine included "the selective
use of counter-terror through paramilitary forces. 1112 This philosophy comprised the
psychological

part

of the

counter-insurgency

equation.

Friendly governments

supposedly had the legitimate right to retaliate in kind against communist terror directed
against them

As Naval Intelligence officer , Albert L. Fisher , wrote in "To Beat the

Guerrillas at Their Own Game , 11in Military Review:
This is the tactic of intimidating, kidnapping or assassinating carefully selected
members of the opposition in a manner that will reap the maximum
psychological benefit for :friendly forces. 13
This type of doctrine had been taught for years to Guatemalan officer candidates
at the U.S . Army School of the Americas and dozens of other U.S. facilities around the
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world. Therefore when the United States expressed alarm at escalating paramilitary
violence in Guatemala, its criticisms should be judged more as protest against the
amount and not the~

of violence employed.

The MLN took out full page advertisements as early as August 26, 1966, in
Guatemala's most popular newspaper El Imparcial which warned of the impending
"vigilante action...the MLN cannot prevent the people from acting in self-defense. The
government should not ~ be surprised that the citizenry organize themselves for
self-defense or take justice into their own hands." 14 On May 7, 1967, just as the
counter-terror gathered momentum, another advertisement, this time in La Hora read:
The government, the people and the Army have amalgamated into a single
fighting force with the object of destroying the guerrillas definitively in a
political and armed struggle without quarter which will be a true national
crusade!15
The MLN mounted a concerted effort both in the cities and the countryside to
whip up a popular frenzy for its new vengeance campaign. It bussed urban supporters
to rural demonstrations where they waved placards reading: "Death to the Guerrillas!"
"Long Live the Army!" "We Don't Want to Be Another Cuba!" "Guerrillas, Stop
Killing Innocent People!"

The U.S. Embassy drove American journalists to these

staged events where they reported "mass peasant support for the counter-insurgency
campaign in Zacapa and Izabal. "16
Paramilitary groups next distributed death list pamphlets throughout the cities
with names and pictures of "Traitors to the Guatemalan Nation."
Guatemalan Air Force planes dropped these leaflets.
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In rural areas

"Your Hour Has Come,

Communists at the Service of Fidel Castro, Russia and Communist China." They read:
"You have until the last day of March to leave the country. "17
MANO BLANCO enthusiasts stencil painted hundreds of white hands on the
doorways of union leaders, leftist journalists, activist priests , labor lawyers, even largely
moderate politicians who had once suggested negotiations with the guerrillas.
The paramilitary squads placed the mutilated bodies of their first victims in
prominent areas: in city market squares, on the steps of churches or in victims'

..

doorways. They pinned notes to the bodies which explicitly described: "how the victim
had been slowly cut to pieces, castrated, strangled, burned , drowned or smothered. "18
Often pieces of bodies were simply strewn about city streets, leaving it to relatives to
piece them together and try and discover who was who. Hundreds of victims simply
disappeared never to be heard of again, ten years before the desseperados of Argentina
became a cause celebre.19

The U.S. Army's 1962 field manual Operations Against

Irregular Forces, the virtual bible at the U.S. School of the Americas in the early 1960s,
included the following list of overt irregular activities that could be used to confront
communist insurgents and their supporters:
terrorism by assassination, bombing arson, torture , mutilation and kidnapping,
provocation of incidents, reprisals, and holding of hostages, the use of chemical
or biological agents, the use of booby traps and explosive devices.
Covert irregular activities included:
espionage, sabotage, dissemination of propaganda and rumors, issuing of false
or misleading reports , assassination, extortion, blackmail, identifying individuals
for terroristic attack, psychological destruction of individuals.20
Lyndon Johnson may have been referring to more than just the CIA
assassination attempts on Castro when he exclaimed in 1964: "We have been operating
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a damned Murder Incorporated in the Caribbean!"21

In his 1984 work, Ganison

Guatemala, George Black investigated U.S. complicity with violent paramilitary
organizations.

Black demonstrates how the Guatemalan military and elites, long

accustomed to hostility against the Indians and upstart ladino reformers, felt more at
ease with the United States anti-communist crusade than with their own country's
nationalist aspirations.

This attitude embodied a classic colonial elite mentality,

emphasized in much of Franz Fanon's ground breaking work, and is clearly rooted in the
...

300 year old Spanish colonial experience. Like many revisionist studies published in the
early 1980s at the height of the Reagan backed contra war in Nicaragua and the bloody
civil war in El Salvador, Garrison Guatemala contains a fair amount of presentism and
sometimes reaches, in trying to present parallels between the 1960s and the 1980s.
Black does an effective job, however, in portraying counter-revolution as a way of life
for successive Guatemalan governments ever since the 1954 U.S. backed coup.

By the fall of 1967 the activities of right-wing assassination squads reached
pandemic proportions. Every week scores of twisted bodies, many those of outstanding
and educated ladinos were discovered in rivers, lakes, municipal dumps and alleyways.
At the funeral of academic and labor lawyer, Julio Carey Herriera, the rector of the
University of San Carlos expressed the frustration of those trying to reform the political
system:
The black banner that preaches the death of intelligence has been raised many
times ...It seems that the blood of the university is being demanded as the
solution to the problems of Guatemala. It seems that giving bands of killers a
license to operate is seen as the solution to our problems.22
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Earlier in the year, Walt Rostow, Chairman of the State Department Planning
Council and a longtime counter-insurgency enthusiast, praised "the aggressiveness of
the security forces in Guatemala" which resulted in "the death or capture of several key
members of the guerrilla and urban terrorist apparatus ...The security forces should be
congratulated for conducting an outstanding counter-terrorism campaign against the
Communists. 1123 Rostow failed in any way to either mention or criticize the incredible
amount of atrocities and bloodletting associated with this effort. He also totally ignored

..

the concerns of the duly elected Revolutionary Party (PR) whose Congressional
representative Edmundo Lopez Duran spoke out in the Congress in February 1967:
"The situation of the state of siege has been taken advantage of by the terrorist
organization MANO BLANCO and by the military commissioners to persecute and kill
well known members of the Partido Revolucionario."24 The next day MANO BLANCO
I

put Lopez on its death list. (They murdered him in January 1968.)
By October 1967, however, the State Department Director of Intelligence and
Research, Thomas Hughes sent an urgent memorandum to Dean Rusk:
President Mendez Montenegro evidently gave the security forces a carte blanche
in the field of internal security in exchange for military support to his
administration. The United States supported this arrangement. He and we may
now wish to reconsider, however, as the military use of extra-legal tactics is
creating considerable unease in Guatemala and threatens to undermine the
President's popular support. The Embassy warns that continued use of such
rough and ready counter-insurgency tactics could lead to popular agitation for
the re-establishment of law and order, and eventually might create conditions
propitious for a coup ...At the center of the Army's clandestine counter-terrorist
apparatus is the Special Commando Unit formed in January 1967 by CIA
advisors and currently under the command of Colonel Maximo Zepeda.
Composed of both military and civilian personnel, the Special Unit has carried
out abductions, bombings, street assassinations and execution of real or alleged
communist and occasionally has also acted against other vaguely, defined
"enemies of the government." The Special Unit supposedly does not act
without specific orders from Colonel Zepeda who in tum receives his
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instructions from the Defense Minister, Colonel Arriaga Bosque..For a time the
Special Unit also worked with the leaders of the notorious MANO
BLANCO ...rough estimates indicate that approximately 500-600 persons have
been killed by the unit since January; with the addition of missing persons this
figure might double to 1,000-1,200.
This remarkable document ( one of the few declassified and completely
unsanitized reports of the period) went on to describe the full breadth of the
Guatemalan terror network as well as the depth of U.S. complicity:
Civilian counter-insurgency groups armed and organized by the military are also
active in rural Guatemala -- particularly under the jurisdiction of Colonel Carlos
Arana, commander of the Zacapa Military Brigade ...The Army says it has
approximately 1800 armed civilians under its control but other armed groups are
known to be operating semi-independently. These groups have long been a
source of concern to rural members of President Mendez's Revolutionary Party
(PR) who have complained of persecution and who fear that reported
rightist/military plans to expand these groups are motivated by partisan political
considerations ...The entire situation brings into serious question the ability of
President Mendez, the government or even the Minister of Defense to control
the activities of the counter-insurgents ...We find persuasive the Embassy
speculation that "in some instances the government can still exercise a degree of
control over the activities of the clandestine killer units, both civilian and
military" but that it would "be foolhardy to count on it." Mendez may shortly
discover, ifhe has not already done so, that survival can have too high a price.25
The crowning irony of this conclusion was that the United States helped push
Mendez Montenegro into making his agreement with the military in the first place. But
now that right-wing terror, which Washington helped sponsor, began to spin out of
control, the State Department blamed Mendez Montenegro for failing to bridle his
military.
What the Guatemalan military at the behest of the United States government
actually conducted in Guatemala was a Central American version of the highly
controversial Vietnam Phoenix Program. Begun also in 1967 by CIA assistant director,
William Colby, the Phoenix program embodied an abandonment of the original
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integrated rural program of Robert Komer's in Vietnam, the so-called "strategic hamlet
concept", in favor of a complete liquidation of the Viet Cong infrastructure. As ex-CIA
agent, Frank Snepp, put it: "Instead of winning their hearts and minds the idea behind
Phoenix was to just kill the bastards. 1126 By 1971, the Phoenix program had eliminated
20,687 supposed members of the VC resistance network. (The South Vietnamese
government cited a figure of 40,994.)27

This program, like its smaller version in

Guatemala, encompassed the use of specialized "CT" counter-terrorism units comprised
of CIA, U.S. Special Forces and indigenous South Vietnamese paramilitary personne~
the so called Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRUs) to identify and assassinate anyone
remotely connected to the Viet Cong.

Besides VC operatives the victims included

Buddhists, students, opposition politicians and civilian critics of the Saigon regime -even personal enemies and creditors of the assassins.28 The program called for the use
of murder, ambushes, kidnappings, torture and intimidation against VC leadership, the
same "fight fire with fire" rationale employed by right-wing terrorist groups in
Guatemala.
Political violence in Guatemala reached a crescendo in early January, 1968,
when members of MANO BLANCO dumped the raped, mutilated and tortured body of
popular 26-year old Rogelia Cruz Martinez, the former "Miss Guatemala of 1959" onto
a main thoroughfare in the capital. Martinez came from an upper middle class family,
professed leftist sympathies and was reportedly the girlfriend of rebel guerrilla Leonard
Castillo Johnson.29

On January 16, 1968, before the outcry over this atrocity died

down, masked FAR machine gunners, firing from a passing green sedan, sprayed a
Ford van full of U.S. military advisors about ten blocks from the U.S. Embassy. They
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succeeded in killing the chief of the U.S. military mission, Colonel John D. Webber, and
the Naval Attache, Lieutenant Commander Ernest A Munro, as well as wounding two
other U.S. servicemen. 30

The FAR issued a statement claiming the attack represented

an act of vengeance against "the master minds of the genocidal forces that had
murdered 4,000 Guatemalans in the past year. "31
A January 26, 1968 Time Magazine article reported that "Webber and Munro
were victims of their own success in Guatemala ." The article went on to praise the
~

energetic Webber for reinvigorating the Guatemalan counter-insurgency

effort by

procuring "U.S. jeeps, trucks, armored cars and helicopters to give the army more
firepower."

When the reporter questioned Webber's policy of arming "civilian

collaborators to kill peasants who they considered guerrillas or potential guerrillas,"
Webber replied: "That's the way this country is. The Communists are using everything
they have including terror. It must be met ."32

In his statement Webber conformed to the widely held misconception
proclaimed in virtually every official document of the period that terror lay at the base
of the Guatemalan guerrillas' civilian support.

This constantly repeated "mantra"

appeared as an almost desperate attempt to explain away the apparent cooperation of
large segments of the population with the Revolutionary guerrillas.

Washington's

counter-insurgency dogma remained adamant in its belief that peasants were coerced
into compliance with the Communists. Why else would they join them? The Vietnam
experience is replete with similar delusions .

Since the counter-insurgency experts

mistakenly held terror as the key communist technique, it naturally followed that
counter-terror framed the appropriate military response . Yet with the exception of a
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limited number of executions of government informants and notoriously brutal
landlords, the Guatemalan guerrillas practiced very little terrorism against civilians in
the countryside. In fact, they went out of their way, unlike the U.S . trained Guatemalan
counter-insurgency units, to befriend the population.

"Without the people we are

nothing," FAR leader Cesar Montes said. "We have men who work with us by night
and work the soil by day. We build the people's organization for revolutionary war.
Land to him who works it is our slogan."33

Eduardo Galeano, a Marxist Uraguyan

journalist, spent several months in 1966-67 in the mountains of Zacapa, interviewing the
guerrillas. His 1968 Guatemala: Pais Occupado is an important representation of the
radical Latin American view of U.S.-Guatemalan relations. Published at the height of
the Vietnam War, his work captures much of the romanticism, the tragedy , and the
violent anti-Americanism of the period. Imperialism is Galeano's favorite word and he
manages to work it into practically every other sentence. His view of Guatemala and
most of Latin America as a colony of the United States is an important one, however,
so prevalent among the Latin American Left in the 1960s and 1970s. Galeano is a kind
of forerunner of the later "dependency school" of economists and other social scientists,
such as Andre Gunder Frank, who maintain that the only thing the United States ever
developed in Latin America was underdevelopment. This school strongly influenced
later revisionist historians such as Walter LaFeber and Richard Immermann.

Tue decapitation of the U.S. military mission in Guatemala in January 1968
sparked increased waves of atrocities.

Right wing gunmen

cut down liberal

Congressmen at home over their breakfast tables. Police captains were assassinated
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leaving church. One labor leader ran into a police station to escape a carload of MANO
BLANCO gunmen. The police shot him in the lobby. Bleeding profusely he begged for
his life. Laughing, the police carried him up to the fourth story roof and threw him
off.34 He thus joined the list of "leftist suicides" which one U.S. embassy official
surmised "may be a result of the growing disillusionment with communist ideology. "35
By the spring of 1968 the collapse of Mendez Montenegro's government
appeared imminent: It could not control Guatemalan Army directed terrorism or the

"

retaliations and bombings of the left. In an example of both Mendez Montenegro's
growing impotence and personal decency, the National Palace was full of his friends
and former students sleeping on cots and sofas. Once he learned acquaintances were on
the "death lists" the president invited them to live with him in the palace, the only place
in Guatemala where political activists were safe.36 Moderate elements even those that
originally supported MLN

paramilitary attacks on communist civilians and blatant

leftists felt the campaign had gone too far. Washington's confidence in Mendez
Montenegro reached a new low after the assassination of its military mission and
increasing rumors of military plots against him. Hard right officers, aligned with the
MLN, resented the president's efforts to restrain their paramilitary campaign and plotted
against him.
On March 16, 1968 the Guatemalan right, delirious with recent success,
overplayed its hand. Three key security force officers, Colonel Francisco Arana, leader
of the Zacapa counter-insurgency war and of the paramilitary terror in the countryside;
Colonel Manuel Francisco Sosa Avila, the Director of the National Police and
coordinator of the right-wing urban death squads; and Colonel Rafael Arriaga Bosque,
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the Minister of Defense and "godfather" of the Guatemalan terror network conspired to
overthrow Mendez Montenegro.

They hatched a plan for kidnapping Guatemala's

Roman Catholic Archbishop Mario Caseriego and blaming it on the Rebel Armed
Forces (FAR). The Archbishop was a well known conservative and vociferous critic of
the guerrillas. He blessed U.S. donated police cars and armored personnel carriers with
holy water at ceremonies in the capital. In an interview he unabashedly admitted, "I
love military life. I. love it when it is based upon discipline such as I believe is the case
·~

in our army and the American army."37 The military conspirators felt that the abduction
of such a man would naturally be blamed on the guerrillas. They hoped it would
provoke massive anti-government demonstrations. They could then seize power to
restore order. Of the three, Colonel Arana had the strongest presidential ambitions.
After taking control of the government the three colonels planned to arrange for the
release of the Archbishop following a period of sham negotiations with his "leftist
captors" from which they would emerge as even greater heroes for delivering the
archbishop to safety.38
Their plan backfired mainly because of poor execution and the unwillingness of
the archbishop to go along with this bizarre scheme, this auto-secuestro or
self-kidnapping. The abductors picked up the archbishop within 100 yards of the
heavily guarded National Palace in the presence of scores of heavily armed troops and
police. Guatemalan journalists working for El Imparcial and La Hora immediately
suspected military collusion .39

Rumors of security force involvement led to anti-military, not anti-government,
demonstrations as the plotters had hoped. By March 20, the second day of the crisis, a
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U.S. Embassy telegram to the State Department decided "the kidnapping of the
archbishop is part of a military/rightist plot to overthrow the government. Kidnapping
of the archbishop seems to have been carried out by members of the armed forces to
promote public demonstrations. "40
In a comedy of errors a Guatemalan civilian, a postal clerk, spotted the
archbishop in the company of the paramilitary kidnappers. The civilian followed them
in his car to a safe house in Villa Candes where the bishop was held. The postal clerk

-~

called the National Police to report the kidnappe rs whereabouts. Within minutes of his
call the bishop and his entourage suddenly left the townhouse confirming to the clerk
that the police were in on the deal.

He phoned the newspapers minutes before he

himself was arrested by the police "for spreading malicious rumors detrimental to the
security of the state. 41 Tue CIA meanwhile got wind of this story and through their own
confidential police and military contacts , quickly confirmed the military's involvement.
Their scheme unco vered , the conspirators searched desperately for scapegoats.
On the same day that the archbishop was released unharmed , the National Police

arrested two MANO BLANCO operatives involved in the kidnapping , Raul Estuardo
Lorenzana and Ines Mufio Padilla . While in transit to a courthouse , the patrol car
holding the two men stopped and the arresting officers abandoned it. A few seconds
later another car pulled up alongside the patrol car and fired approximately 200 machine
gun bullets into it, shredding the two hand-cuffed prisoners .42

If the plotters hoped this act would exonerate them, they were mistaken . The
whole sordid incident generated widespread public outrage against the security forces , a
rare occurrence in Guatemala in the 1960s. Seizing upon this propitious turn of events,
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President Mendez Montenegro reasserted himself and demanded the resignation of all
three conspirators. 43
The military surprisingly acquiesced.

Several semor officers, including the

retired yet influential Colonel Peralta, felt that military discipline and control had
collapsed badly amid the "wild west" tactics of the past year. While Colonel Arana
remained extremely popular among his own crack counter-insurgency troops,
significant sectors . of the officer corps -- the more moderate technocratic and
~

administrative branch -- regarded him as a dangerous opportunist. The government in
the end brought no charges against the three men such was the institutional power of
the military in protecting its own. Instead the conspirators were quietly given foreign
assignments. The government sent Defense Minister Bosque to Miami, Florida, to
become Counsel General, National Police Chief Avila to Spain as Military Attache, and
"The Butcher of Zacapa" (his own men called him the "Tiger of Zacapa"}, Colonel
Arana, to Nicaragua as ambassador, where Dictator Anastasio Somoza feted him as a
hero. 44
Briefly the right-wing terror abated. In late August, however, on a tip from an
informant, the government captured FAR leader Camilo Sanchez. The rebels demanded
his release and began a series of savage reprisals against government officials which
culminated in the August 28, 1968, assassination of U.S. Ambassador John Gordon
Mein, the first American ambassador ever to be killed in service in history. The rebels
apparently meant to kidnap and exchange Mein for Sanchez, but the ambassador ran
from the gunmen after they forced his car off the road . They shot and killed him.45

149

The government declared a state of siege. What little control President Mendez
Montenegro had managed to reimpose over his military and right wing terrorists due to
the archbishop fiasco, ended. The resurgent security forces unleashed a new series of
attacks occasionally matched by FAR atrocities. A Tet-like atmosphere descended over
Guatemala City particularly around the U.S. embassy compound. Machine gunned,
bombed, its ambassador slain, its military mission slaughtered, the facility took on
wartime siege mentality strongly reminiscent of Saigon during the horrific attacks of
January and February 1968, when Viet Cong sappers penetrated the compound and
nearly killed Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker. Cables from the State Department warned
all embassy personnel to take the strictest security precautions when traveling to and
from the embassy. Washington ordered a doubling of the Marine guard contingent.
Guatemalan armored cars ringed all access roads. 46
In Washington 1968 proved a turning point in the Cold War. Johnson virtually

admitted defeat in Vietnam with his decision not to run again.

The policy of

containment that had shaped U.S. foreign policy from Truman, Kennan, Acheson,
Dulles and Kennedy seemed at least temporarily bankrupt. The United States' global
economic dominance, the engine of its military and political power, also appeared to be
slipping. But while a reappraisal of Washington's relationship with the Soviets and the
world might be taking place in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the hard line in Latin
America only intensified. It was one thing to admit failure eight thousand miles away in
Asia; it was quite another to countenance defeat in one's own backyard. U.S . fairly
direct intervention in Guatemala on two occasions in 1954 and 1966 predated by two
years similar Soviet interventions within its own sphere of influence in Hungary in 1956
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and Czechoslovakia in 1968. While Washington might write off Vietnam as an exotic
military adventure gone awry, it regarded communist subversion in Guatemala as an
almost internal domestic revolt the same way Khrushchev and Brezhnev viewed their
respective Warsaw Pact rebellions . In siege warfare, dissension inside the fort in often
more threatening than the larger battle on the ramparts .

The New York Twies called Mein's murder a "foul cowardly act."47 Missing in
its coverage

was any mention of Mein's complicity in the relatively enormous U.S .

military build-up of Guatemalan security forces during his tenure or of Mein's
enthusiastic support for the "paramilitary solution" in Guatemala. One of the reasons
Washington assigned the 52 year old Mein to Guatemala in 1966 was because of his
counter-insurgency experience in Greece during the late 1940s when he was the
political officer at the U.S. embassy in Athens. 48 (John Peurifoy, the U.S. ambassador
during the 1954 coup, had held a similar position in Greece.)
In 1978, ten years after the assassination, a MANO BLANCO operative, Jorge

Zimeri Saffie alleged to the New York Times that right-wing Guatemalan military
officers participated in the murder of Mein. Their influence badly diminished by the
archbishop kidnapping farce, they hoped to regain the upperhand by committing this
outrage which would automatically be blamed on the left. Counter-insurgency doctrine
listed staged atrocities as "an often very effective technique for discrediting opposition
forces ." Guatemalan paramilitary units were famous for bombing government buildings
as a prelude to vicious political crackdowns.

Michele Firk, a French socialist who

reportedly rented the car used to assassinate Mein, "committed suicide" before the
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police could bring her to court. She shot hersel.£ which even the CIA report on the
incident noted "was an uncharacteristic method of suicide for a woman. "49
No conclusive proof has ever surfaced of military or right-wing involvement in
the assassination of Mein. Zimeri, arrested in Miami for illegal arms sales, when the
New York Times interviewed him, may have simply concocted the story to escape
prosecution or extradition to Guatemala. Yet the continued Machavellian tactics of the
Guatemalan right throughput this period leave the charge open to question.
Spurred on by the assassination, the ever growing cycle of political violence
continued throughout 1968 and into 1969. President Mendez Montenegro barely hung
on as a sort of figurehead leader. The CIA chronicled the main deleterious effects of
this new Tet offensive and counter-offensive in Guatemala: "The fact that real power in
Guatemala resides with strictly violent conservative elements means that any
government -- and especially the suspect incumbent one -- flirts with political disaster in
pushing for even the most elemental progress and reform. 1150 Just as the "winning the
hearts and minds" campaigns in Vietnam, the seven year attempt at "nation building" in
Southeast Asia -- collapsed irrevocably in the January-February 1968 bloodbath, so
similar hopes of the Alliance for Progress in Guatemala died in a hail of machine gun
fire along rural trails and city back alleys in the late 1960s. The savage "scorched earth"
counter-insurgency campaign in Zacapa and Izabal destroyed overnight the decade long
efforts of Peace Corp Volunteers, Maryknoll missionaries and AID local project
workers to build peasant cooperatives and credit unions, dig wells, improve irrigation,
open schools and clinics. The chilling effect of the right-wing terror spread far beyond
the actual areas of the counter-insurgency. "Everyone was terrified," one Peace Corp
152

volunteer , James McNeill, testified. "Peasants and Indians ran from anyone connected
with the government. Two years of work went down the drain in my district. We had
the materials but the campesinos were afraid to build their own school...[for fear of the]
landowners retaliation. "51
In Guatemala City the AFL-CIO recruitment drive effectively ended when
rightists bombed their headquarters in 1967. "You would have to have a death wish to
want to become a labor ,.organizer in Guatemala in the late 1960s," AFL-CIO local
coordinator, Emiliano Zebadua,

recalled years later. 52

In 1968 AID canceled its

sponsorship of a large scholarship program at the University of San Carlos. It seemed a
wasted effort since most of the graduates were either murdered or became guerrillas. 53
John Breen, AID director in Guatemala,

concurred

with this generally

pessimistic outlook in an October 2, 1968 memorandum:
My personal view is that this country is not going to achieve political and
economic stability and democratic government is not going to survive, if
government is essentially an absent figure throughout most of the country
leaving the work of protecting lives and punishing offenders to private armies,
armed crackpots, or burgeoning military caesars making a reputation in the
countryside prior to their triumphant entry into Guatemala City. 54
What Breen chose to ignore was his own agency's Office of Public Safety
division's contribution to this process. As part of U.S. policy it effectively armed and
trained the private armies and crackpots.
From the late 1960s onward, AID increased its emphasis on the larger scale
development projects which benefited the wealthy and the Guatemalan military that had
grown into an economic powerhouse of its own. Hopes for rural development , small
business entrepreneurship

and land reform ended with the Mendez Montenegro
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Administration. For the next 19 years, from 1970 to 1989 Guatemala's presidents
would all be generals. As three successive Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Generals Matthew Ridgeway, John Gavin and Maxwell Taylor all came from the U.S .
Army paratroop elite, so the successive presidents of Guatemala all emerged from the
counter-insurgency units of the Guatemalan Army-- the "Kaibiles" or Tigers.
Ironically, Sir Robert Thompson, the counter-insurgency guru of both the
Kennedy and Nixon Administrations, warned against the development of extra legal

..

overkill which helped destroy the Alliance for Progress in Guatemala:
There is a strong temptation in dealing both with terrorists and with guerrilla
action for government forces to act outside the law, the excuses being that the
processes of law are too cumbersome, that normal safeguards in the law for the
individual are not designed for an insurgency, and that a terrorist deserves to be
treated as an outlaw anyway. Not only is this morally wrong , but, over a
period, it will create more practical difficulties for a government than it solves.
A government which does not act in accordance with the law forfeits its right to
be called a government and cannot expect its people to obey the law. 55
Thompson's argument fell on deaf ears in Guatemala. The policy of endless
militarization and polarization grinded on.
Maryknoll priest, wrote:

In 1968 Blase Bonpane , an outlawed

"Guatemala smells like South Vietnam in the early 1960s.

There are the same United States military advisors by the hundreds , the same corrupt
power structure , the same fear of communism to the point of paranoia, the same heaps
of dismembered peasants by the sides of the roads ... "56
In early 1970 the newly promoted General Francisco Arana Osario, kidnapper

of Archbishop Casariego, the "Butcher of Zacapa", returned to Guatemala in triumph to
run for the presidency. He was elected a few months later in an election noted for
"major voter discrepancies" and "massive intimidation at the polls". In an interview
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before his inaugural address he promised "to kill every last communist in Guatemala
even if I have to turn the whole country into a graveyard. "57 Arana, long a favorite of
the U.S . Military Mission, would prove as good as his word.
In the

1966-1969 paramilitary terror

campaign, the

United

States'

counter-insurgency doctrine in Guatemala reached its apogee. The entire debacle was
the logical outgrowth of the nearly decade long policy which began in the United States
School of the Americas,~the Inter American Police Academy, and Special Warfare
School at Fort Bragg in the early Kennedy years. In fact, the roots of this tragedy could
be traced back as far as the immediate post 1954 coup's counter-revolution, when at
CIA and FBI direction Castillo Armas' newly established Liberacion government
ruthlessly purged the Guatemalan left and center, murdering and imprisoning thousands
of Arbenz supporters. MANO BLANCO operatives frequently drew upon the 1955
70,000 name "black list" compiled by the CIA, FBI , and Guatemalan security agencies
for their 1966-1969 victims. Many of these Guatemalan leftists and centrists, after
fleeing their country in 1954, had returned during the relatively "moderate" reign of
Ydigoras (1958-1963) or the early days of the Mendez Montenegro government, only
to be caught up in the sudden counter-insurgency slaughter of 1966-1969. This brutal
policy of political massacre forever dashed whatever slight hope of political
reconciliation and consensus might have still existed in Guatmalan society in the early
1960s.
The horrific legacy of this Guatemalan Tet continued into the 1970s and 1980s.
To this day Guatemala remains one of the most politically polarized nations on the face
of the earth, where bullets not ballots are the principle means of discourse, where
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torture , castration and the gasoline torching of political opponnts is more the norm than
the exception. Sometimes a military laboratory can become almost too diabolicai a
kind of eternal Stalingrad where Nazis and Communists fight everyday to the last man,
such is the political climate of Guatemala, fostered by deep sociai raciai culturai and
economic divisions yet fought with hardware, doctrine, and ideology largely exported
by the United States.
Washington's attempts to try and pull back from this policy in 1968, when faced
~

with the full magnitude and logical consequences of its own actions, proved too little
and far too late.

If anything, the bitter stalemate in Vietnam steeled the Johnson

Administration's resolve to gain a clear victory over communist insurgents, not only in
Guatemala, but in various other Latin American countries during the 1960s -- no matter
what the long term costs.

While the Nixon Administration would re-examine

containment in both Europe and Asia with its policy of detente with the Soviets and its
opening to China, the policy of ruthless anti-communism continued unabated in Central
America until the 1990s.

156

CHAPTER VI FOOTNOTES

1

Office of Public Safety Monthly Report for April 1967, WNRC, OPS, Box
67, Folder: Guatemala Monthly Reports, Jan . 1966-Dec. 1968.
2

Beatrice Manz, Refugees of a Hidden War : The Aftermath of
Counter-insurgency, (new York: Univ. ofNew York Press, 1988), pp. 29-30.
3

"Counter-guerrilla Operations , Policy Planning Council," March 20, 1961,
JFKL, NST, DOD Meetings and Memoranda, Box 276, Folder: Counter-insurgency
Training and Techniques .
4

..

Figures like these are difficult to estimate but are nonetheless cited in
Timothy P. Wickham Crowley "Winners, Losers and Also-Rans: Towards a
Comparative Sociology of Latin American Guerrilla Movements" in Susan Eckstein
( editor) Power and Popular Protest in Latin America, (Berkeley Univ . of California
Press, 1988), pp. 137-8; and in Robert M. Carmack Harvest of Violence, (Norman
Univ. of Oklahoma Press , 1988), p. 113.
5

Jim Handy, Gift of the Devil: A History of Guatemala, (Boston: South End
Press, 1984), p. 162.
6

El Imparci!!l, March 1, 1966, pp. 1, 7.

7

George Black, "Central America: Crisis in the Backyard," New Left Review,
No . 135 (September-October 1982), pp . 20-2.
8

La Hora, March 10, 1967, pp. 3, 8.

9

Keith Parker to the author , Allan Nairn, "Bank of America Asked to Explain
its Support for the Guatemalan Death Squads", Multinational Monitor , March 1972, p .
14.
10

"Troop Training and Behavior," March 10, 1961, JFKL, NSF, DOD, JCS,
Vol 1, Box 276, Folder: Military Action for Latin America.
11

Fred Sherwood to the author , Allan Nairn, "To Defend Our Way of Life: An
Interview with a U.S. Businessman," in Jonathan L. Fried (ed.), Guatemala in Rebellion:
A Documentary History, (New York: Grove Press, 1983), p . 90.
12

"Counter-guerrilla Operations, Policy Planning Council," March 20, 1961,
JFKL, NST, DOD Meetings and Memoranda, Box 276, Folder: Counter-insurgency
Training and Techniques .

157

13

Albert L. Fisher, "To Beat the Guerrillas at Their Own Game," Military
Review, Vol. XIX, No. 5, (Dec. 1963), pp. 82.
14

El Imparcial, August 26, 1966, p . 14.

15

La Hora, May 7, 1966, p. 10.

16

New York Times, March 3, 1967, p. 21.

17

Gabriel Aguilera, "The Process of Terror in Guatemala," in Central America:
A Contemporary Crisis, LARU Studies, Vol. V, No. 1, September 1982, p. 13.
18

Ibid, p. 19.

19

Ibid,p. 20.

,.

20

Michael McClintock, Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare,
Counter-insurgency and Counter-Terrorism, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1992), p.
- 236.
21

Ibid, p. 205.

22

Gabriel Aguilera, "Terror and Violence as Weapons of Counter-insurgency in
Guatemala," Latin American Perspectives, Spring-Summer, 1980), p. 106.
23

Rostowto Johnson, "Appraisal ofthe Guatemalan Security Situation," May
26, 1967, LBJL, NSF, Country File, Guatemala, Box 54, Folder: Guatemala, Volz,
Memoranda and Miscellaneous.
24

El Imparcial, February 1, 1967, p. 1.

25

Hughes to Rusk, "Counter-insurgency Running Wild," Oct. 23, 1967, LBJL,
NSF, Country Files, Guatemala, Box 54, Folder : Guatemala, Vol 2, Cables, Jan.
1967-Dec . 1967.
26

William Blum, The CIA: A Forgotten Documentary History. (London: Zed
Books, 1986), pp. 144-145.
27

Ibid, p . 146.

28

Douglas Blaufarb, The Counter-insurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and
Performance, 1950 to the Present, (New York: Free Press, 19798), p. 143.
29

Susanne Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala: Rebels, Death Squads and U.S.
Power, (Boulder : Westview Press, 1991), p. 63.

158

30

Ro stow to Johnson, "Assassination of Guatemala's MAAG Commander,"
Jan. 16, 1968, LBJL, NSF, Country Files, Guatemala, Box 54, Folder: Guatemala Vol.
2, Memorandums and Miscellaneous, Jan. 1966-Nov. 1968.
31

El Tmparci!!l,Jan. 17, 1968, pp . 2, 14.

32

Time Magazine, Jan. 26, 1968, p. 23.

33

Cesar Montes to the author, Alan Howard, "With the Guerrillas in
Guatemala, New York Times Magazine, June 26, 1966, p . 25; Eduardo Galeano,
Guatemala: Pais Occupada, pp. 30, 40 ..
34

Gabriel Aguilera, "The Process of Terror in Guatemala," p. 17.

35

Breen to Assistant Secretary Oliver, "Morale of the Guatemalan Guerrillas,"
March 3, 1968, LBJL, NSF, Country Files, Guatemala, Box 54, File: Guatemala , Vol.
2, Cables, Jan 1966-Nov . 1968.
36

Eduardo Galeano, Guatemala: Paix Ocupada, p. 59.

37

Archbishop Caseriego to Pablo Richard, "Blessing the Powerful: An
Interview with Archbishop Caseriego" from Jonathan Fried et al (eds.), Guatemala in
Rebellion: A Documentary History. (New York: Grove Press, 1983), p. 221.
38

McClintock, The American Connection, Vol 2, State Terror and Popular
Resistance in Guatemala, (London: Zed Books, 1986), p. 94.
39

Ibid, p. 95; El Tmparcial,March 18, 1968, pp. 1, 12; La Hora, March 18,
1968, pp. 1, 8.
40

Mein to Oliver, "Archbishop's Abduction," March 20, 1968, LBJL, NSF,
Country File, Guatemala, Box 54, Folder: Guatemala, Vol. 2, Cables, Jan. 1966-Nov .
1968.
41

Henry Ginger, "Guatemala is a Battleground," New York Times Magazine,
June 16, 1968, p. 14.
42

Ibid, p. 16.

43

"Guatemala : Crisis of the Military," CIA Intelligence Memorandum, May,
1968, LBJL, NSF , Country Files, Guatemala, Box 54, Folder: Guatemala, Vol. 2,
Memoranda and Miscellaneous, Jan. 1968-Dec . 1968, pp . 3-5.
44

Ibid, pp . 7-8.

45

U.S. Embassy, Guatemala City to Johnson, "Death of the Ambassador ," Aug.
28, 1968, LBJL, NSF, country Files, Guatemala, Box 54, Folder: Guatemala, Vol. 2,
Cables, Jan. 1966-Nov. 1968.
159

46

"Assassination of Ambassador and Further Security Concerns ," Aug . 30,
1968, CIA Intelligence Memorandum, LBJL, NSF , Country Files, Guatemala , Box 54,
Folder: Guatemala, Vol. 2, Memoranda and Miscellaneous, Jan. 1968-Dec. 1968.
47

New York Times, August 29, 1968, pp. 1, 16.

48

Michael Klare and Cynthia Arnson , Supplying Repression : U.S . Support for
Authoritarian Regimes Abroad, (Washington , DC: Institute for Policy Studies, 1981),
p. 45.
49

McClintock, The American Connection , p. 96; New York Times, Oct . 18,
1978, p . 4.
50

"Guatemala : Cnsis of the Military," CIA Intelligence Memorandum, Ibid, p .

81.
51

McNeill to the author, Carol A Smith, "The Militarization of Civil Society in
Guatemala: Economic Reorganization as a Continuation of War ," in Latin American
Perspectives (Fall 1990),
p. 36.
52

Richard N. Adams, Crucifixion by Power: Essays on Guatemalan Social
Structure 1944-1968, (Austin : Univ. of Texas Press, 1970), p. 423.
53

Reed to Rostow , "Abolition of the AID-Supported General Studies Program
in Guatemala, Aug . 17, 1968, LBJL, NSF , Country Files, Guatemala , Folder :
Guatemala Vol. 2, Memoranda and Miscellaneous, Jan. 19968-Dec . 1968.
54

Breen to Oliver, Oct. 2, 1968, WNRC , RG 286, OPS, Box 63, Folder :
Guatemala, General, p. 1.
55

Sir Robert Thompson , Defeating Communist Insurgency, Experiences form
Malaya to Vietnam, (London : Chatto and Windus, 1966), p . 53.
56

Blase Bonpane, Washington Post , Feb. 2, 1968, p. 26.

57

Quoted from New York Times, March 8, 1971, p. 8 in Walter La Feber,
Inevitable Revolutions , (New York: W. W . Norton, 1984), p . 57.

160

"Pamper the army and despise the rest"
Septimus Severus' deathbed advice to his son and successor Caracalla.

CHAPTER VII CONCLUSION
One of the difficulties in gauging the effects of United States military assistance,
doctrine and training on the Guatemalan military and society is the lack of a control
group . If one national military or country in Latin America developed without receiving

"
U.S . military assistance, it could be studied and compared with Guatemala .
Unfortunately no such army or country existed. In the 1960s the United States funded
and trained all the militaries, police forces and nations of Central America, Latin
America and the Can'bbean. (Costa Rica had no Army but the United States trained and
funded its police force.)
Cultural biases can present a problem as well in judging U.S .-Guatemalan
military relations. Most Americans tend to view the concept of professionalizing and
modernizing a military as depoliticizing it. In fact the American tradition of civilian
control over a largely apolitical military is an historical anomaly. It also can be a racist
generalization to suppose that there is something intrinsic in the Latin American
character that lends itself to military rule. Probably the most professional and modem
army of the nineteenth century was the Prussian Army which was deeply involved in the
politics of Germany. By comparison Guatemala's twentieth century military played a
less prominent role in its government's affairs prior to the United States massive
injection of aid, equipment, training and doctrine in the Kennedy years.
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Another seductive trap in analyzing U.S.-Guatemalan relations is to ascribe
everything that occurred in Guatemala solely to outside forces. Many early revisionist
historians succumbed to this temptation. According to this scenario, the United States
commanded and Guatemala obeyed. Yet it would be an even greater miscalculation to
discount the enormous economic, political and military power the United States wielded
in the Caribbean in the early 1960s and the huge influence of its Cold War
anti-communist ideology on militaries and economic elites in the region.
~

Walter

LaFeber in his 1984 Inevitable Revolutions correctly emphasizes the clear historical
links from Teddy Roosevelt, Taft and Wilson to FDR, Eisenhower, Kennedy and
Johnson in their overall view of the Caribbean as the United States mare nostrum and
their consistent opposition to revolution in the region.
Anecdotal examples of the influence of American military indoctrination can be
powerful but are they scientific? A Guatemalan-American, Carlos Caranza, who served
in his country's military in the 1960s and trained in the United States remembered:

I don't think people here can appreciate what it's like to come from a poor
village in Guatemala and at the age of nineteen go to a place like Fort Bragg. It
was the greatest thing in my life...I don't think Americans understand how
powerful their military is, what a reputation it has as the greatest and strongest
Army in the world. Every day at Fort Bragg was like a dream to me to think
that I was training and learning from the richest, most powerful people in the
world ...The equipment, the money, the food! I don't think my whole country
had as much food as was at Fort Bragg ... Some of the people didn't like us.
They thought they were better than us but I don't think I really even noticed
it. ..At the graduation an important official from the American government came
to address us. And all the officers up on the platform in their shiny uniforms and
medals with the tanks and armored cars lined up, the band playing and
paratroopers jumping into the sky. It was like a miracle. And I thought what an
honor it is to be a part of this big fight against the people who were trying to
destroy my country, my church and my people. I was sure we would defeat
them. How could we not defeat them with the United States on our side?'
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Young Turcios Lima expressed similar sentiments before he turned to
Communism a few years later. American military indoctrination had no long term
effects on him For the average, barely literate Guatemalan conscript, however, U.S.
training must have been a heady and extremely influential experience. Those who
questioned U.S. doctrine and anti-communist ideology probably comprised a small
minority of the thousands of officers and enlisted men who went through this process.
More importantly their senior commanders -- Peralta and Arana -- and the governments

..

they served, enthusiastically subscribed to said doctrine and ideology.
Guatemala was a racist authoritarian society for nearly four centuries before the
United States intervened in its affairs significantly in the late nineteenth century.
Post-revisionist historians, such as Stephen G. Rabe, Jim Handy and James Dunkerley,
have explored the cultural and historical roots of Guatemala's social inequities. Jim
Handy convincingly argues that three centuries of Spanish rule in Guatemala proved
much more crucial in shaping Guatemalan society than the last hundred years or so of
U.S . domination. Yet Guatemalans make a credible argument that they had begun to
ascend from their own dark and troubled past during the "ten years of spring,"
1944-1954 before anti-communist paranoia in the form of the Dulles State Department
and the CIA crushed their small experiment in democracy. While the United States in
the 1960s invested, loaned, and donated enormous sums of money to Guatemala, it did
so in ways which best served United States economic interests and favored traditionally
U.S. allied elites. Castro undoubtedly posed a real threat to Washington policy-makers
in the early 1960s -- not so much Castro, the military leader, as Castro the example. A
good deal of America's economic affluence remained tied to America's favorable
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balance of trade with Latin America -- cheap and vital imports combined with expensive
manufactured exports . In 1960, 20% of all U.S. trade was with Latin America and 25%
of all U.S. investments overseas were concentrated there.

But the Kennedy

Administration's obsession with counter-insurgency warfare as a solution to the
problems of poverty and underdevelopment

mGuatemala

proved contradictory, self

defeating, and ultimately tragic.
Both the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations displayed a palpable sense
contempt for Guatemala in their decision, based upon the pretext of a relatively small
internal rebellion, to turn the whole country into a counter-insurgency laboratory. In
1963 General Maxwell Taylor stated in a Congressional Hearing on U.S. involvement in
South Vietnam:
Here we have an ongoing laboratory where we see subversive insurgency, the
Ho Chi Minh doctrine being applied in all its forms. This has been a challenge
not only for the armed forces but for several of the agencies of government, as
many of them are involved in one way or another in Vietnam On the military
side, however, we have recognized the importance of the area as a laboratory .
We have teams out there looking at the equipment requirements of this kind of
guerrilla warfare. We have rotated senior officers through there, spending
several weeks just to talk to people and get the feeling of the operation so even
though not regularly assigned to Vietnam, they are carrying their experience
back to their own organizations in other countries. 2
One of those "other countries" was Guatemala where a disproportionately
amount of freshly assigned embassy and military personnel had Vietnam experience. In
a September 25, 1968 speech to the Eighth Conference of American Armies in Rio de
Janeiro, former Vietnam Commander General William Westmoreland stated:
I am pleased to accept this invitation because as military men, I believe that we,
perhaps more than any other profession in the public service, recognize the
immediate threat to the countries and people we serve that is posed by the sort
of thing which is taking place today in Southeast Asia. We know that South
Vietnam is a communist laboratory. We know that if aggression under the guise
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of "national liberation" succeeds there , it is ready to be marketed in our own
Hemisphere .3
But Guatemala was clearly more of an American than a Communist laboratory.
One way to establish proprietorship of a laboratory is to determine who owns the
property and the equipment. In 1960 U.S. and other Western investors owned nearly
40% of the arable land of Guatemala. (The U.S . allied Guatemalan oligarchy owned
another 40%.) By the mid-1960s the United States had donated over $20 million worth
of sophisticated military equipment to Guatemala -- jet bombers , helicopters , armored
personnel carriers , artillery, communication equipment , night vision scopes , machine
guns, mortars, sensory devices , and thousands of brand new M-16s . The Guatemalan
rebels on the other hand possessed about 300 M-1 and M-14 rifles. If Guatemala was
Castro's laboratory , it was severely underfunded , under-equipped and understaffed .
The proportional ratio of permanent U.S . military advisors to the Guatemalan Army in
the 1960s was the highest in the Western Hemisphere (see table) .

TABLEXVill

4

U.S. Military Advisors to National Armed Forces
1964-1968
1/2034
1/1760
1/1250
1/1470
1/2010
1/300

Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Ecuador
Guatemala

But this only encompassed permanently stationed advisors within the Embassy's
MAAG staff Hundreds of additional American advisors (MTTs) were flown in during
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crisis periods such as the 1966-7 counter-insurgency war, bringing the ratio up to an
almost incredible 1 to 9.
The United States initially regarded its Guatemalan laboratory an enormous
success, a clear cut victory compared to the murky, unsettling results in its Vietnamese
lab. U.S . led Guatemala security forces crushed most of the rural insurgency while
allied paramilitary forces decimated the urban left.

But this "triumph" proved

transitory . Turcios Lima and Yon Sosa, the communist guerrilla leaders who had
ironically been trained by the U.S., never really established a broad Indian or ladino
peasant base in Izabal and Zacapa. By the mid-1970s their successors (Yon Sosa was
killed in 1970 by Mexican Police while crossing the border) put together a truly popular
based insurgency among the Indians of El Quiche which the Guatemalan military,
despite tens of thousands of atrocities and twenty years of fighting, have thoroughly
failed to eradicate.

Turcios Lima and Yon Sosa fielded about 500 guerrillas in the

mid-1960s ; the EGP currently maintains 6,000. Indeed the violent counter-terror of
1966-1969 planted the seeds for this new more virulent form of guerrilla revolution.
The application of U.S. counter-insurgency doctrine radicalized the Indians,
traditionally the most isolated and apathetic group in Guatemalan society.
The United States so lavished the Guatemalan military with equipment, training,
advisors, education, money . and technology it virtually assured their becoming the
dominant and most cohesive group in Guatemalan society. The corporate nature of the
Guatemalan military; its insularism, emphasis on personalism, nepotism and graduate
class loyalties contributed to this process , but without U.S. military assistance and
political backing, it is difficult to imagine the military running Guatemalan society as it
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has from 1962 to the present as a virtual garrison state. In no other Central American
nation has the military held such prolonged endemic and undisputed sway. On two
separate occasions in April 1962 and May 1966 the United States exerted its
considerable diplomatic pressure to assure Guatemalan military's dominance of the
civilian government. In March 1963 the United States conspired with senior Guatemala
officers to overthrow an elected government and install an illegal military one, which it
recognized eighteen days 1'iter.
Did the United States have any credible policy options to simply militarizing
Guatemala? All the steps fundamental to meaningful change for Guatemalan society -redistribution of land from the criollos to the Indians, nationalization of Guatemala's
natural resources, guaranteeing of full democratic participation for all political parties
(including socialists), subsistence farming as opposed to vast two crop agricultural
exports, developing a Guatemalan industrial-manufacturing base instead of relying
solely on imports from the West, the United States diametrically opposed, some on the
grounds of economic self-interest, others due to even deeper ideological beliefs on the
sanctity of property , investments and free market superiority over any collectivist
solution.

In order to bring real freedom and more equitable living standards to

Guatemala, the United States purported Alliance for Progress goals, Washington would
have had to let Guatemala go and become a sort of Caribbean Switzerland. But the
Kennedy Administration believed in holding onto every square inch of the "Free World"
in its zero sum game approach to the Cold War and was more than prepared to fight for
Guatemala.

I. F. Stone explained the political delusions of the Kennedy

Administration's main doctrine better than most:
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In reading the military literature on guerrilla warfare now so fashionable in the
Pentagon, one feels that these writers are like men watching a dance from
outside through heavy plate glass windows. They see the motions but they can't
hear the music. They put the mechanical gestures down on paper with pedantic
fidelity. But what rarely comes through to them are the injured racial feelings,
the misery, the rankling slights, the hatred, the devotion, the inspiration and the
desperation. So they do not really understand what leads men to abandon wife,
children, home, career, friends and to take to the bush and live gun in hand like a
hunted animal; to challenge overwhelming military odds rather than acquiesce
any longer in humiliation, injustice, or poverty ... 5

Between 100,000 to 140,000 Guatemalan civilians would die from political
violence from 1960 to 1~94, due in no small part to this myopic tunnel vision of
counter-insurgency. 6
The United States' intervention in Guatemala in the 1960s closely mirrored its
policy in Vietnam of the same time period and fit in neatly with the larger context of
U.S . actions during this stage of the Cold War. As in Vietnam, the United States found
itself on the wrong side of nationalism in Guatemala, resented by large segments of the
Guatemalan people as a colonial overlord, not the liberal modernizer or concerned
political mentor of American rhetoric. In order to prop up an unpopular government ,
Washington sent enormous amounts of economic and technical aid, military advisors
and state of the art weaponry. Civic action, Peace Corps, and charitable programs built
"model projects" and strategic hamlets. U.S . advisers at training facilities molded the
local army and security forces.

American officials launched a concerted effort at

"nation building" and "winning hearts and minds." But by 1965, with the advent of the
new Johnson and Mann Doctrines , much of the energy and idealism had dissipated from
the Alliance for Progress, from the spirit of Punta del Este . Obsessed with events in
Southeast Asia, fiscally constrained by the growing cost of the war there and the Great
Society at home, Johnson lost interest in Latin America as a vast social experiment .
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Whereas Kennedy, at least, started out with a dual

program of reform and

counter-insurgency, Johnson by the mid-sixties in both Vietnam and Guatemala
concentrated solely on the latter, indeed on outright conventional war. Kennedy felt the
U.S. should kill virulent communists, retain the ability to tear gas and club unruly
leftists, yet also strive to prevent Third World peoples, like the Vietnamese and the
Guatemalans, from becoming communists in the first place through social improvements
and western style econom,icprosperity. Saddled with the abject failure of the Kennedy
Doctrine to achieve any substantial results in these areas, Johnson simply unleashed the
vast killing machine of the modern American military to cut down all real and potential
enemies in both nations.. Claymores, helicopter gunships, and airborne units, replaced
Green Beret advisers and esoteric theories of the stages of economic growth . To
paraphrase General Sheridan for the Johnson Administration, the only good Third
World Communist was a dead Third World Communist. Yet in all fairness to Johnson,
his policies were only the logical result of his predecessor's miscalculations and willful
blindness to the realities of the Third World.
The Kennedy and Johnson White Houses made some undeniable efforts to
institute improvements and local development projects in Guatemala, but the bulk of
their foreign policy emphasis always rested with the elites and the security forces. The
United States never really trusted a democratically elected liberal politician -- be it
Jacobo Arbenz in the 1950s or Mendez Montenegro in the 1960s to govern Guatemala.
A 1962 State Department telegram entitled: "Guatemala: Guidelines for Policy and
Operations" clearly stated the U.S. political objectives.
1. The prevention of the ascension to power of Communists in Guatemala.
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2. The continuance if possible within the :framework of objective no. 1 of a legally
established constitutional government. 7
By the very nature of its command structure and its intrinsic legitimization of
violence , the military profession was not a good training ground for the techniques and
processes of negotiation, consensus building and bargaining so necessary for effective
democratic political leadership. Nonetheless obsessed with objective number one, the
Kennedy and Johnson Administrations bet on an Army and not an Alliance for Progress
in Guatemala.

170

CHAPTER VII FOOTNOTES
1

Carlos Caranza to the author, January 10, 1995.

2

cited in Michael Klare War Without End, (New York: Alfred Knopf: 1977), p.
49 from Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, Hearing on
Department of Defense Appropriations for 1964, Part 1, February 13, pp. 483-84 .
3

cited in Thomas and Marjorie Melville, Guatemala -- Another Vietnam?,
(London: Penguin Books, 1971), p. 288 .
4

Andre Ronquie, The Military and the State in Latin America, (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1987), p. 133.
5

I. F. Stone, In Time of Torment , (New York: Random House, 1968), pp.

173-4.
6

"Abandoning the Victims ," The UN Advisory Services Program in Guatemala ,
Feb . 1990, p . 6.
7

Guatemala Guidelines for Policy and Operations," Nov . 30, 1962, JFKL, NSF ,
Country Files, Guatemala, Box 101, Folder 4, Guatemala, Genera~ July 1962-Dec.
1962.

171

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Archival Sources:
Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, National Security Files, Country Files, Guatemala
1963-1969.
John F. Kennedy Library , National Security Files, Country Files, Guatemala 1961-1963.
John F. Kennedy Library, Presidential Office Files, Country Files, Guatemala
1961-1963.
"
John F. Kennedy Library , Department of Defense Files and Regional Security Files ,
Latin America 1961-1963.
John F. Kennedy Library, Alliance for Progress Files, 1961-1963 .
National Archives , Office of Public Safety, Country Files, Guatemala 1957-1974.
Office of Public Safety Records 1957 - 1974. National Archives, Washington, DC.

Government Publications :
Department of State Bulletins . 1954 -1969 .
Foreign Relations of the United States : The American Republics, 1944-1964.
Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1968, 1983.
Johnson , Kenneth F. The Guatemalan Presidential Election of March 6, 1966:
An Analysis . Washington, DC : GPO , 1968.
The Speeches of John F. Kennedy, Presidential Campaign of 1960. Washington ,
DC : GPO , 1961.
The Speeches of John F. Kennedy : The White House Years . Washington, DC:
GPO , 1964.
U.S . AID "Office of Public Safety Termination Phase-Out Report." Washington , DC:
GPO, 1975.

172

Articles :

"Abandoning the Victims." The UN Advisory Services Program in Guatemala.
Feb., 1990.
Adams, Richard N. "The Guatemalan Military." Studies in Comparative International
Development. Vol 4. No . 5. (March 1968), pp. 97-120.
Aguilera Peralta , Gabriel. "The Militarization of the Guatemalan State" from Fried,
Jonathan , ed., Guatemala in Rebellion: A Documentary History. New York:
Grove Press , 1983.
_________
""Terror and Violence as Weapons of Counter-insurgency in
Guatemala." Latin American Perspectives . (Spring-Summer 1980), pp. 103-125.
"The Process of Terror in Guatemala" in Central America: A
--------Contemporary Crisis LARU Studies. vol. V, No. 1. (September 1982), pp. 3-21.
Ahmad, Eqbal. "The Theory and Fallacies of Counterinsurgency." The Nation.
Aug. 2, 1971, pp. 70-85.
Angel Albizurez, Miguel. "The Oligarachy and the Kennedy Administration in
Guatemala." Latin American Perspectives . Vol. 49. (Spring and Summer 1972),
pp. 61-77 .
Black, George . "Central America: Crisis in the Backyard ." New Left Review. No. 135
(Sept . - Oct. 1982), pp. 20-42.
Castano , Camila. "Avec les Guerrilles de Guatemala." Partisans. No. 38. (July-Sept.
1967), pp. 128-153.
Collazo-Davila, Vincente. "The Guatemalan Insurrection" from O'Neill, Bard E.,
ed. Insurgency in the Modem World . Boulder : Westview Press, 1980.
de Coro , Alejandro. "Los commissionados militares en Guatemala, 1963-1966."
Estudios Centroamericanas. Vol. 17, No. 7. (Spring 1972), pp. 43-59 .
Crain, David A "Guatemala Revolutionaries and Havana's Ideological Offensive
of1966-1968." Joumalofinter-American Studies. Vol. 17. No . 2.
(Spring 1975), pp. 183-197.
Duncan, Donald. "The Whole Damned Thing is a Lie." Ramparts Vol. 9, No. 6
(Sept. 1969), pp. 38-52 .

173

.•

Fisher, Albert L. "To Beat the Guerrillas at Their Own Game ." Military Review.
Vol. XIX , No . 5. (Dec. 1963), pp. 73-91.
Francis, Michael J. "Military Aid to Latin America in the U.S. Congress ." Journal of
Inter-American Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 3 (July 1964), pp. 389-404.
Gilly, Adolfo . "The Guerrilla Movement in Guatemala ." Monthly Review . Vol. 17,
No. 1. (Dec. 1965), pp. 21-49.
Hildebrand, John R "Latin American Economic Development , Land Reform and U.S.
Aid with Special Reference to Guatemala." Journal of Inter-American Studies 4
(July 1962), pp. 354-368 .

..

Howard , Alan . "With the Guerrillas in Guatemala." New York Times Magazine .
June 26, 1966., pp. 8-9, 16, 18, 20, 33, 35.
"Human Rights Development in Guatemala ." Human Rights Watch World Report.
1993.
"Human Rights in Guatemala." National Academy of Sciences on Human Rights : 1992
Report of a Delegation.
Jenkins, Brian and Sereseres , Cesar D. "U.S. Military Assistance and the Guatemalan
Armed Forces." Armed Forces and Society. Vol . 3, No. 4. (Aug . 1977),
pp . 575-594 .
"Little Hope: Human Rights in Guatemala January 1984 to January 1985."
An Americans Watch Report. Feb., 1985.
Menchu , Rigubenta. "In Guatemala We Indians Have No Childhood" from Fried ,
Jonathan , ed. Guatemala in Rebellion : A Documentary History . New York:
Grove Press , 1983.
Montes , Cesar. "Una ruptura logica y necesaria" , Punto Final. Vol. 3, No . 23 .
(April 23, 1968), pp. 37-53.
Nairn , Allan. "Bank of America Asked to Explain Its Support for the Guatemala
Death Squads ." Multinational Monitor. (March 1972 ), pp . 12-19 .
-----

"To Defend Our Way of Life: An Interview with a
U.S . Businessman" from Fried, Jonathan L., ed. Guatemala in Rebellion:
A Documentary History . New York: Grove Press , 1983.
--

Payeras , Mario. "Guatemalan Army and U.S. Policy . Monthly Review . yol. 37,
no . 10. (March 1987), pp. 14-20.
174

Perlmutter, Amos. "The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army." Comparative
Politics. Vol. 1, No. 3 (April 1969)
Pye, Lucien, W. "Roots of Insurgency and Commencements of Rebellions in Eckstein,
Henry. Internal War: Problems and Approaches. New York: Face Press, 1964.
Rabe, Stephen G. "Clues Didn't Check Out: Commentary on the CIA and
Castillo Armas." Journal ofDiplomatic History. Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 67-95.
________
"Controlling Revolutions: Latin America the Alliance
for Progress and Cold War Anti-Communism" from Paterson, Thomas G.,
ed. Kennedy's Quest for Victory : American Foreign Policy 1961-1963.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.
Rogers, Robert and Yates, Ted. "The Undeclared War in Guatemala." Saturday
Evening Post. June 18, 1966, pp. 30-33.
Saxe-Fernandez, John. "The Central American Defense Council and Pax Americana,"
from Horowitz, Irving Louis, ed. Latin American Radicalism New York:
Random House, 1969, pp. 68-93.
Smith, Carol A "The Militarization of Civil Society in Guatemala: Economic
Reorganization as a Continuation ofWar." Latin American Perspectives .
(Fall 1990), pp. 8-41.
Streeter, Stephen M. "Reform or Revolution: The Alliance for Progress in Guatemala"
(a paper presented at the Southwestern Social Science Association, March 17-20,
1993 at New Orleans, Louisiana).
Torres- Rivas, Edelberto. 11Guatemala: Crisis and Political Violence." Latin America
1970: NACLA Report on the Americas. Vol. 2, XIV, No. 1. (Jan.-Feb. 1970),
pp. 51-63.
"Seven Keys to Understanding Central America" from
Wiarda, Howard J., ed. Rift and Revolution: The Central America Imbroglia.
Washington, DC: American Enterprise for Public Policy Research, 1984.
Walker, William 0. III. "Mixing the Sweet with the Sour: Kennedy, Johnson, and Latin
America" from Kunz, Diane B., ed. The Diplomacy of the Crucial Decade:
American Foreign Relations During the 1960s. New York: Columbia University
Press, 1994.
Weaver, Jerry L. "The Political Style of the Guatemalan Military Elite." Studies in
Comparative Political Development. Vol. V. (1969-1970), pp. 47-71..

175

______
"The Military Elite and Political Control in Guatemala, 1963-1966 ."
Social Science Quarterly. Vol. 50, No. 1. (June 1969), pp. 127-135.
Wickham-Crowley, Timothy P. "Winners, Losers and Also-Rans: Towards a
Comparative Sociology of Latin American Guerrilla Movements" from Eckstein,
Susan, ed. Power and Popular Protest in Latin America. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1988.
Yates, Lawrence . "The United States and Rural Insurgency in Guatemala 1960-1970:
An Inter-American 'Success Story?"' from Woodward, Ralph Lee Jr. Central
America : Historical Perspectives on the Contemporary Crisis. New York:
Greenwood Press, 1988.
Yurrita, Alfonso . "The Crisis of the Established Order in Guatemala" from Goodman,
Louis W., ed. The Military and Democracy in Central America. Lexington :
Lexington Books, 1990.

Books and Dissertations:
Adams, Richard. Guatemala: Crucifixion by Power. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press,
1973.
Alba , Victor. Alliance Without Allies: The Mythology of Progress in Latin America .
New York: Praeger, 1965.
Arevalo, Juan Jose. The Shark and the Sardines. New York: Lyle Stuart Co., 1963.
Barber, Willard F. and Ronning, C. Neale. Internal Security and Military Power:
Counterinsurgency and Civic Action in Latin America. Columbus: Ohio State
University Press, 1966.
Berry, Tom Dollars and Dictators : A Guide to Central America . New York: Grove
Press, 1983 .
Berry, Tom and Preusch, Deb. The Central American Fact Book. New York: Grove
Press, 1986.
Black, George . Garrison Guatemala. New York: Monthly Review Press , 1985.
Blaufarb, Douglas . The Counter-insurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance, 1950
to the Present. New York: Free Press, 1978.
Blum, William The CIA : A Forgotten Documentary History . London : Zed Books ,
1986.

176

Bonpane, Blase. Guerrillas of Peace. Boston: South End Press, 1985.
Burbeck, Roger and Flynn, Patricia. Agribusiness in the Americas. New York:
Monthly Review Press, 1980.
Carmack, Robert M. Haivest of Violence. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press,
1988.
Chilcote, Ronald H., ed. Radical Thought in Latin America. Boulder: Westview
Press, 1991.
Cook, Blanche. Declassified Eisenhower. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1981.
de Coro , Alejandro. Guatemala : la volencia. Mexico City: Nuestro Times, 1968.
Davis, Shelton and Hudsen , Julie. Witness to Political Violence in Central America.
Boston: Oxfam America, 1982.
Dunkerly , James. Power in the Isthmus: A Political History of Central America.
London: Verso, 1988.
Eisenhower, Dwight D. Waging Peace. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965.
Etchison , Don L. The United States and Militarism in Central America. New York:
Praeger, 1975.
Eulerman, Kenneth M. and Herring , George C., eds. The Central American Crisis:
Sources of Conflict and the Failure of U.S. Policy. Wilmington, DE : Scholarly
Resources Inc., 1988.
Fitzsimons , Louise. The Kennedy Doctrine . New York: Random House, 1972.
Fried, Jonathan L., Ed. Guatemala in Rebellion: A Documentary History. New York:
Grove Press, 1985.
Galeano , Eduardo. Guatemala: Pais Ocupado. Mexico City: Nuestro Tiemeo, 1969.
Gleijses, Piero. Guatemala: Perspectives of a Regime's Transformation . Bonn:
Friedrich Ebert Stiftuns, 1981.
Gott, Richard . Guerrilla Movements in Latin America. London: Thomas Nelson, 1970.
Handy, Jim. Gift of the Devil: A History of Guatemala. Boston : South End Press,
1984.

177

Hanson, Simon G. Five Years of the Alliance for Progress : An Appraisal.
Washington: Inter-American Affairs Press, 1967.
Harnecker, Marta. Pueblos en Armas Managna. Nueva Nicaragua, 1983.
Immerman, Richard H. The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention.
Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982.
Jonas, Susanne. The Battle for Guatemala: Rebels, Death Squads and U.S . Power. San
Francisco: Westview Press, 1991.
Jonas, Susanne and McCaughan, Ed. Guatemala, Tyranny on Trial: Testimony of the
Permanent People's Tribunal. San Francisco: Synthesis Publications, 1985 .

..

Jonas, Susanne and Tobis , David, eds. Guatemala. New York: NACL , 1974.
Klare, Michael T. and Arnson , Cynthia. Supplying Repression: U.S. Support for
Authoritarian Regimes Abroad . Washington, DC: Institute for Policy Studies,
1981.
Kunz, Diane B., ed. The Diplomacy of the Crucial Decade: American Foreign
Relations During the 1960s. New York: Columbia University Press , 1994.
LaFeber , Walter . Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America . New
York: W . W. Norton and Company , 1984.
Landau, Saul The Guerrilla Wars of Central America: Nicaragua, El Salvador, and
Guatemala. New York: St. Martins Press , 1993.
Larteguy , Jean. Los Guerrilleros. Mexico City: Raoul Solar, 1970.
Lieuwen , Edwin . Arms and Politics in Latin America . New York: Praeger , 1961.
------

Generals vs. Presidents : N eo-Militarism in Latin America. New York:
Praeger, 1965.

Lowentha~ Abraham F. and Fitch , Samuel J. Armies and Politics in Latin America.
New York: Holmes and Meier , 1986.
Manz , Beatrice. Refugees of a Hidden War : The Aftermath of Counter-insurgency .
New York: University ofNew York Press, 1988.
Martinez Polquez, Severo. La Patric del Criollo . San Jose , Costa Rica : Editorial
Universitania Centroamericana, 1979.

178

McClintock, Michael. The American Connection, State Terror and Popular Resistance
in Guatemala. London: Zed Books , 1985.
Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism 1940-1990. New York: Pantheon Books, 1992.
McNeil, Frank. War and Peace in Central America . New York: Charles Scribner,
1988.
Melville, Thomas and Melville, Marjorie. Guatemala : The Politics of Land Ownership.
New York: The Free Press, 1971.
-

Guatemala-Another Vietnam? Harmondsworth:
Penquin Books, 1Q7l.

--------

Minofl: Bruce. Pragmatic illusions: The Presidential Politics of John F. Kennedy . New
York: David McKay, 1976.
Paterson, Thomas G., ed. Kennedy's Quest for Victory : American Foreign Policy
1961-1963. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989, pp . 70-85.
Phillips, David Atlee. The Night Watch . London: Robert Hale, 1978.
Prados , John. The Presidents' Secret Wars : CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations Since
World War Two. New York: William and Morrow , 1986.
Rabe, Stephen G. Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of
Anti-Communism Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press , 1988.
Revel, Jean-Francois. How Democracies Perish. Garden City, NY : Doubleday, 1984.
Rouquie , Alain. The Military and the State in Latin America . Berkeley : University of
California Press, 1987.
Schlesinger, Stephen and Kinzer, Stephen. Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the
American Coup in Guatemala. Garden City, NY: Anchor Press, 1983.
Sereseres , Cesar D. "Military Development and the U.S. Military Assistance Program
for Latin America: The Case of Guatemala ." Ph.D. dissertation, University of
California, Riverside, 1971.
Sloan, John W. "The Electoral Garn in Guatemala ." Ph.D dissertation , University of
Texas at Austin, 1970. Department of Political Science.
Steel, Ronald. Pax Americana. New York: Viking Press , 1967.
179

Stone, I.F. In a Time ofTorment.

New York: Random House, 1968.

Streeter, Stephen M. "Managing the Counter-Revolution: The United States and
Guatemala, 1954-1961." Phd dissertation . University of Connecticut, Storrs,
1994.
Thompson, Sir Robert. Defeating Communist Insurgency, Experiences from Malaya to
Vietnam London : Chetto and Windus, 1966.
Toriello Garrido, Guillermo . Guatemala, Mas de 20 anos de traicion . Caracas:
Editorial Altereo de Caracas, 1980.
Walton , Richard J. Cold War and Counterrevolution: The Foreign Policy of John F.
Kennedy. New Y ot;.k:Viking Press , 1972.
Wright, Thomas C. Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution . New York:
Praeger, 1991.
Wythe, George. The United States and Inter-American Relations: A Contemporary
Appraisal. Gainesville: University of Florida Press , 1965.
Ydigoras Fuentes, Miguel. My War with Communism Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prentice Hall, 1963.

Newspapers:
Chicago Daily News. December 1966.
El Imparcial. 1960-1969 .
La Hora . 1960-1969 .
Miami Herald. 1966.
New York Times. 1960-1969 .
Prensa Libre. 1960-1969.
Washington Post. 1964-1969 .

180

